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And while the pythons of sickness swallow the children
And the buffaloes of poverty knock the people down
And ignorance stands there like an elephant,
The war leaders are tightly locked in bloody feuds
Eating each others liver
OKOT p'BITEK
Song of Lawino, 1966
To state that Africa has had its share of bad politicians and bad
men would be banal if critics [do] not simplify so many of the
continent's problems down to a consideration of parochial,
power-hungry personalities, and go so far as to declare that
the tendencies towards authoritarianism and one-party
systems can be explained by the supposed fact that personal
love for power has been the prime motive of politicians.
IRVING MARKOWITZ
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This is a critical evaluation of the politics of Uganda and Kenya from 1960
to 1990. It reviews the political developments of the two countries from a
statistic perspective and focuses mainly on the personal power relations
among the leading politicians. The aim is to account for the dynamics of
factional politics and its effects on political change and state stability. The
concept of political clientelism is used to provide the theoretical
framework. The study sees factionalism as a process, with clientelism and
spoils politics as products, and suggests that although factional politics
inevitably leads to spoils politics and instability if left uncontrolled, it can
also be utilised into clientelism under certain conditions and this can
provide the basis of state stability. This proposition is then used to account
for the different political experiences of Uganda and Kenya since
independence. It argues that in Kenya Kenyatta's ability to control factional
politics and manage personal power relations among the leading
politicians led to the establishment of clientelism as a system of rule,
which in turn ensured a measure of stability. By contrast, it suggests that
Obote's inability to control competition among his ministers only led to
the intensification of factional struggles and the forging of temporary and
conspiratorial alliances and consequently to instability.
The thesis is not a field research project, but a reflection on the
literature on the politics of the two countries in an attempt to reinterpret
their political experiences a new way. It is loosely divided into three parts.
Chapters 1-3 is a general introductory section of the topic and the concept
of clientelism. Chapters 4-7 is a more systematic review of politics in the
two countries between 1960 and 1970, and focuses primarily on the
dynamics and effects of factional politics on state stability. Chapters 7-10
discusses the successor regimes and their response to the legacies of the
1960-70 decade. The prospects of clientelism and stability in the two
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction: Theme and Approach
The Origins of the Idea for the Thesis
The origins of this study can be traced to one of my undergraduate courses
on African development at Hampshire College, Amherst, Massachusetts,
between 1986-1990. My main interests were in political change and the
causes of state instability in Africa after independence. Professor Frank
Holmquist and I had endless arguments about what issues and themes
needed to be emphasised in the study of African political history and
development since independence. I was critical about the near-neglect of
personal power struggles, and the emphasis on 'social forces', class
conflict, neo-colonialism and imperialism.
I was of the view that proper recognition and emphasis should be
given to the pursuit of power and the personal power relations among
the leading politicians. Factional struggles, the outcome of this pursuit of
power, I felt, have been the main driving force behind political change,
and causes of state instability, and that for a proper understanding of
politics in Africa, it is important to examine the effects of such struggles
on political development. And this is what I intend to do here. In a sense,
therefore, this thesis is the amplification of the argument I inconclusively
tried to put forward to Professor Holmquist in 1986-90.
In this I have been encouraged by a number of books and parts of
books I have since read about political stability in Africa, notably Jackson
and Rosberg (1982), Chabal (1992), Sandbrook (1985), Allen et al (1989) and
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Fatton's (1987) article on clientelism in Senegal. In their work on politics
in Africa, Jackson and Rosberg (1982) have pointed out the importance of
personal considerations on the part of leaders in political development,
and have suggested that the formal institutions such as political parties,
and state bureaucracies, have been turned to serve, in the first instance,
the needs of the leadership rather than the other way round (pp. ix-x).
They have observed that politics in Africa 'are most often a personal or
factional struggle to control the national government or to influence it',
and that this struggle is only 'restrained by private and tacit agreements,
prudential concerns, and personal ties and dependencies rather than by
public rules and institutions.' (Jackson and Rosberg 1982:1). This is a view I
entirely agree with, and will show, by examining the experiences of
Uganda and Kenya, the effects of such political behaviour on state stability.
The thesis is not based on fieldwork, but is a discussion on the
political developments of Uganda and Kenya since independence, in an
attempt to account for their political experiences. It focuses more on
personal power relations among the leading politicians, and less on other
factors. It is an attempt to explain the apparent paradox in the political
experiences of the two countries after independence. The political paradox
I mean here is the almost opposite political experiences of the two
countries after independence. At least according to the theories of
development and modernisation (discussed in detail later), the differences
in their political experiences after independence cannot be satisfactorily
explained in terms of their historical evolution into statehood, or on the
basis of their prospects at independence.
Uganda and Kenya became independent at about the same time,
respectively in October 1962 and December 1963. During the colonial
period, they were both 'developed' or 'guided' by the same colonial power,
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Britain. Uganda was styled a Protectorate and Kenya a Colony, but these
appellations had no practical effect on their developments because of the
uniform formulation and application of colonial policies. (See for
example Hailey 1950; Morgan 1980). In Kenya, European settlers had an
early influence and some control on the political development even after
1945 (Throup 1978; Berman 1990; Berman and Lonsdale 1992). But that
control technically ended with independence in 1963, when political
power was assumed by Africans. It was in the power of the new leaders to
redirect the political course of Kenya and they were therefore ultimately
responsible for what happened after 1963. On this basis, while the impact
of European settlement and the social, economic and political effects
(such as the Mau Mau struggles of 1950-1960), should not be ignored, it can
be said that history and political development of the two did not in
themselves quite warrant the different experiences they have had after
independence. This is especially so since the development of
administrative institutions, such as the civil service and local
administration to promote 'good governance' in both countries followed a
broadly similar pattern. (Chapter 3).
But by 1980, less than twenty years after independence, their
political experiences had moved in opposite directions as far as stability
and economic progress are concerned. Kenya was then usually described as
a success case in Africa in both stability and economic progress, while
Uganda had joined the other extreme category of failed states. Its history
since independence has been a story of failures, violence and profound
instability, with frequent changes of regime. The numbers and manners of
regime changes in the two in fact illustrate their different experiences as
far as state stability is concerned. Whereas Kenya has had only one,
peaceful and constitutional change of regime since independence, in
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August 1978, Uganda has had eight: in May 1966, January 1971, April 1979,
June 1979, May 1980, December 1980, July 1985 and January 1986.
Moreover, the changes of regime in Uganda have been by means of coups
or quasi-coups since all of them, from substantial to overwhelming
degrees, involved the military.
Why have their political experiences been so different after
independence? What has propelled their developments in opposite
directions? Why has Uganda experienced long periods of instability? And
how can we account for their experiences and differences? These are the
questions I intend to answer in this thesis. To do this I will examine the
effects of factional struggles among the leading politicians and relate them
to political changes and stability from 1960 to 1990.
But before embarking on a discussion of the effects of factional
struggles, I would like to briefly spell out the deficiencies of the earlier
approaches of modernisation and development in explaining the paradox
in the development of the two countries.
The Early Approaches
During the first two decades of independence (1960-1980), research in
politics in Africa focused mainly on the supposed 'transition from
colonial dependency to independence, and from traditional tribal units to
modern states' (Markovitz 1970:1). State-building, national integration, the
transfer and operation of institutions like parliament and the
modernisation of the civil service, along with the one-party state debate,
were the main themes. (On this see Irving Markovitz's (1970)
introduction to, and the collection of, 30 articles on politics in Africa in
the 1960s). The modernisation approach saw political leaders, with the
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aid of political institutions like political parties and the civil service, as the
main agents of this transformation (Cartwright 1983:23-40). Attention
therefore focused on the capabilities of leaders and the political
institutions to affect change, and on the problems they encountered in the
process (Apter 1965:180-202; Kingsley 1963:301-317). This approach then led
to the identification of a set of 'crises' and 'challenges' facing the leaders in
their tasks. The leaders themselves and the personal relations among
them never became a subject of examination. African leaders came to
assume the image of saints toiling day and night for the betterment of
their societies.
This theme was promoted principally by American political
scientists, especially James Coleman and Leonard Binder. (For more detail,
see the collection of essays edited by James Coleman and Carl Rosberg,
Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, 1966). Nation-
building, that is, making a nation out of the several ethnic groups which
colonialism had brought together, and promoting economic development,
were seen as the main challenges (Liebenow 1980:3). Consequently much
effort has gone in understanding them on the part of the researcher, who
assumed that the leaders were likewise preoccupied in overcoming these
problems. Markovitz (1970:9) has stated that, if political leaders in Africa
were not 'wholly responsible', they were at least sufficiently 'responsive to
the wishes of their constituents more than to their [own] interests because
of the nature of their occupations and their own concerns [for the welfare
of the people]' (p. 9, emphasis retained).
In addition to failing to recognise that the pursuit of power and its
attendant benefits as ends has been a part of the problem, these
approaches have had the additional effect of drawing attention away from
the struggles among the political leaders for the leadership itself and the
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effects of this on stability. In particular, they have not helped in explaining
why, if African leaders have been committed to the betterment of their
countries, the countries have not developed in the ways and to the extent
predicted. This is the major failure of these early approaches.
Some Recent Approaches
Fortunately these earlier approaches are no longer popular, and new
approaches which promise to be better tools for the analysis of political
development in Africa have been adopted. For example, Jackson and
Rosberg's (1982) theme of 'personal rulership' has, in more recent years,
been taken up by scholars in the effort to reassess Africa's political
experiences since independence (Chabal 1992; Bayart 1993; Joseph 1991).
The importance of power relations in political change in Africa has been
recognised and stressed (Bayart 1993). Also a number of scholars have
proposed that attention should focus more on factional politics since it
is this, and not other development issues, that has most profoundly
affected political development in Africa since independence, and
consequently has been the primary cause of political changes and
instability that most African countries have experienced since (Keller
1991:50-3; Ndegwa 1992:42-5).
Chabal (1992:217-232) and Bayart (1993:10-179) have suggested that
the pursuit of 'hegemony' in the state, or the quest to dominate the
apparatus of the state for the purpose of retaining power has been the
primary preoccupation of leaders in Africa, and that this is the root cause
of instability in the continent. Joseph (1987) also sees this as the root cause
of Nigeria's political problems since independence. The notable difference
in Joseph's approach is that while Chabal talks of the pursuit of power
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and domination as ends, Joseph sees the quest for domination primarily
as means of economic gain. Politicians, in his view, struggle for the
control of the state in order to use its resources for themselves and their
relatives. But the two writers agree on the fact that the primary aim of
leaders is the domination of the state rather than its development, a view
which I share. The effect of this pursuit is that, in Bayart's words, 'at the
bottom, the [political] actors organise themselves in factions to gain or
conserve power at the various echelons of the social pyramid, and this
competition is the very stuff of political life' (Bayart 1993:211).
The Aims of the Thesis
This thesis is an attempt to make a modest contribution to the debate. As
noted in the abstract, the work in not a piece of field research,
but a critical reflection on the literature on the politics of Uganda and
Kenya. It is an effort to reinterpret their experiences in a new way. In
their recent work entitled Political Stability and Development: A
Comparative Analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (1990), Dirk Berg-
Schlosser and Rainer Siegler have seen stability as resulting from 'the
interactions of political and economic factors' (pp. 1-2). Their basic thesis is
that a stable political climate promotes economic development and this in
turn helps promote political stability.
The present work takes a different view in in that it sees personal
power relations as more important in accounting for stability and
instability. Its aims are, firstly, to demonstrate the importance of
factionalism in African politics, and secondly to suggest a method of
approach in analysing the effects of factionalism on political change. For
as I will show in a moment, the major changes in Africa since
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independence have not been the transformations predicted by the
modernisation theories, but rather the change from relative stability in
the early 1960s to profound instability from the mid-1960s, then back to
comparative stability in the 1970s and 1980s.
The thesis attempts to show that the problems and crises thus
identified (including the lack of integration and economic development)
have been mere symptoms of factional struggles among the leaders, rather
than the causes in themselves. The thesis argues that this has been
primarily due to the effects of factional politics, and then proceeds to
demonstrate how this actually happened by following, on a comparative
basis, the experiences of Uganda and Kenya up to the early 1990s.
Factional Politics and Its Effects
The thesis uses the concepts of factional politics, clientelism and spoils
politics to analyse and explain the political change in the two countries.
So far writers in the 'recent approaches' category mentioned above have
not gone beyond recognising the effects of factional struggles on political
change and suggesting that it can be used to account for political changes
in Africa. There has thus been no systematic examination of the effects
factional politics on the political development of any African country. The
few exceptions with substantial focus on factionalism as a central force in
change are Bienen (1974) on Kenya; Clapham (1976) on Sierra Leone and
Liberia; Mutibwa (1992) on Uganda, and the first part of Allen et al (1987)
on Benin. The first three authors describe the effects of factionalism on
stability without discussing the role of clientelism, while Allen sees it as a
'system' of political recruitment and a basis for party or personal support.
However, most of the scholarly articles that have discussed factional
8
politics have done so without relating it in a systematic way to political
changes or stability.
Recently, however, Fatton (1987) has made an interesting
observation about the role of clientelism in politics in Senegal, and noted
that although clientelism undermines the authority of the state, at the
same time, (because clientelism is particularly entrenched in that
country), it has become the major means of political change and may even
be necessary for democratisation. The effects of clientelism in the political
process has also been noted O'Brien (1971; 1975), in both pre- and post-
independence Senegal; and Allen (1989) in pre-and post-independence
Benin. ^v^wv6tv4(l1$P) sees clientelism in Nigeria in terms of its influence in
class formation. In this study I will however limit myself to a discussion
of the effects of clientelism on state stability, not its potentials for
democratisation. The concept of political clientelism, its relation to
political change, and its application to research as used in this work, will
be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
Part of the reason for the failure to use the concept of clientelism for
a systematic analysis of political change lies in the failure to distinguish
the political, as opposed to the anthropological, importance of clientelism,
as well as the failure to clearly distinguish between the two forms of
clientelism.
The effect of the borrowing of anthropological works has been the
use of local patron-client ties as models for clientelism at the national
level. Lemarchand (1972:68-89), for example, discusses the effects of
factional struggles in general theory as it might affect change in countries
in tropical Africa as a whole. In the main, factional politics has been seen
as an (illegitimate) end, not as a dynamic process generating political
change, and referred to mainly in order to demonstrate the political
9
backwardness and failure of democracy in a given country (Medard 1982).
I will argue, after Bayart (1993), that 'factional struggle does not belong to
the periphery of political systems [but] is the mainspring of [political]
evolution and vibrates at the heart of the State of which it is the true
dynamic' (p. 211).
The focus is primarily on the two outcomes of factional politics,
namely, clientelism and spoils politics. As Jackson and Rosberg (1982:1)
have observed, the consequences of factional politics 'have usually been
increased political instability and occasionally the deterioration of the
game of politics into "fights" among personal and factional contenders for
power'. The term "spoils politics" as used throughout the thesis refers to
what Jackson and Rosberg describe as "fights" in the above quotation.
(Also see Chapter 2).
The argument is that at independence the two countries - like
other African countries previously under colonial rule - were left with
institutions that did not command the allegiance or respect of the leaders
and the people alike, or capable of defending themselves against abuse.
Institutional norms were therefore easily disregarded in the pursuit of
personal interests. The leaders were therefore able, to use Clapham's
words, 'to pursue their interests independently of, or in opposition to, any
conception of public interest, and .... are prepared to subvert or circumvent
the ... procedures of the state in order to do so' (Clapham 1982:1). Such
open misuse of the 'procedures of the the state in the pursuit of personal
objectives has in fact been the norm rather than the exception in many
countries in Africa. In Uganda, for example, Obote unilaterally abrogated
the 1962 independence constitution and replaced it with a new and more
authoritarian one in 1966 just in order to prolong his term in office. (See
Chapters 4 and 5).
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This quest for domination and other related factors inevitably led to
factional politics. For as the leader seeks to establish his hegemony over
the state and other politicians, the other politicians, equally propelled by
the desire to dominate, resist and fight back in order to secure dominant
positions for themselves. This struggle is what Bayart (1993) quoted above
has rightly identified as the real stuff of political life. The other related
factors included the demands of local communities (especially community
leaders who were patrons of sorts). These local leaders too had to look for
persons higher up to assist them in realising their demands.
The thesis will argue that it was the different capabilities of the
political leaders in controlling or regulating the factional struggles among
their ministers (Chapters 4-7), that led to the different political experiences
of the two countries. Whereas in Kenya factional politics was successfully
regulated into clientelism by Kenyatta and led to a measure of stability, in
Uganda Obote was unable to control factionalism, which instead resulted
in spoils politics as the leaders struggled amongst themselves without
anyone being able to call them to order. A more structured discussion of
the relationship between factionalism and clientelism as exemplified in
Kenya, and the relationship between factionalism and spoils as
exemplified by Uganda, is provided in Chapters 4 and 5 below. The concept
of spoils politics and its relation to clientelism is explained more fully in
Chapter 2.
Structure of the Thesis
The study views political changes from an internal perspective, focusing
on actual politics 'on the ground'. The political process itself is seen as the
springboard and cause of change. I focus on the post-colonial period,
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with particular emphasis on the first decade of independence (1960-1970).
Besides this introductory first chapter, there are 9 other chapters.
Chapter 2 discusses the concept of clientelism, its relation with factional
politics and its use as an analytical concept, and explains how it is used in
this thesis. The aim here is to more clearly distinguish 'clientelism' as
used in this study from its other uses in the literature on interpersonal
power relationships, particularly in the fields of anthropology and
sociology. I also discuss both clientelism and spoils politics as variables
of factional politics and their relation with each other, showing how and
why they come about, their effects on the political process, but in
particularly their relationships to stability and instability.
In Chapter 3,1 discuss the political background to the emergency of
factional politics in Uganda and Kenya. I argue that the colonial
institution failed to evolve into indigenous institutions in the two
countries, with the result that at independence a situation of weak
institutions resulted. I first discuss the relationships between weak
institutions and factionalism. The pre-colonial forms of political
organisation among the peoples in the two countries are reviewed. The
chapter shows how and why the attempt by the colonial administrations
to promote and adapt the pre-colonial systems as their agents or partners
in administration through the system of indirect rule failed in most areas
in Uganda and Kenya. The chapter shows how the development of the
colonial administration, especially the manner and pace in which
African representatives were introduced in the legislative councils, did
not make the Africans identify themselves with the institutions of
government as their own. It also reviews the period after the Second
World War, and shows how the first political parties, for historical
reasons, were beset by factionalism.
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Chapter 4 is an account of the actual development of factionalism
among the political parties at independence, and the effects this had on
the positions of the ruling political parties, the Uganda Peoples Congress
(UPC) and the Kenya African National Union (KANU), and their leaders,
Milton Obote and Jomo Kenyatta. It explains the weaknesses of UPC and
KANU in terms of the promotion of factional interests by the various
politicians, and shows why and how clientelism and spoils politics
resulted, respectively in Kenya an Uganda.
Chapter 5 explains the different ways in which Obote and Kenyatta
responded to the factional struggles around them. It argues that the
starting point of the differences between the developments of the two
countries was the different manners in which central authority was
asserted over the various factions. It shows how in Kenya factional
politics was 'stabilised' by the establishment of mutually beneficial
relationship, that is, clientelism, between Kenyatta and the political
notables1 , thus leading to state stability; and how in Uganda clientelism
failed to evolve due to Obote's inability to regulate factional struggles;
and how this resulted in spoils politics. Chapter 6 discusses the the
management of clientelism in Kenya, showing and describing particularly
its establishment as the major system of rule under Kenyatta, to the
extent that it undermined both KANU and parliament.
In Chapter 7,1 contrast Kenyatta's position with that of Obote. The
chapter shows how Obote's inability to forge reliable clientelist alliances
led him to resort to and subsequently rely on authoritarian and violent
means to remain in power, thus exacerbating factional struggles, and how
1 The term 'notables' as used throughout this thesis refers to the men who rose as the
main political leaders among, and came to be seen as the representatives of,the various
ethnic groups in the two countries at or around the time of independence. All were men who
either in government or in opposition played major roles in national politics and who were
looked upon as district, and in cases, regional, leaders. A notable example was Oginga
Odinga.
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spoils politics and the stability of the state resulted from this. Considered
here are the factors leading to the promulgation of the centralised
Republican Constitution of 1967 and how its imposition paved the way for
Idi Amin's coup in 1971. I argue that Obote's failure to control factional
struggles among the political notables, and his instability to establish a
more reliable clientelistic relationship between himself and any
important section of the Uganda society, forced him into a single-minded
alliance with the military as the only means of retaining power, and this
was what proved to be his political undoing.
In Chapters 8 and 9 I discuss the problems and prospects that faced
the successor leaders, Idi Amin and Daniel arap Moi. I argue that despite
the changes of leadership and regime in Uganda and Kenya respectively in
1971 and 1978, the legacies of the past continued to influence politics in the
two countries. Clientelism continued in Kenya and spoils politics in
Uganda because, in both cases, the legacies of the past remained strong and
dominated the two leaders. I argue that the stability that Kenya enjoyed
after (and despite) Kenyatta's death in August 1978 was due to the
clientelist system, and Moi's own success as leader at this stage was also
due to the fact that he inherited a well-established clientelist machine.
With regard to Amin I argue that although he succeeded more than Obote
did in establishing (by fear) clientelistic links between his regime and
important elements both in the armed forces and the rest of the
population, these links were neither durable nor reliable. The result was
even more instability because not only was the semblance of order and
normality maintained by force or fear of it, but also because Amin became
the only person that politically mattered in the country and his
government was a sort of a one-man government, with no roots in the
society. The chapter further argues that Amin's policies left him open to
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the dangers of spoils politics just as Obote's authoritarianism had prior to
his fall in 1971.
Chapter 10 is on the future prospects for clientelism in Uganda and
Kenya. It considers the impact of Obote's second overthrow and the rise of
the National Resistance Movement (NRM) of Yoweri Museveni to power
in Uganda in 1986. It argues that, due to the very different system of
political organisation under the NRM, such as Resistance Councils (RCs)
and the periodic elections, spoils politics is likely to come to an end in
Uganda, and how it would probably be replaced by clientelism, and
possibly institutionalised politics. It suggests the conditions under which
any of the three could occur. The chapter argues that in view of Moi's style
of personal intervention in everyday politics after 1982 and his
appointment of marginal politicians in powerful positions, the future of
clientelism in Kenya is in doubt; and that it is more likely to be replaced by
spoils politics. The chapter suggests that, therefore, Kenya is more likely
than Uganda to experience instability in the years ahead.
The Conclusion argues for more focus on factional politics and the
use of the concept of clientelism in analysing political development in
Africa. It suggests that the dynamics of factional politics should be
examined in greater detail, focusing primarily on its main variables,
clientelism and spoils politics, as they provide better prospects for a more
realistic assessment of political developments in Africa.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Concepts of Clientelism and their Applications
In this chapter I will discuss the concept of clientelism, its relations with
factional politics and spoils politics, the way it affects state stability, and its
use as an analytical concept. There are six loose subdivisions. The first
section discusses, in theory, political institutions. The aim here is to
explain how weak institutions create the conditions that may lead to the
emergence of clientelism in a state. The second section discusses the
various definitions of the concept of clientelism, the ways it has been
used in the social sciences, and the controversies over its use in political
science research. In particular I distinguish between the ways the concept
is used by anthropologists in 'anthropological' situations, and by political
scientists in 'political' situations. The remaining sections describe what
constitutes political clientelism, the relationship between clientelism and
spoils politics, the ways in which clientelism may be described as a system
of rule as well as its role in, and relationships with, the formal state
institutions like the civil service and parliament, and party. The ways as a
n analytical concept is used in this thesis are also explained.
Political Institutions and Stability
For our purpose here, we may define a political and administrative
institution after Sandbrook (1985) and Huntington (1968). Sandbrook states
that a political institution is a 'valued and stable procedural rule or
16
organisational device for resolving disputes, selecting leaders and making
authoritative decisions' (Sandbrook 1985:xi). And according to Huntington
(1968), a given society is said to have a political institution if, over a
period of time, it has evolved a 'universally' accepted system of resolving
disputes among the members as well as for running public affairs. For an
institutionalised reference point to govern all conduct and resolve public
and private conflict will be present in such a society. In kingdoms such an
institution is symbolised by the king. But in a community without a king,
or where there are several kings forcibly or otherwise encompassed in one
community, no such institution is automatically present, and one must be
created and established if order is to be ensured. Viable institutions
therefore ensue good order and consequently stability. At all times there
are thus arrangements for 'maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting
authoritative leaders and thus promoting community among two or more
social forces'. (Huntington 1968: 8-9).
The basic characteristic of a well-established political institution is
that it must be self-regulating, and capable of preserving itself. It must
command the respect and support of the members, or be capable of
compelling anyone to do so. Its preservation depends on no force other
than that they embody. The British political system, at least in its capacity
to cope and response, may be cited as an example of well-established and
effective political institution. For all public political functions are at least
generally seen to be conducted according to the established and accepted
rules. Any individual or sectarian attack on it would fail. Well established
political institutions thus ensure stability by controlling personal excesses
and irregular or improper behaviour by those in power.1 A viable political
' Richard Nixon's resignation in fear of imminent impeachment in 1976 over the
Watergate scandal is a good example of a well-established political institution defending
itself against individual abuse. On the weakness of Zaire's political institution, see Young
(1994).
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institution responds effectively when control itself failed. In many African
states, institutions have a weak capacity for both control and response,
such as in Zaire. The political systems of the new states of Africa and
elsewhere in the developing world, by contrast, generally lacked the self-
regulating faculties of an effective institution. In the absence or weakness
of a common reference point, individual and factional interests are
pursued independently and the states are often used to satisfy the interests
of individuals rather than the other way round. Prime ministers or
presidents may abrogate the constitutions with impunity. As already noted
in Chapter 1, the ease with which Obote abrogated the independence
constitution of 1962 in 1966 indicates the absence of a viable political
institution of Uganda at that time.
How the African states became independent with weak institutions
will be discussed later in this chapter. At present I am concerned with
establishing how institutional weakness may lead to clientelism. Where
the government institutions are weak (for instance when court orders are
not obeyed and cannot be enforced, when the police will not enforce
order), the government of the day 'cannot always claim effective
monopoly of force throughout its territorial jurisdiction' (Jackson and
Rosberg 1982:2-3. See also Migdal (1988) for various descriptions of weak
states). The capacity of rival groups to challenge the legally or otherwise
instituted government, or that of members of the government itself to
manipulate the institution for their personal ends, is increased. As the
various groups lay claim to the state for communal or even sectarian or
personal fulfilment, factional struggles occur amongst them. Out of this
struggle, clientelism and or spoils politics emerge, depending on the
manner and capacity of the government respond to factional struggles.
(Chapters 5 and 6).
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A state with weak institutions is also vulnerable to military coups
if, as it usually happens, the officer corps of the army gets involved in
politics and becomes either (as a group) the rivals of the established
government or the ally of a rival group. It is also common, depending on
the history and nature of the army and its interaction with the civilian
leadership, for the officer corps itself to become factionalised. Omara-
Otunnu's (1987) study of the Uganda Army for example shows that prior to
Amin's coup in 1971 , serious factionalism had occurred in the Army from
1974. (See Omara-Otunnu 1987, Chapter 7, also Decalo 1976). Also in the
1960s, because the factionalism in the civilian administration of Balewa
had already spread to the military, the Nigerian army disintegrated into
various factions after the coups of January and June 1966. The leading
officers were unable to agree amongst themselves on who should become
head of state. The conflict threatened the survival of Nigeria itself, and had
to be resolved by a civil war. (See for example, Obasanjo 1980; Joseph 1991).
In any case, in a situation of weak institutions, the government
usually uses or seeks to use the military for political support. Coups are in
the first instance manifestations of weak institutions even if their
occurrence further weakens and perpetuates the weakness of these
institutions. The prevalence of military coups d'etat and dictatorships in
Africa since independence indicates the basic weaknesses of political
institutions in the new states. (Decalo 1976:27-37). The instability and
economic decay in the new states of Africa and other third world countries
have for this reason been seen as a result of the institutional weakness in
these countries. (Jackson and Rosberg 1982:1-23; Sandbrook 1985:112-129;
Huntington 1968:192-8).
The main reason for this is that in in states with weak institutions,
both the end and the means of politics become personal as there is no
19
significantly established institution to regulate political behaviour or to
worry about in the pursuit of personal interests.
Definition of Clientelism
As noted in the introduction, clientelism is a variety of interpersonal
power relationships collectively known as patron-client relationships.
Patron-client relations are usually defined as relationships of exchange
between two or more peoples of unequal status, wealth or power, but in
which everyone somehow benefits, at least in theory. The better off person
is the patron and the less well off is the client. On this see the collection of
essays in Eisenstadt and Lemarchand (1981); Schmidt et al (1977); Gellner
and Waterbury (1977) and Clapham (1982).
From the above works, three distinct concepts of clientelism may be
identified. One is the personal link between the actors, which may best be
described as patron-client relationships. This is found at both
anthropological (that is, isolated or local) and political (national) levels.
Technically the relations in both settings may be alike, but the uses to
which they are put are quite different. The second concept, arising from
the first, is the uses to which the links are put by the actors. It is this which
primarily distinguishes political clientelism from anthropological patron-
client relations, and may more properly be called clientelism. The third is
the political system, or systems, that evolve out of the persistent use of
clientelism, and may be distinguished by describing it as political
clientelism. In this work I am concerned with the second and third
concepts, though the terms "clientelism" and "political clientelism" are
loosely and somewhat interchangeably used in the text.
Lande (1977:xx) defines the patron-client relation as 'an alliance
20
between two persons of unequal status, power or resources', in which each
person 'finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior to
himself'. The most basic of the patron-client relations is the dyadic
relationship. This involves only two persons, the patron and the client, or
a patron and a group of clients. A particular feature of a dyadic relation is
that it usually involves no competition either among patrons for clients or
clients for patrons; and if competition occurs it remains between the
persons involved and does not affect the wider society. (Foster 1977:15-27;
Lande 1977:xii-xxxvii). But the definitions offered in the literature on the
subject are largely a recycling of the same definition. Compare Lande's
definition above with that offered by Lemarchand (1972:69), which sees it
as 'more or less personal relationship between actors ... or set of actors,
commanding unequal wealth, status or influence'. He also adds that the
relationship has to be 'based on conditional localities and involving
mutually beneficial transactions'. (See also Kaufman (1974); Scott
(1977:92); Weingrod (1968:376), and Powell (1970:412). The critical
difference here is Lemarchand's expansion to encompass a set of actors'.
For as I will show in a moment, it is the dynamics of this expanded form
of the patron-client relationship (its management and effects) that
constitute clientelism.
The (dyadic) patron-client relations can more accurately be described
as clientages rather than clientelism. In a clientage the clients are usually
tied to the patron by conditions beyond their control (poverty, religion,
custom, for example) and are powerless or otherwise unable to end their
bondage. The relationship is therefore not exactly voluntary as the concept
of patron-client relations seems to suggest, even if the client does not
complain about it, since some relations are forced on them by harsh
environmental conditions. Derrick's (1975) account of modern slavery in
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and around the Sahara Desert in north-west Africa shows a relationship
where the slaves (clients) are theoretically free to leave their masters
(patrons), but they choose not to since they have nowhere else to go. They
have come to accept it as their fates to be permanently in a state of slavery,
(pp. 25-30. See also Newsweek, 4 May, 1992, pp. 9-15).
The difference between clientage and clientelism is that whereas
clientage denotes a fairly fixed relationship in an equally fixed
environment, clientelism denotes a relationship that is more fluid and in
an equally fluid environment. It is the dynamics of the (clientelistic)
patron-client relations that constitute and perpetuate the phenomenon of
clientelism, particularly when the critical resource of the bargain is
political power.
Anthropological and Political Science Uses
Anthropologists and political scientists use the concept of clientelism in
different ways. Also, despite the indiscriminate application of the term in
"anthropological situations", what anthropologists are concerned with can
more accurately be described as clientage rather than clientelism, because
clientelism more appropriately denotes a process over time. But, as already
noted, since anthropologists have used the concept for a longer period of
time, political scientists often utilise these earlier works even when the
situations to be analysed are quite different. For this reason it is important
to first distinguish the anthropological uses of the term and put them
aside. It must be emphasised here that unlike anthropologists who are
concerned with localised relationships between patrons and clients, I am
concerned with a system dominated by clientelism at the regional and
national levels. The basic differences between clientelism as used by
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anthropologists and that used by political scientists and sociologists are
noted in the following sections. In general the anthropological use of the
term denotes a dependence relationship of the master-servant type.
'Anthropological' Clientages
In the anthropological use, patron-client ties essentially mean a dyadic
relationship. In a dyadic relationship, such as that between a master and
servant or a group of servants, there is usually no third party between the
patron and client and the relationships become static and enduring, and
even legalised, and amounts to an "ownership" of the client by the patron.
In Derrick's (1975) studies already referred to, due to the particular severity
of conditions in the Sahara, the boundary between "client" and "slave" has
eroded and the clients consider themselves as belonging to the patrons,
obligated to them for life and generations.
The less severe, and most common type of this kind of relationship
is between a ruling class (and therefore land-controllers) and peasants, in
a society dependent on subsistence agriculture, cattle-rearing or a
combination of the two. Such societies have provided the settings for
some of the major studies of clientelism: The works of Rene Lemarchand
on Rwanda are good examples. (Lemarchand 1972; 1976). Here the
relationship is based on the principle of reciprocity as each party needs the
other: the patrons need (or rather exploit) the clients to maintain a high
status and increase their wealth, and the clients need for protection.
Patron-client ties in the anthropological meaning of the term may be
grouped into four categories: feudal, patrimonial, mercantile and 'saintly'
or religious. (Scott, 1977:91-113; Lemarchand, 1972:73).
Feudalism clientage is the most typical of the four and was quite
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common in traditional African societies. In this type of clientage, the link
between patron and client rests mostly on religious and ideological
considerations, and is enforced by the ecological realities of the society,
such as the scarcity of resources. In a feudal clientage, the patrons are
usually the only party that benefits materially, since the clients pay taxes,
gifts and offer free labour in return for protection or blessing. The
relationship between the Tutsi and Hutu in pre-independence Rwanda is a
good example of feudal clientage. Here patron-client ties were
institutionalised into a system called buhake, in which the Hutu peasants
were bound to the Tutsi aristocrats for a lifetime and often for generations.
(Newbury 1988; Lemarchand 1972:72-4). Since the Tutsi aristocrats held
total monopoly on both land and animal resources, the peasant Hutu were
permanently destitute They thus had no choice but to seek protection
from hunger and starvation. In extreme cases, feudalist clientage can
quite easily degenerate into actual slavery, as in the Sahelian case already
mentioned.
In less harsh conditions, custom and culture can replace economic
needs as the basis of the feudal relationship. The bonds between the king
(the Kabaka), his chiefs and their subjects in traditional Baganda society is a
good example. Because the Baganda believed Kintu, their ancestral
Kabaka came from heaven, to be close to the Kabaka was a privilege and a
source of gratification. Moreover, as Fallers and Richards (1964:273-4) have
recorded, 'a client is praised for his deference and loyalty to the Kabaka and
his subordinate chiefs'. Both types of relationship depend on face-to-face
contact between patron and client, as is also the case, but to a lesser extent,
in patrimonial clientage, to which we now turn.
Patrimonial clientage is strictly of a political nature. It is most
commonly found between a king or emperor and local notables in the
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outlying provinces. Since kings and emperors are, by the nature of the
institution of monarchy, one-person rulers, their control of the kingdom
or empire depends on this sort of link. The king, emperor, emir, or sultan,
as the case may be, is the grand 'patron of patrons'. The powers of the emirs
over the population, and the political organisation as a whole in northern
Nigeria before and even after independence were examples of control
through patrimonial clientage (See Whitaker 1966). Ethiopian politics
under Emperor Haile Selassie can be cited as the best example of
government run through patrimonial clientelism. As Clapham's (1969)
detailed account shows, all authority emanated from the Emperor who
appointed all the principal officers from the members of his family (see
especially pp. 28-33). Marriage ties involving the king in person or his
children, and the children of the notables, may also used to strengthen
and perpetuate the clientelistic bonds (Markakis 1974:1-49). A patrimonial
ruler is also invested, often by himself, with uniqueness and mystical
qualities not found elsewhere in the kingdom or empire. These 'qualities'
(which may include deification) in time become important means of
controlling the masses.
Other forms of clientage common in traditional society include
mercantile clientage, 'saintly' clientage, and Islamic trading networks
across the Sahara. Mercantile clientage is purely commercial in purpose
and application although it could be used for political purposes. In this
kind of link, the most important person is the middleman whose primary
function is to coordinate trade between the trader and consumers. With
institutionalisation of trade and development of transport, mercantile
clientage appears to have not survived the modernisation process in
Africa. (Lemarchand 1972:74-7) But middlemen of various descriptions
(such as trade union leaders) continue to have important roles in the
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modern political process. (Sandbrook 1972:3-27). This reference to the
middlemen in mercantile clientelism may help in the appreciation of
their position later on in this study.2.
Saintly clientage is mostly found in Muslim societies in the Middle
East and North Africa. The patron's power rests on the conviction of the
clients that their salvation depends on his intercession with God on their
behalf. The patron also distributes needed resources (for example seeds or
even land) among his followers. (O'Brien 1975). The important power of
Muslim clergymen can best be appreciated in terms of this type of
clientage. A good sub-sahara African example of saintly clientelism is the
"system" of "maraboutism" in Senegal and Mauritania. In Senegal, the
marabouts, or religious leaders, had for a long time organised themselves
into sects called brotherhoods. The best known and most powerful of these
was the Mouride Brotherhood (O'Brien 1971; 1975). The Mourides
controlled land, markets and seeds, and the peasant Wolof people had to
pay taxes, gifts and offer their labour in exchange for these goods. French
colonial administrators used the marabouts to reach and administer the
rural areas, thus not only giving them additional powers over the peasants
but establishing links between them and the state.
This can be compared to appointed or recognised chiefs in British
colonies, who were vastly empowered in the implementation of the policy
of indirect rule discussed in Chapter 3. Had the appointed East African
chiefs been religious saints like the marabouts of Senegal, their influence
in political development after independence may well have been just as
great. To this day the marabouts have remained an important part of
2 Islamic trading networks, such as those which ran across the Sahara Desert and which
used to provide a life-li| for both middlemen and patrons, have declined in importance. The
total monopoly exercised by kings and their relatives at the coast has been largely broken,
since many more merchants can now provide the goods middlemen in the interior can use.
The concept of an all-powerful patron is no longer as strong as it used to be.
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clientelism in Senegal, and clientelism has become a sort of a political
system. Or at the least it has become established as the oil that lubricates
the wheels of national politics. (O'Brien 1975:59-81, 87-109: Villalon
1994:163-193).
To approach the understanding of clientelism as a political process
(that is, political clientelism) along the above lines is unhelpful. The
notion that a definition of clientelism 'in the harder sense' is a prerequisite
to an effective application of the concept as an analytical tool is
misleading. The need for such a definition arises from the limits of the
anthropological definition (the patron-client dyad) as a tool of analysis of a
wider society. Restricting the definition to the individual or 'observable'
relationships would impose the same limits on the concept. It would
mean boxing oneself into a corner unnecessarily. Other multifunctional
concepts in the social sciences, such as "conflicts", "diplomacy",
'democracy", "lobby", "authority", are not defined in the harder sense, and
yet they are widely used as analytical concepts. If for instance we are to
restrict the definition of democracy to Lincoln's famous axiom that it is a
'government of the people, by the people, for the people', and then
attempt to find such a government, we will find that it does not in fact
exist.
Political Clientelism
The variety of clientelism we are concerned with here differs significantly
in scope, aims and in the kind of goods and services exchanged, from the
traditional clientelism discussed above. The conditions which gave rise to
this form of clientelism in Uganda and Kenya will be discussed in Chapter
3.
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The main characteristic of the political clientelism is that the
cultural or economic relationships between a client and his patron of the
pre-independence period became power, that is, political, relationships.
Patrons now perceived the clients as the basis of political power since the
latter had the vote. Clients likewise see patrons not merely as providers
of their basic needs, shelter, food and protection. They now attached
themselves to patrons in the hope of participating in gaining access to the
resources controlled by the politicians through the state. Newbury
(1988:117-174) notes that in Rwanda the establishment of colonial rule
'altered the powers of the chiefs and accelerated the growth of social
stratification', and consequently the Tutsi 'nobles' who had long kept Hutu
peasants, suddenly began to compete amongst themselves for more Hutu
clients because there were now additional (political) benefits associated
with the number of a chief's clients. More resources would for example be
provided by the state for the chief to distribute.
Once economic clientelism was supplemented by power clientelism,
patrons of the old order now became the clients of other more powerful
(or higher) patrons from both within and outside the local area. Someone
aspiring to be a minister for instance would act as the patron of a notable
person, who will in turn work to ensure that the politician gets the votes
of those over whom he has influence.
Description of Clientelism
Such informal 'contracts' eventually and structurally (in successful
clientelism) extend to the president and his cabinet. This is why, as we will
see in Chapter 3, most of the leading and initially successful nationalist
politicians in Uganda (Wilberforce Nadiope, George Magezi, Felix Onana,
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Grace Ibingira) and Kenya (Kenyatta, Mbiyu Koinange, Charles Njonjo,
Oginga Odinga) were either through individual efforts or family links
patrons of sorts during the colonial period.
In 1963, Otema Alimadi, a member of the Acoli District Council in
Uganda was appointed to the United Nations (UN), and a by-election
became necessary. Obote's UPC party, anxious to prevent the election of
the opposition Democratic (DP) candidate, resorted to drastic measures to
ensure the UPC candidate won. According to Leys (1967:74), only two days
before the election, 'several central government ministers visited the
division... and announced that the Gulu-Patiko road would be taken over
by the Ministry of Works [and] a tractor began work on the road the
following day'. O'Brien (1975:177) records that in Senegal the government
usually made sure that 'preferential access to administrative favours [was]
given to those saints who were deemed to have a large body of followers'.
At one time the state reportedly spent up to £100,000 to influence the votes
controlled by one local patron (p. 177). See also Chinua Achebe's famous
short story, 'The Voter', in Girls at War (London: Heinemann, 1960)
which describes how politicians use "campaign boys" to bribe local chiefs
and elders to ensure they obtained block votes from the areas under their
control.
A systematic occurrence of incidents of this kind constitute political
clientelism, and can provide a prism through which an understanding of
the political process of a given state can be analysed since, as Kaufman
(1974:284) has noted the relationship 'constitutes in some instances the
most important basis of interest articulation and political control'. In
Benin (formerly Dahomey), for example, Allen (1989:22) found that, 'as a
means of mobilising the electorate, clientelism has few equals, especially
after 1957 when ... Dahomean [Beninois] politicians controlled the main
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source of goods, the state.'
Elections are a particularly relevant medium through which to
observe clientelism as a political process. (Barkan 1987; Allen et al 1989;
Joseph 1991). During elections the phenomenon becomes more manifest.
Whether the elections are between parties for an alternative government,
or within the party in single-party political systems, patron-client ties play
an important role in the calculations of politicians seeking elective offices.
Barkan (1987) finds widespread use of clientelist ties in all elections in
Kenya from independence to 1984. He concludes that the main function of
elections in Kenya (and other single-party states) is to enable the
government to maintain its clientelist links with the people. The elections
provide a periodic opportunity for the government to end its links with
those who do not toe the party line, and renew and reaffirm its ties with
the people. The result has been the establishment of 'a series of patron-
client networks that tie key elements of the ... peasantry, particularly small
landowners, to the Kenyan state' (p. 215)3.
The relationship between clientelism, factional politics and spoils
politics is illustrated in Figure 2.1. What links these three phenomena is
that all of them result from competition for power among leading
politicians. According to Huntington (1968:412-3), factionalism is the
phenomenon where 'politics involves a small number of people
competing with each other in a large number of weak, transitory groups.
The groupings have little durability and no structure. They are typically
the projection of individual ambitions...' Factionalism is thus a temporary
3 This is of crucial importance and we will come to it from time to time in the study. By
getting rid of those who do not toe the party line through the use of the party bureaucracy,
the civil service, legislative amendments and intimidation, KANU has kept a loyal
clientele of MPs and thus control of the state. Obedient MPs are better for the leadership
than popular ones who are seen as a threat to the party machine. This explains the
frequent assassinations of popular MPs throughout Kenya's history. KANU's survival
tactics can be summed up by Machiavelli's notion that it is better for a prince to be feared
than loved.
30
phenomenon, and confined even more to the political elites than is the
case with clientelism.
Whereas competition in clientelism is aimed both at gaining and
holding power, that in factional politics aim at gaining power only since,
in theory at least, it is possible only in a situation where power is open to
competition. Thus factional politics usually becomes manifest in
competitions for positions in political parties.
Coercion, Ethnicity and Clientelism
There is some confusion about the relationship between clientelism and
ethnicity, and their functions in factional politics. (Powell 1970:411-425;
Roth 1977:167-179; Lemarchand 1972:69-72). There is also a controversy
over whether coercion, rather than rewards, can constitute the basis of
clientelism. Ethnicity and coercion are widely regarded as a means of
political control in Africa and elsewhere in the developing countries. But
the two are not regarded as constituting clientelist politics. Powell (1970)
writes:
Patron-client ties clearly are different from other ties which might
bind parties unequal in status and proximate in time and space, but
which do not rest on the reciprocal exchange of mutually desired
goods and services - such as relationships based on coercion,
authority, manipulation and so forth, (p. 412)
If we were thinking of the nature of patron-client relationships for its own
sake, then coercion may not count as a part of clientelism because the
relation does not rest on the notion of voluntarism (or at least of consent).
But here we are concerned with the function of clientelism in
the political process and coercion must be regarded as a part of clientelism.
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The reason for this is that obedience induced through threats provides the
regime, or an individual politician, with the same kind of support as by
voluntary association based on reciprocity. This is the case both at the
higher horizontal level of the clientelist exchange among MPs and
downwards from MPs to their clients below. The Kenyan case may
illustrate this. Tamarkin (1986), after describing the method by which
Kenyatta controlled his MPs as 'the carrot and stick policy', goes on to say:
'For those who choose to ignore the carrot and prefer confrontation to
cooperation the government's stick steps in. The immunity of MPs is
rather limited and they are exposed to the government's coercive
measures' (pp.304-5). In 1975, Kenyatta threatened to 'trample underfoot'
and 'mow like grass' MPs who criticised the government after the popular
MP and government critic J.M. Kariuki was murdered4 The effect of such
measures was the demoralisation of MPs and their inducement into
submission.
Clientelism, therefore, if it is well organised and regularised, can act
as a system of rule, and play the rule of a formal political institution in
resolving conflicts and disputes in the manner described by Sandbrook
(1985) and Huntington (1968) mentioned at the beginning of this section.
The ways in which clientelism can act as an institution in the place of, or
alongside, the formal state institutions like the civil service or the ruling
political party, will be discussed in a moment. It would suffice to note here
in passing that the effective use of clientelism as a system of control and
rule in states with weak formal institutions is a widespread phenomenon,
and has been observed elsewhere. For example, Chubb (1982) found that in
Italy, the everpresent threat of instant Mafia violence usually ensured that
"The murder of J.M. Kariuki is a significant example of the measures the regime was
prepared to to take to protect itself. I will comment more on it when discussing the politics
of regime management in Kenya.
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Figure 2.1
The Relationship Between Factionalism, Clientelism and Spoils Politics
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their approved candidate always won in city or even national elections.
Walston (1988) also describes how the various Mafia groups routinely use
fear to ensure that their own members or preferred candidates got the
support of the people in local and national elections in
Italy. The support of the client, no matter how the patron obtained it, is
therefore be seen as a part of clientelism in this study.
The Analytical Application of Clientelism
The analytical value of the concept of patron-client ties to the study of
national politics is still a matter of debate among scholars Critics have
argued against it in a variety of ways. Some have argued that as a concept
clientelism excludes other social conflicts from discussion because it
focuses fixedly on a few and well ordered interpersonal relations, for
example, class or religion. (See the discussion of these criticisms by
Lemarchand 1981:7-15).
There are also contrasting views in the literature on clientelism
concerning its prevalence in the political process and its use in the study of
large-scale politics. Writers who acknowledge the importance of
clientelism in politics in the developing countries at the same time
question its value as an analytical approach. Medard (1977) for instance
writes: 'Clientelism has been found practically all over the [African]
continent in the form of patron-client relationships and political patronage
[and] is instrumental as a way of articulating the centre and the periphery'.
He further notes that '... clientelism is the foundation of any constitution
or consolidation of a political centre' (p. 165-6). But the general thrust of
his argument is against the use of clientelism as an analytical tool. 'These
(above) reasons are not sufficient, however, as [clientelism] does not cover
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a number of related but distinct elements' (p.171). One of such related
elements is what he calls neo-patrimonialism.
Waterbury (1977:330) also questions the analytical value of
clientelism on similar lines. His objection rests on two main arguments.
First, since several elements combine to constitute the patron-client
relationship (e.g: class, kinship, power), it is not possible to know which of
them is more important in the relationship. To approach the study of
politics of a given state through clientelism would be giving the concept
a prominence it does not in fact deserve. Secondly, he argues that there
ought to be a clientelist system through which to view a society. The
emergence of this 'system', according to him, is also impossible because of
the changing nature of the relationships. The importance of patrons
changes from time to time; someone who is a patron at one time may
cease to be so at another time. The 'introduction of competitive [elections
in] polities', he writes, means that a particular patron does not always
monopolise the 'scarce or desired resources', and his relations with those
who support him in a competition election cannot therefore be
described as that between a patron and clients. Clapham (1982:30) also sees
the emergence or identification of 'clientelistic political systems' as a
prerequisite to an effective use of the concept as a research tool.
Others have argued against the way the concept is applied in
research by academics 'for all seasons ... quasi-univerally to a multiplicity
of relationships in a wide diversity of social and economic formations'
(Gilsenan 1977:167). In his study of the patron-client relations between
sheiks and the peasants in a remote village in north Lebanon, Gilsenan
concludes that the concept has no analytical value. His reasons are that the
ties are themselves a result of local conditions or ideology, and confined to
the locality. They are moreover mere symptoms of the existing conditions,
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not their causes. As such, he argues, to seek to understand society through
such ties 'obstructs a deeper analysis of social structures in quite
fundamental ways' and that as a part of local ideology it 'cannot be used to
analyse itself' (p.168).
To some extent, the above argument is valid. Patron-client ties of
the dyadic type in isolated and peripheral areas which do not extend to
the national political system have no links with, and therefore little
relevance to, the politics of that country. The author describes Akkar, the
site of his study, as one of the 'underdeveloped peripheral provinces that ...
formed effectively a political and quasi-autonomous enclave' (p. 168). This
is a type of patron-client ties in which the clients are in effective fiefdom
of the patrons. Besides, while technically they constitute patron-client
relations, they do not produce clientelism because the "clients" have no
choice of or sanction against the patron. A few African examples of this
sort of relationship may be cited here. The relationship between the rulers
(sarakuna) and the ruled (talakawa) in the Hausa states of northern
Nigeria from the 16th Century up to the time of independence is similar,
because the rulers were regarded and treated as divine. (See for example
Dudley 1986; Whitaker 1970:37-121). The relationship between the Kabaka
and other lesser chiefs and their subjects in of Buganda, even for quite
sometime after independence, provides another example of "voluntary
bondage".
By their very nature, clientages are also durable and fairly crisis-
free, because they depend on limited and often fixed exchange. The
ambition of the clients extends no further than the need to please the
patron since there are no other resources beyond him.
The above arguments have been selected because they raise two
important and common issues of concern in the literature on clientelism.
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(See also Lemarchand, 1972; Scott, 1969; Gilsenan, 1977; Eisenstadt and
Roniger, 1984). First, the confusion between clientelism in the traditional
society and clientelism as a political process in modern African states is
very much in evidence. The writers quoted above clearly have in mind
the variety of clientelism found in the traditional society when it is the
modern political process they are thinking of studying. Although certain
aspects of the traditional form of clientelism have survived independence
the transformation has rendered such relationships functionally different
even if it still involves the same set of individuals or groups. Secondly,
the writers all insist on a more exacting definition of clientelism 'in the
harder sense' so as to enable the construction of a 'theory of clientelism'
(Clapham, 1982:31)5.
It is therefore premature to dismiss wholesale the relevance of
patron-client ties to political development in the developing countries, or
the analytical value of the concept in the study of national politics, on the
basis of what it means or does not mean in isolated traditional societies.
To do that, to use a common expression, would be throwing away the baby
with the bath water. The critics of its analytical value often conceive
clientelism in the anthropological sense, and try to apply it to analyse a
modern political process. Unless we clearly distinguish between the local
and isolated (anthropological) and national and systematic (political)
uses of the concept, it becomes difficult to appreciate its value as an
analytical concept and as a political process. This point needs to be borne
in mind especially since clientelism as a process is multifunctional. Also
active clientelistic politics occurs periodically when there is a need to
mobilise supporters at elections times. Moreover, even for analysis the
5 'Harder sense' refers to what may be called the technicalities of the patron-client
exchange, such a observing anirecording the flow of goods from the patron to the client, and
measuring the degree of support a given good may 'buy'cn the process.
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concept is used to describe or analyse a variety of functions, such as the
distribution of goods by the state to the peripheral regions. As a theory it is
therefore used in the discussion of concepts such as resource allocation,
class formation, state-society relations, ethnic solidarity, and, of course, the
dynamics of factional politics. (See for example Diamond 1987:578-86. For a
discussion of these uses, see Lemarchand 1981:7).
It has also been suggested earlier that for analytical purposes the
scope of clientelism needs to be broadened beyond the anthropological
micro-level definition. For the same reason, 'ethnic polities' is here treated
as a part of clientelism, or at least it is seen as complementary rather than
contradictory to clientelism. The reason for this is that ethnicity has a
potential for enhancing clientelism, just as clientelism reinforces the
ethnic bond, especially in situations where the political culture is fluid. For
example, when the Kamba leader Paul Ngei broke from KANU to form
his African People's Party (APP), the rest of the Kamba people also left
KANU en bloc and joined the new party. Ethnic groups should therefore
be considered in terms of their possible provision of pools of clients for
prominent patrons. The manner in which prominent politicians in Kenya
and Uganda used their ethnic roots as power bases will be discussed in
Chapter 3.
I will argue that for the purpose of analysis, clientelism is best
visualised as a phenomenon, with the stress firmly on its general and
collective impact rather than on the particulars and technicalities
constituting the relationship. It is the "manifest clientelism" that
influences political change. For this reason the importance of clientelism
in the political process does not depend on its having become a single
compact system covering the whole country. On the same basis I further
argue that it is a bit hasty to conclude that there is no such a thing as a
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'clientelistic system' or that such a system cannot emerge because of the
short life-span of the patron-client relations in a society characterised by
competitive elections. Consider the following situation. During an
election, patron A wins office with the support of a block vote of clients x.
But during the next election, x changes allegiance and supports another
candidate, patron B. A ceases to be a patron, but x are still clients.
Moreover, the influence of clientelism in the political process is not
diminished but actually intensified, as for instance by A trying to reclaim
his previous clients or recruit new ones.
A conscious disengagement from the anthropological definition is
needed if political science is to find the concept useful as an analytical tool.
In this thesis I will therefore consciously disengage myself from the
trappings of the anthropological definitions, and use the concept to denote
a political process. Also it needs to be spelt out here that it is the effects of
clientelism on political change that I am interested in, not its technical
aspects as an exchange mechanism.
The Advantages of the Concept of Clientelism
It will be an extravagant claim to say that the above constitutes a 'theory of
clientelism', and no such claim is made here. What I have tried is to
roughly sketch out ways in which the concept of clientelism can be used to
explain the effects of factional politics in political change. The
effectiveness of this approach will be demonstrated later throughout the
thesis when explaining the political changes in Uganda and Kenya since
independence. However, we may briefly spell out major advantages over
the early development and modernisation approaches. In the earlier
theories, politics in Africa, for example, was seen as largely responding to
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external or unfortunate developments over which the political actors had
little or to control (Chapter 1). Development, dependency and
modernisation studies6 generally saw politics in Africa as material for
testing theories rather than as a process that required the formulation of
theories more related to what actually happened. Chabal (1992) is correct
therefore in observing that these approaches were interested in 'finding
out how the evolution of the new African nations fitted the theories of
development than in understanding politics in Africa' (Chabal 1992:12).
Perhaps even more serious for the analysis of politics in Africa is the fact
that these earlier approaches drew attention away from examining what
actually happened on the ground. On this I agree with Ndegwa (1992:43)
when he says that these approaches overlooked or ignored 'important
elements and subtleties that constitute and propel politics and social
relations in African countries'.
In any case the most profound experiences of African countries
since independence have not been the transformations from traditional
to modern societies predicted by these theories. Taken as a whole the
major change has been the transformation of the states from relative
stability at independence in the early 1960s to profound instability in
general in the mid 1960s, and a persistent instability for a large number of
states thereafter. (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Decalo 1976; Sandbrook 1985).
We define stability in the broadest terms to mean that stable states are
those where central state authority remains intact, with the government
capable, by whatever means, of maintaining public order. A good
indicator of state stability in this sense would be the frequency and
manner of regime changes: whether the changes are peaceful,
6 Some examples are the following: Zolberg 1964; Apter 1964; Bienen 1967; Wallerstein
1967; Markovitz 1970; Rodney 1972; Leys 1972; Cohen and Daniels 1980; Nabudere 1980;
1981; 1992; Liebenow 1980; Tordoff 1984.
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constitutional or violent by means of coups. The capacity of regimes to
manage crises is also a good indicator. Sandbrook (1985:117) has defined
unstable those countries which 'experience two or more episodes of
political violence (revolution, rebellions, coups, insurrections) within a
decade'. Already by 1975, for example only 16 of the 44 independent states
in sub-Sahara Africa had not experienced coups or were still under civilian
administration (Decalo 1976:10-11).
Taking this as a rough guide, African countries may be divided into
three broad categories according to how they experienced stability or
instability. At one extreme are those countries which have enjoyed
relative stability. Botswana is the best example of these, followed by
Tanzania, Senegal, Zambia, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, the Gambia,
Malawi and Kenya. In the middle are those which have had a balance
between periods of stability and instability, but have remained
continuously intact and functional. Ghana, Benin and Togo are examples.
On the other extreme are those where instability has been the norm rather
than the exception; those countries which have had long periods of
ineffective or nonexistent administration and state authority. Zaire, Chad,
Somalia, Liberia and Uganda can be cited as examples.
It is also worth noting here that most of the problems identified by
the earlier theories as facing African countries were actually the result of
factionalism. The problem of nation-building, or integration, for instance,
which Liebenow (1980:3) says is 'central to our understanding the others' is
largely a product of factionalism. To take an extreme example, the
attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria between 1967-70 was a serious
challenge to the integrity of Nigeria. But Obasanjo (1980) blames the
personal ambitions for power of the Biafran leader, Colonel Ojuku, as
largely responsible for failure to resolve the crisis arising from the January
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1966 coup and the outbreak of the war. In his view Ojuku 'wanted to rule
an independent state at all costs [and] deceived the people he claimed to
love' to support him and the cause of Biafra (p. xiii). This comment,
coming from Ojuku's opponent, may be too parochial: nevertheless, it
draws attention to the pivotal role the pursuit of personal and factional
interests can play in the destiny of a country.
Somalia is another good example of how factional struggles lead to
state instability regardless of how ethnically 'integrated' the state is. The
population of Somalia is almost entirely Somali, and they speak the same
language. Yet the factional struggles among the leaders have ripped it
apart: and since there are no ethnic groups which the notables could adopt
as their causes, they resorted to the next sub-unit, the clan. Therefore,
clan, ethnic, and region alliances are not in themselves political problems
unless factional struggles make them so. (See Chapters 4 and 5 for a
discussion of how this happened in Uganda and Kenya).
The issue to consider now is how, since politics in Africa since
independence has been dominated by factional struggles, leaders have
actually managed to govern, with some states like Kenya (1965-1978)
enjoying a measure of stability.
Tnstitutionalisation of Clientelism'
All post-independence African political systems utilise clientelism, but
their fates have been remarkably different, from the stability enjoyed by
countries like Tanzania to extreme instability in countries like Somalia.
This study is concerned in part with how such different fates emerged, and
takes Uganda and Kenya as examples. In Kenya, stabilisation was
achieved, in large part, through the institutionalisation of clientelism as a
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system of rule. In Uganda, where clientelism failed, a pattern of spoils
politics developed instead, thus undermining the political system created
in the 1960s. These two processes, which are by no means uncommon
elsewhere in Africa, are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 5, 6 and 7
below.
As we have seen, clientelism is essentially an informal and private
power relationship designed for gaining and maintaining public political
power (Clapham 1982:1-34). For this purpose the leader usually undertakes
a set of reforms linking him to the various important institutions and
persons in the state in a clientelistic network (Migdal 1988). When the
patron (in this case the political leader), by using his clientelistic networks,
has gained power, strengthens the same networks to maintain his position
over a period of time, or as long as he is able to do so-When this happens
we can say, at least for the period that his power and rule are maintained by
clientelism, that clientelism has been "institutionalised" in that state and
that it is, or serving as, the institution of rule. This is because the role of
institutions as defined by Huntington (1969) and Sandbrook (1985) referred
to at the beginning of this chapter, such as resolving disputes, all come to
be performed by clientelism.
Institutionalisation of clientelism therefore refers to both the
successful strategy of establishing clientelistic networks for the purpose of
rule and the outcome of the prolonged retention of power by this means.
Therefore, even though most leaders rely on clientelism, its
institutionalisation does not happen often. In 1966, for example, when
Kenyatta sensed a threat to his position within KANU from Oginga
Odinga, he relied on his major clients (or at least those who identified
their interests under his leadership for the time being, such as Tom
Mboya), and the Provincial Administration and the party as a whole, to
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destroy Oginga Odinga in the "Little General Elections" (Gertzel 1970;
Mueller 1984).
In speaking of the institutionalisation of clientelism, however, it is
important to stress one point. This is that clientelism can be said to be
institutionalised in a given state only over a specific period of time, and
only in a tacit sense. As a private system it cannot be openly or formally
adopted as the institution of state and must therefore remain invisible.
Also not all issues will need to be resolved by resorting to the clientelist
ties. There will always be roles for the formal state institutions, especially
the civil service.
The best way to explain how clientelism can be institutionalised is to
draw an analogy with a political machine. (For an account of political
machines as systems of rule, see Powell 1969:1142-1158). A political
machine is in fact essentially a condensed form of clientelism, because it
rests on strong informal links tying together persons with common
interests and aims. Like clientelism, a political machine remans 'a non-
ideological organisation interested less in political principle than in
securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing income to those
who run it and work in it' (Powell 1969:1144). Political machines operate
well in small-scale and isolated political situations, such as in city or town
council governments.
Formal Institutions and Clientelism
A well established and maintained clientelist system encompassing the
whole state, and under the control of a powerful individual, as in Kenya
under Kenyatta (Chapter 6), can become a clientelistic machine, and hence
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an institution. Once that has happened, we can say that clientelism has
become institutionalised as a system of rule, until the time clientelism
itself disintegrates at which it will cease to be an institution or machine.
Clientelism as a system of rule cannot be discussed without
mentioning the roles of the formal state institutions like the civil service
and parliament. For even in states where politics is dominated by and
largely run through clientelism, the roles of some of the formal
institutions remain important as part of the whole administration.
This is particularly so with regard to the civil service. Indeed, the
establishment of clientelism as an effective system of rule in a state usually
strengthens and reinforces the civil service, at least in its technical capacity
to be effective. The reason for this is that it is usually through the civil
service that clientelism can be most effectively established and operated. It
is quite impractical to attempt to establish clientelism outside of, and
therefore in opposition to, the civil service. In its role as the main
watchdog of the state, the civil service can quickly undermine and render
the network obsolete. To establish a effective clientelist system, it is
therefore necessary to take over or assimilate the civil service. The service
will lose its formal 'independence' and becomes a part of the clientelist
system
As far as the civil service is concerned, the establishment of
clientelism will have two possible effects. Either civil servants ;/enter" the
clientelistic network and become patrons and clients in their own right,
such as has happened in Nigeria (Joseph 1991; Diamond 1987). In this
position they become competitors with others to gain and exercise power,
and accumulate resources. When this happens, the civil service becomes
inefficient and corrupt, since it will be caught up in political rivalries and
divisions. The likely result is spoils politics, because the leader will lose
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control. The other alternative is that the administrators become part of the
clientelist system of rule, but without themselves playing any active role as
clients or patrons in their own right. The civil service is invariably linked
directly to the President or his equivalent (as happened in Kenya under
Kenyatta). When this happens, the civil service can remain efficient since
it only performs as as the agency of the President.
In Kenya under Kenyatta, for example, the civil service, especially
the powerful Provincial Administration, was turned into the main agent
of the presidency through the appointment of loyal clients in strategic
positions like Provincial Commissioners, District Commissioners and
District Officers (Gertzel 1966; Bienen 1974. See also Chapter 6). As far as the
civil service is concerned, therefore, clientelism assimilates it in order to
be effective and the two become functionally indistinguishable from each
other.
The relationship of clientelism with political parties and
parliaments is a little different from that with the civil service. While to be
effective, clientelism will need to undermine the formal rules of the party
in power so that what the party does ostensibly as a part of its formal
functions according to the written rules becomes largely underhand
manoeuvres on behalf of the party leader. The same can be said of
parliament. Since the ruling party and parliament will always contain
members who are not the clients of the leader, it is difficult to turn them
solely into agents of the leader. They can however be used and
undermined by clientelism because the leader's allies would seek to
frustrate their opponents, who in turn may rely on the formal rules of the
party or parliament and constitute themselves into "defenders of
normality". Factional struggles therefore develop within these
organisations, even when clientelism is the system that "gets things done"
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in the state. The relationship between clientelism and party/parliament is
more that of confrontation than cooperation.
Functionally, therefore, clientelism tends to undermine both
parliament and party when it is well established. The roles of party and
parliament, but particularly that of parliament, become that of protest.
The political party and parliament do not become . agents of clientelism
in the same way that the civil service does. It was in this sense, due to the
strength of clientelism in Kenya under Kenyatta, that both KANU and the
Kenya parliament remained weak throughout Kenyatta's rule. (Leys 1975).
Spoils Politics and Clientelism
When institutionalisation of clientelism is absent, or has failed, factional
struggles will continue unchecked and deteriorate into "fights". (See
Chapter 1). This leads to increased instability and political disorder in the
state. For institutionalised clientelism functions as a system of control
against factional struggles, and can be the basis of support for a faction or
individual, as well as a basis for state stability. If factional struggles within
a state are not contained or controlled by an effective institutionalised
system of clientelism, the struggles spiral out of hand as the various
factions or individuals continue struggling for state power and state
resources. When this stage of an absence of control is reached and the state
and its resources become the object of continuous struggle and plunder,
the "phenomenon of spoils politics" ensues.
Spoils politics is therefore a situation where all the various factions
in the state freely struggle for power without actually seizing control of it
over a period of time. The competition becomes intensive and inclusive,
on the basis of "winner takes all", and leads to violence. And since control
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of the state is the object of the factional struggles it becomes considerably
weakened. Each faction acts as a law onto itself and against the other
factions. In short, spoils politics is a modern political equivalent of a
Hobbesian state of nature.
Somalia since 1991 (and before) is a good modern example of a state
'fallen victim' to spoils politics. For when the long-serving President
Mohammed Siad Barre fell from power in 1991, the very idea of a focal
reference point in Somali politics was removed. Not that Siad Barre had
been in effective control of the state before he fell. But at the very least,
when he was in office, there was the idea, if not the reality, of a head of
state, and a grand if weak patron, who was theoretically able to rely on
some of his clients to ensure that some of his orders were carried out. His
fall removed both the concept and reality of control. The various armed
factions have been struggling for control of the state since, each with its
own rules and territory within Somalia. Had Siad Barre been able to
establish and control an effective clientelist system in Somalia as Jomo
Kenyatta did while he was president of Kenya (see Chapter 6), Somalia
might have been spared the agonies of spoils politics it has been
experiencing in recent years.
Spoils politics has been a major cause of state instability in Africa
because there have usually been factions within each state capable not
only of defying but also of threatening the formal leader in charge of the
state. 'State weakness' in Africa as some writers call it (Migdal 1988,
Jackson and Rosberg 1973), really refers to the existence of spoils politics in
the continent. In his study of of how weak states can become strong ones
Migdal (1988) is basically talking (though without mentioning it) of the
process by which state recover from spoils politics. According to him,
weak states are those 'with a melange of social organisations, many having
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their own rule-making ability', and such states 'have witnessed stiff
resistance to leaders' efforts to use the state as a political control' (Migdal
1988:207). Migdal sees a weak state as one in which the leader lacks the
'ability to use the agencies of the state to get people in the society to do
what [he] wants' (p. xiii).
The Relationship Between Clientelism and Spoils Politics
The general relationship between factionalism, clientelism and spoils
politics is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The figure shows what happens when
factional struggles are left unchecked because of the lack or weakness of
institutionalisation of clientelism. The relationship between clientelism
and spoils politics can be further clarified by considering it alongside the
concept of prebendalism, that is, the practice of using the state as a source
of material gain. (On this see Joseph, 1991). Prebendalism is a type of
political behaviour in which the state is seen primarily as a source of
economic gain for those who operate the state machinery as well a their
relatives or kinsmen. In prebendal politics, 'a state official is given the
right to attach a certain portion of the tribute of the state and use it for his
or her own purpose' (Joseph 1991:189). Appointments to public service are
either 'sold' in the form of bribery or given to relatives7, who in turn will
use their new positions in the same way, and so on. A well established
government official, such as a permanent secretary of a ministry, would
over time, build a powerful position in his post since most of the
important positions would have been filled by his appointees, who remain
loyal to him. Prebendalism and clientelism are therefore broadly similar,
7 This has been a common phenomenon in most Africa countries. In Uganda for example,
it s quite common nowadays to promise to give the whole of your salary of the first one or
two months to the person within the department responsible for appointments before you can
hope to get a job in most government departments (Personal information, April, 1995).
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with the important distinction that whereas clientelism is primarily
concerned with the pursuit of political power by using economic resources
as a means to that end, prebendalism is concerned in the main with
economic gain, and using politics only as a means to that end, and order to
safeguard an already well established position within the state apparatus
for the practice of prebendal politics.
The concept of prebendalism a outlined above helps in the
understanding of the concept of spoils is that it is the 'prebends' of the
state, whether to be attained through political power or otherwise, that
factional competition, as already noted, is largely about. The relationships
is summed up as follows.
Prebendalism is a state of affairs where the state is seen and treated
as an economic reservoir to be used for individual and collective gains. As
in clientelism the pursuit is facilitated and made possible by institutional
weakness when the state is unable to prevent or punish those abusing the
formal rules. Clientelism in this regard is the activity involving the
distribution (in an orderly or at least organised manner) of the resources in
a prebendal state, for the political benefit of the patron and clients in the
manner described above. Spoils politics then refers to the uncontrolled and
intense corn-petition for the resources in a prebendal state when
clientelism has failed to establish ordered channels for distribution. Spoils
politics occurs and exists when a prebendal state is left open and at the
mercy of the various factions.
From Spoils Politics to Clientelism
Spoils politics, more than clientelism, is transitory and usually has a
shorter life-span. It can be turned back into clientelism in a number of
ways. In some cases spoils politics has been checked in Africa through
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one of three means before it plunged the state in utter disintegration like
that in Somalia mentioned at the beginning of this section. The ways in
which spoils politics can be checked include the reestablishment of control
by one of the factions and then forging clientelist ties; a military coup, and
through a revolution. Also, in very rare cases, spoils politics can be
'coordinated' among the various factions, but with the state remaining
unstable for as long as the phenomenon lasts, as has happened in Zaire.
The second option of reclaiming the state from spoils politics is a
military coup, either by the armed forces independently or in alliance with
one of the factions. Amin's coup against Obote in 1971 (see Chapter 7) was a
response to, or at the least a manifestation of, the unchecked factional
struggles from 1965 that threatened to plunge Uganda into even more
serious crisis. The military coup in Nigeria in 1966 was also in responses
to spoils politics (or prebendalism as Joseph (1991) describes it). Major
Kaduna Nzeogwu, who led the coup, stated that the coup was aimed at 'the
political profiteers, the swindlers...who [sought] to keep the country
permanently divided they can remain in office as ministers.' (Joseph
1991:71). As a result, the leading personalities who 'sought to keep Nigeria
divided' while remaining at the heads of powerful regional factions, the
prime ministers of the Western Region and the Northern Region, as well
as Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the federal prime minister were immediately
killed. The termination of Major Kaduna Nzeogwu's coup by another coup
in June 1966 simply shows that the first coup had failed to establish an
effective control over spoils politics. The whole question of asserting not
only authority but also Nigeria's physical identity as a state was to be settled
in the bloody Civil War from 1967 to 1970.
In rare cases a revolution that is internally organised or promoted
externally can sweep away all the warring factions and set up a new order.
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The rise of Yoweri Museveni to power in Uganda n 1986 (see Chapter 10)
can be seen as a revolution in response of the long period of state malaise
due to factional struggles and spoils politics.
Another, even rarer response to spoils politics is to allow it to
continue unchecked but in a 'coordinated' manner. This can be done for
example by a tacit dividing up the state among the main factions, who
amongst them continue using the state as reservoir. In Zaire, Mobutu has
since the late 1970s retained political power essentially by opening up the
state for plunder by few powerful individuals and factions. Since he did
not interfere with their activities, spoils politics continued and Zaire as a
state has been very weak. Indeed, in the opinion of some writers, Zaire
has ceased to exist as a state in the conventional sense. Young (1994:262)
has for example observed that in Zaire, 'naked power and bribes erode the
law... The state ... has lost much of its effective grip, because its legal
directives are ignored, except when they seem to be opportune'. The
experiences of Somalia, Zaire, and more recently Liberia and Sierra Leone,
illustrate what happens to states at the mercy of spoils politics.
Conclusion
I am concerned here with clientelism as a political phenomenon and its
effects on change and state stability. The emphasis on the macro-level
politics and change is in order to preserve and perhaps amplify the
analytical value of clientelism (see below). There are two reasons for this.
First, although clientelism as a phenomenon, in the developing countries
at least, encompasses the whole political spectrum of the state from the
local to the national level, it is usually managed at the the very top of the
national leadership, and its effects on political change occur at the national
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( See Chapters 5-6). The second is that it is impractical if not impossible to
assess the impact of clientelism on political change by focusing on its
dynamics at one or a set of localities, such a district or a province, or group
of them. Client politics in a municipal or city council for instance would
not affect a political change at the ministerial level unless the mayors (as
local patrons), are themselves clients to ministers or the head of state.
Local clientelism in city governments in the United States can illustrate
this point. Johnston (1979:387) notes that between 1971 and 1974, the city
council in New Haven, Connecticut, distributed jobs as gifts to build
political support. But due to the clear division between the different levels
of government in the federal system of the United States, these forms of
clientelism have little if any impact or influence on the national political
process. By contrast, in Kenya for example, the Nairobi City Council may




Political Developments During the Colonial Period, 1920-1960
In the introduction it was noted that an effective political institution is the
one able to regulate or mediate the actions of the members within the
community of which it is an institution, such that the collective behaviour
of the members promotes and leads to the collective good of the
community. Factional politics and therefore clientelism, both of which
involve and thrive on the use of public resources for personal benefit, are
thus undermined in an ideal institution. It was further suggested that the
what led to factional struggles among the leading politicians at
independence in Uganda and Kenya was the lack of viable institutions.
In this chapter we are concerned with the background to the rise to
factional politics in the two countries at independence. For this purpose I
will review the political developments of the two countries from the
1920s to 1960. The aim is to demonstrate that no territory-wide institutions
evolved in the two countries during the colonial period and to show how
colonial policies instead entrenched ethnic particularism to the extent that
at independence the national political parties, including KANU and UPC,
were necessarily coalitions of the various ethnic groups and their
representatives. My argument is that, due to this failure, there was no
strong political institution in these countries at independence, and that
this encouraged and enabled the rise of factional politics among the
nationalist politicians. The dynamics of factional politics in turn led to
clientelism in Kenya and spoils politics in Uganda (See Chapters 4-7).
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The chapter is loosely divided into two main sections. The first
section is a review of the major factors that prevented the evolution of
viable, indigenous institutions in Uganda and Kenya after the
establishment of colonial rule. Here I will focus on the the issue of
African representation in the colonial institution, in particular on the
policy of indirect rule and the development of local governments, and
their effects. In the last section I discuss the formation of national political
parties after the Second World War, indicating particularly the influence of
factionalism among the nationalist politicians.
Historical Roots of Weak Institutions
When Britain established its rule over the territories of Uganda and Kenya
at the end of the 19th Century, like other colonial possessions, they were
ruled as a part of the British Empire. Legislative councils were set up in
Kenya in 1905 and in Uganda in 1920, but these remained a part of the
British institution because Africans did not participate in them. It was only
towards the end of the Second World War that the first Africans were
appointed to councils in both countries, in Kenya in 1944 and in Uganda in
1945 (below).
As institutions, the colonial governments in Uganda and Kenya
were coherent and fairly well-established even in the territories. But at
the same time they had feeble roots within the East African societies: they
were and remained until independence extensions of the British political
institution with their roots in Britain. The attempt to assimilate the pre-
colonial institutions by developing structural links between them and the
colonial institution, for example by appointing chiefs as local agents of
administration under the system of indirect rule succeeded more in
55
establishing local power bases than in creating territorial institutions,
which the colonial authorities specifically guarded against, in favour of
gradual and guided development from the local level. The concept of
nationhood was thus undermined while local identity was nurtured and
strengthened.
The late and minimal participation by Africans in the colonial
administration at the national level also meant the colonial institutions
were never indigenised. This in turn meant that as an institution the
government remained alien to the people. The African peoples, leaders
and laymen alike, did not regard the concept and institution of national
government as theirs. As such, political participation after independence
came to be viewed at best as a chance to further promote the locality at
the expense of the centre, and at worst as an opportunity for communal or
personal promotion or enrichment rather than in order to serve. Since the
institution of government did not command the respect and loyalty of the
people, and had no committed guardians as the colonial administrators, it
was open to abuse. The result was that, once Africans took over the task of
government, politics was immediately dominated by factionalism among
the leaders over the pursuit of personal ambitions, rather than by a spirit
of consensus on what was best for their countries.
Pre-Colonial Political Systems in Uganda and Kenya
To understand the failure of the colonial administration to promote the
evolution of national political institutions in Uganda and Kenya from the
1920s to independence, it would be helpful briefly to look at the type of
political organisations that existed in this region in the pre-colonial period.
On the basis of their pre-colonial political and social organisations,
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the peoples of East Africa may be divided into two: those without kings
and those with kings. The first category, and by far the largest, had what
anthropologists call stateless or acephalous political systems. In Uganda
the Lugbara, Acoli, Langi, Iteso, Alur belonged to this category. In Kenya,
the Kikuyu and all the major ethnic groups also belonged to this group.
Here the largest political community was the clan, followed by the sub-
clan, the village and the family 1.
The clan was however the weakest political unit because its only,
and periodic, involvement in the affairs of the people occurs at times of
inter-family disputes, or, as in the Acoli, when there was inter-clan strife.
The family, under the eldest man in the lineage, constituted the most
powerful unit. The family had the ultimate power of punishment, and
decided whether to refer a matter to the clan. Among the Iteso, for
example, it was reported that 'anyone who repeatedly broke the accepted
order of society or anyone who brought defamation to his or her [family
head] would be ostracised' Webster at al 1973:167).
Of this group, in East Africa, only the Kikuyu came close to
constituting a compact community or what in theory might be called a
distinct nation-state. But their political organisation was just as
segmentary. In terms of political organisations the Kikuyu were just like
other more scattered groups like the Acoli and Langi and the Lugbara of
Uganda. The 'wider [Kikuyu] community was of little practical importance
in day to day life, ... segments of [the clan] were more significant' (Muriuki
1974:113). They had no chiefs, and were opposed to the idea of
chieftaincies, since a person's status in the community was always judged
1 For details the forms of political organisations in stateless societies in Africa, see
Forbes and Evans-Pritchard (1940); Middleton and Tait (1958); Mair (1962); Southall
(1953) on the Alur; Middleton (1960) on the Lugbara; Evans-Pritchard (1971) on the Azande
in Sudan; Dyson-Hudson (1966) on the Karamojong; Tosh (1978) on the Langi; Girling (1960)
on the Acoli; Muriuki (1974) on the Kikuyu, and many other anthropological accounts of the
major ethnic groups in Kenya.
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by individual achievements, not by birth or association with family.
According to Berman and Lonsdale (1992:337), the Kikuyu 'believed that
public authority came from private achievement, power from virtue'.
Kenyatta's account in his anthropological study of the Kikuyu, Facing
Mount Kenya (1961 Edition) bears this out. He wrote that individual
liberty was greatly valued in traditional Kikuyu culture: 'a man was a man,
and as such he has the rights of a man and liberty to exercise his will and
thought in a direction which suited his purpose as well as of his fellow
men' (p. 212). The notion of centralised authority such as in kingdoms was
therefore alien to the Kikuyu. (See also Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:145-
154). The only strong commonly held value in traditional Kikuyu culture
was largely religious, in that every one of them recognised Mumbi as the
mother of all Kikuyu.
The Kikuyu were divided into loose cluster of clans, but authority
in these clans lay with a special committee, a council of elders, called the
kiama. The clans were however often divided by animosity and seldom
acted together, this further made Kikuyu country as a whole a severely
segmented society. (For a lively account of such inter-clan animosity, see
Ngugi wa Thiong'o, The River Between, 1965). This council was made up
of members over 40 years of age, those who had retired from warriorhood.
The kiama was concerned with all aspects of Kikuyu custom and politics.
Positions of influence in the society could be reached only after one was a
member of the kiama, and such an elevation rested on personal
achievement such as bravery, prowess in battle, wisdom or good conduct,
since appointment to the kiama was not hereditary.
Although the Kikuyu recognised no chiefs, it was possible for
exceptionally talented persons to rise above a kiama or a clan, and be
accepted as leader by several clans at once. In other words, it was possible to
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become a Kikuyu hero and leader when one had qualities which were
'universally' respected and accepted. Persons who reach this status were
called athamaki. Kikuyu history has been full of such individual rises to
prominence. In the 1890s, a man called Waiyaki attained such political
status among the Kikuyu. Also Harry Thuku, a Nairobi clerk in the 1920s,
became a Kikuyu hero in his confrontation with the colonial government.
(Thuku 1970). Jomo Kenyatta himself may be regarded as a latter-day
athimaki. But while in theory it was possible for such persons to institute
themselves as chiefs, the important point for our purpose here is that
chieftaincies had not evolved among the Kikuyu by the time British
arrived.
In the kingdom category the Baganda, with their highly organised
and hierarchic system of rule, were the outstanding example, and can be
taken as representative of this group as a whole. These kingdoms, all of
which were under an effective and absolute king were in effect compact
nation-states.
At the head of the Buganda system was the kabaka, who ruled with
the help of series of lesser chiefs, whom he appointed and who were
directly responsible to him. The whole kingdom was thus tied into a
compact political unit. (Apter 1961; Fallers 1964. See Southwold's
Bureaucracy and Chiefship in Buganda [no publication date]; and Fallers
(1965) on the Busoga).
Buganda's pre-colonial political system (which the British left
largely intact and relied upon for administration), had clearly understood
and well defined rules to govern every inhabitant within the kingdom
(Kagwa 1969). The kabaka delegated power through the system by a
hierarchy of chiefs of various grades and authorities (Richards 1982:8-19;
Apter 1961:90-98). The counties, called sazas, constituted the main
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administrative units, of which there were historically 20. The county chiefs
got their authorities directly from the kabaka. Each county was further
divided into subcounties, and these into parishes. Since the kabaka
appointed and dismissed chiefs, and held the power of life and death over
everyone, the system was kept compact and stable. Also since chieftaincy
was a hereditary function, there were few succession competitions even
between the sons of chiefs, and these did not affect the stability and
effectiveness of the system as a whole. It was over these different systems
of political organisation that the British imposed their colonial
administration.
In the kingdoms the local systems of administration were preserved
and used as agents of colonial rule in the system of indirect rule. In the
non-kingdom areas, chiefs were appointed, in emulation of the kingdoms,
and with a view to establishing compact systems of local rule to serve the
colonial administration as in the kingdoms. (Low and Pratt 1960:163-241).
The system however failed since kings and kingdoms cannot be planted
and grow among people just like trees.
Colonial Chiefs and Indirect Rule
As in West Africa 2 the British ruled their East African territories through
the system of indirect rule. The system consisted of using the then 'existing
indigenous political machinery to every extent possible in the
administration' of the territories (Burke 1964:33). In practice this involved
the use for the purpose of local government 'those men whom the people
2 The policy of indirect rule was widely and most effectively used in West Africa among
the Emirates of northern Nigeria, where Lugard, the architect of the policy, was governor
and later High Commissioner of federated Nigeria after the amalgamation of 1914. The
south eastern region, with no traditional chiefs, was ruled through appointed chiefs, called
Warrant Chiefs. Nigeria thus provides the best African example of the application of the
policy over both acephalous and kingly societies.
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were accustomed to obey' (Low and Pratt 1960:163). Most of these chiefs
were appointed, since societies like that of the Lango, Acoli, the Kikuyu,
the Iteso and the Masai did not have chiefs.
The policy of indirect rule was designed in part to adapt the pre-
colonial institutions to modern conditions in partnership with the
colonial institution. Donald Cameron, Governor of Tanganyika from 1925,
was one of the strongest supporters of the policy. In his report to the
Colonial Office in 1927 (quoted in Morris and Read 1972:3), he expressed
the philosophy behind the system when he wrote that he 'attached the
greatest possible importance' to the policy, and went on to elaborate:
I believe that by [it] we shall secure, as far as is humanly possible to
foresee how, the political and the social future of the natives in a
manner which will afford them a permanent share in the
administrative of the country on lines which they themselves
understand, building up at the same time a bulwark against political
agitators and arresting social chaos of which signs have already
manifested themselves in other countries similarly situated.
Another aim of the policy was to undermine the influence of African
nationalism as represented by what Cameron referred to as 'political
agitators': organisations like the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) in
Tanganyika and Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) in Kenya. In its
implementation, however, indirect rule was not a success as far as the
promotion of national institutions from the existing pre-colonial systems
was concerned.
Whereas indirect rule was meant to pave the way to the evolution
of such institutions by retaining the local institutions, for example chiefs,
as the primary agents of colonial rule, in practise the application of the
policy had different, if not exactly opposite, effects. In hierarchical societies
like the Hausa Emirates in Northern Nigeria, where the traditional
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political machinery under the emirs was strong, the system succeeded in
ensuring effective British control over the people. (Whitaker 1970:40). But
at the same time it made the integration of Nigeria difficult, both then and
later. The creation of local institutions around appointed, or existing chiefs
in the case of kingdom areas like Buganda, merely solidified ethnic
parochialism, which made the establishment of territorial (later national)
institutions or even consciousness difficult.
In the first place, the persons appointed chiefs often had no local
recognition as such (Tosh 1978:150-153). Their offices therefore did not
command the loyalty or respect of the people. This was not only due to the
absence of traditional chiefs in stateless societies. It was rather that, since
the basis of appointment as a chief was loyalty to the colonial
administration, in most cases men other than those respected locally
were appointed chiefs over the recognised headmen. This practice also
led to inter-clan animosities within the same ethnic group, especially
when, as it often happened, a person from an undistinguished clan was
appointed chief over those whom, in accordance to lineage system, he
and his clan were subordinates.
In Tanganyika in 1934, for instance, the Bonde people, over whom
the District Commissioner appointed a descendant of an immigrant, were
so incensed that only four months after his appointment they tried to kill
him (Wills 1993:61-2). Further, when 'no local chief [or person] of
sufficient ability or loyalty could be found' persons from outside the clan or
even outside the ethnic group were appointed (Low and Pratt 1964:177).
Local complaints at such appointments were usually not addressed as long
as the appointed chiefs did their jobs (tax collection for example) and
remained loyal to the colonial administration. The colonial
administration 'treated the appointed chiefs as if they had a customary
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and autonomous claim over the loyalty of the people' (Hailey 1950:178).
Thus, instead of winning the support of the population, the
appointments of the chiefs alienated the people from the colonial state,
especially since some of the appointments were a favour of the colonial
administration for services rendered against the Africans during
'pacification' campaigns. An example of this is the case of a Kikuyu chief
called Kinyanjui, who was loved by the British but very much hated by
the people over whom he was appointed chief. According to Tignor (1974),
Kinyanjui first came in contact with the British as 'a guide in punitive
expeditions for the Imperial British East Africa Company'. And after the
British government took over responsibility for Kenya from the IBEA and
established a protectorate and 'needed a strong man to take charge of the
administration' they made Kinyanjui 'paramount chief of the Kikuyu'
(Tignor 1976:46). From the people's point of view, Kinyanjui did not have
the qualities they admired. Most of the colonial chiefs among the Kikuyu
in fact rose to power in a similar way. For example, two of Kinyanjui's
askaris were later appointed chiefs over different clans (Tignor 1976:46).
Secondly, the chiefs, appointed or recognised local headmen, now
had vastly increased powers and changed functions. Nyangira (1970:3) has
noted that this was the main cause of the antipathy towards the appointed
chiefs in Vihiga Division of Kakamega District in Kenya. The new
functions included the collection of taxes and maintenance of law and
order. All these were strange to the people, especially since the colonial
administration, to which the taxes went (in Uganda at any rate) was seen
and referred to as the "English government" (Morris and Read 1972:35).
Also headmen in the pre-colonial setting had usually only settled disputes
among family members or conducted religious functions. The
requirement for the new chiefs to intervene and even arrest did not go
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well with the people, especially since in order to enforce laws and collect
taxes, a special police forces, called askaris, were set up under the
control of the chiefs.
Some chiefs had their own agendas and used the colonial
administration for their own ends as much as they were used, and the
relationship between them were not always that of collaboration. Masai
chiefs in Kenya in particular were more on the side of the people than that
of the administration, largely because they were opposed to the
transformation of their societies (Tignor 1976:62-3). But having problems
with or opposing some colonial policies did not endear the chiefs to the
people. For one thing, such chiefs were often dismissed and replaced with
more loyal ones. In Machakos District in 1923, for example, the district
commissioner fined, imprisoned or removed from office over one-third
of the chiefs for offences like 'corruption and negligence of duties' ( Tignor
1976:61). In Murang'a District, between 1944 to 1953, 14 chiefs out of 34
were dismissed from office. (Throup 1987:146-7t). Indirect rule and the
system of chiefs did not therefore provide a link between the pre-colonial
systems and the colonial administration.
In the limited sense that indirect rule did actually impose colonial
rule on the African populations and made that rule effective, it may be
said to have succeeded. But in terms of its role in the evolution of
indigenous political institutions, it was a failure. This was particularly the
case in the acephalous societies. The reason for this was that although the
chiefs appointed were local men, the institution they represented was an
alien institution wholly without any roots in the local society. As agents of
an alien institution, the chiefs were de-indigenised by the institution
instead of them indigenising the institution, as the British had hoped.
The crucial issue was that by the time of the nationalist movement after
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the Second World War, the chiefs had been entrenched strongly enough at
the local level, and were able to have a grip on local political
developments. It was the chiefs who provided the nucleus of parochial
politics and thus politicised ethnicity.
African Representation in the District and Legislative Councils
The Legislative Council of Kenya (then known as the East African
Protectorate) was set up in 1905 largely in response to the pressure of the
European settlers, who wanted to have a say in the running of the
protectorate so as to be able to safeguard their farming and commercial
interests (Harlow and Chilvers 1965:1-55, 209-265; Rosberg and Nottingham
1966:18-34. See also Hailey 1950). The only section of the population to be
represented at the early stages were the settlers, who elected their first
representatives in 1907. Although the Council was weak as a policy
making body and its decisions were subject to the governor's approval
and Whitehall veto, the settlers at least saw it as their institution. This is
an important point to note when thinking about the ability of the Council
to evolve as a national African institution, because it developed primarily
as a settler institution. Moreover, the settlers actively guarded against any
attempt to incorporate Africans in the system of government almost up to
the time of independence (Throup 1987:18).
The Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), formed in the 1920s,
pressed early for African representation by Africans in the Legislative
Council, but this was refused because members the KCA were regarded as
political agitators (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:93-6). Thus, until 1935,
African interests were represented in the Legislative Council by two
'sympathetic' Europeans, appointed by the governor. African interests
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were in theory represented in the Legislative Council from 1923, but in
practice this meant little to the Africans since to them, and in actual fact,
there was little difference between the Europeans representing them and
the others in the council. In 1932, in response to pressure from KCA and in
order delay direct representation by Africans for the time being, the
number of Europeans representing African interests was increased to two.
These representatives were missionaries, who were supposed to know the
African people better and to have their interests at heart. The exclusion of
Africans from the Council was based on the dubious reason that there
were no Africans qualified enough 'to take their places in a body occupying
the position attained by the Kenyan Legislative Council' (Hailey 1950: 209).
It was only in 1938 that two unofficial African members were appointed to
the council to represent the interest of the African community.
But this time, however, African nationalism had already developed,
and not only "outside" the colonial institution, but in opposition to it
(Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:188-198). The result was that when the
colonial administration started the process of introducing Africans into
the Legislative Council after the end of the Second World War, owing to
antipathy between itself and African nationalism (represented by the
KCA/KAU), the Africans so appointed, like the appointed chiefs in the
indirect rule system, were seen as collaborators or stooges, rather than
representatives.
In 1948, the number of Africans increased to four, all of whom were
nominated by the governor from a list submitted by local authorities.
Although this was regarded by the colonial authorities as a progressive
development, in terms of African representation it was purely decorative
because they were not elected and too few in numbers. The number of
elected representatives in the council was 17; but none was African since
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the four Africans were all nominated unofficial members. The Indian
community was allowed to elect 5 members, the Arabs 1 member. The
estimated population of Kenya in 1948 was 5,373,470, of which 5,219,865
were Africans, 123,080 were Asians, and only 30,524 Europeans. In the
legislature, the Africans who made up over 97 percent of the population
were not represented. In institutional terms, the state belonged to the tiny
number of Europeans who made up only 0.57 percent of the total
population.
The Legislative Council in Uganda had a similar history, if a less
eventful one, to that of Kenya. Uganda did not have a settler community
like Kenya, but still commercial activity was in the hands of immigrant
European and Asian individuals. It was pressure from the business
community that led to the establishment of the Legislative Council in the
first place. In 1920 the Uganda Chamber of Commerce, made up entirely of
European and Asian businessmen, petitioned the Governor, Sir Robert
Croydon, for a say in the administration of the protectorate (Apter
1961:162). An Order-in-Council established both the Executive Council and
The Legislative Council in 1920, and when it first met in 1921, it had an
all-European membership. The Governor, however, wished to encourage
Asian participation since they were playing an important role in the
economic development of the colony, for example as cotton-ginners, and
asked the Indian Association to nominate one member. But the Indian
Association rejected the request and demanded two members instead of
one (Apter 1961:168-9). The Asian position remained vacant until it was
filled in 1926 by a nominated Hindu. Thus when Europeans and Asians
were getting actively involved in the government of the territory, the
Africans in Uganda were not allowed even a representation by Europeans
like that in Kenya. (Sathyamurthy 1986:202-290; Burke 1964:33-9).
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Africans entered the Legislative Council for the first time only in
1945, when three Africans were nominated to it. But these nominees, it
should be noted, were not the representatives of the African population or
African nationalism as such. They were more the ex-officio
representatives of the rulers of the kingdoms. Of the three representatives,
one was nominated by the kabaka of Buganda; one position was to be filled
in rotation by the 'prime ministers' of the kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro
and Toro, by turns, and one was to be the administrative secretary-general
of the districts of 'either Busoga, Bukedi, Bugisu or Teso, each to serve in
turn' (Apter 1961: 169). Thus, like that in Kenya, African representation to
the legislative council in Uganda was largely decorative. Moreover, since
they were the appointees of their kingdom governments, they saw
themselves as representing the interests of the kingdoms rather than the
whole territory. Since the concept of nationhood was already weak, this
method of representation made it weaker still while the districts and
kingdoms were politically strengthened, and the colonial administration
developed in a political world of its own. As in Kenya, it was only after the
Second World War that Africans in Uganda were introduced in the system
of government. But this was only at the district level in district councils
which helped in solidifying ethnic particularism more than it did in the
promotion of a national institution.
Consequences of Indirect Rule
The result of the exclusion of Africans in the political process was they
were forced to seek political expression outside the colonial institution.
This was the basis of the many political associations, such as the KCA set
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up in 1924 and TAA. (On the TAA see Iliffe 1979:405-513) 3 . As protest
movements these associations opposed the colonial administration, thus
further, at least psychologically removing the African people, whose
interests they championed, from the state. These associations were in fact
the nuclei of the nationalist political parties which later assumed political
power at independence. If these African led associations were allowed to
evolve in territory-wide organisations, perhaps they might have
established the basis of national institutions. (On this point see Rosberg
and Nottingham 1966:188-233). For in the early 1930s, the KCA (from
which KANU evolved), had promising prospects of developing into such
a national institution, because (according to Rosberg and Nottingham
1966:137), it had 'branches in all districts in the central Kenya and in many
arts of the Rift Valley'. (For a detailed history of the KCA and its evolution
into KANU through KAU, see Spencer 1985. See also Berman 1990;
Lonsdale and Berman 1992).
To a very large extent, the colonial administration failed to correctly
assess the true representatives of the overwhelming majority of the
people, and suppressed or otherwise ignored the very forces through
which it could have assimilated the population in the colonial institution.
Organisations like the KCA and TAA in Tanganyika were turned against
the colonial institutions early, and they carried the people with them.
Obote also started his political activities in the Young Lango Association,
formed in 1944 to oppose the appointed chiefs in the district. These
associations were formed mostly by younger, educated and "progressive"
persons who wanted, among other things, 'a share in district affairs and
native administration' (Gertzel 1974:28)
3 TAA, unlike KCA, was more nationalistic in outlook. One reason for this was that no
overriding political issue affected a particular locality or ethnic group as for example the
land issue affected the Kikuyu in Kenya. Tanganyika also did not have many large and
antagonistic ethnic groups.
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Therefore, both in Kenya and Uganda, the administration of the
colonial state prevented the articulation of a common African cause in a
way which the people could have identified with. The important basis for
institutional development - consensus, common destiny, unity - remained
absent. In Kenya, the 'chosen few' subsequently, just before and after
independence, managed to come together and identified their collective
interest with the state, as collaborators or Home Guards during the
emergency.
The major cause of the lack of institutionalisation was the failure of
the British to assimilate nationalist African leaders, such as Harry Thuku
and Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, into the colonial institution at an early stage.
Instead, nationalist leaders were considered a nuisance, and the colonial
administration chose or created local rulers as their agents in the in the
mistaken belief that all the local rulers were the true representatives of the
people and were the spokesmen for their aspirations and that the local
institutions could be adapted into modern national institutions under
British tutelage and in partnership with the colonial institution.
Localisation of Political Developments, 1945 to 1960
In at first excluding nationalist leaders from the colonial institution, and
then suppressing them, the British missed an opportunity to promote the
evolution of an indigenous and territory-wide institution during the
colonial period. Worse, in promoting local and appointing rulers in the
system of indirect rule they established local and ethnic-based institutions,
which proved difficult to assimilate into a national institution and
provided the basis of factionalism.
In 1945, a Labour government came to power in Britain. The Labour
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Party was openly more sympathetic to the idea of independence for the
colonies than the Conservatives. Thus, while the policies of the Labour
government towards the colonies was not as revolutionary as it was feared
(or hoped), the change of government nevertheless led to a new and more
optimistic mood within the colonies. The developments starting in 1945
took place against this background.
After the Second World War it became clear to the British that their
African colonies would have to be granted independence sooner rather
than later. The war and the depressions of the 1930s had weakened Britain
economically and she could no longer afford the high costs that
colonialism required (Throup 1987:15-24; Colonialism in Africa vol. 2,
1914-1960, pp. 450-502). Moreover, after the end of the Second World War,
self-determination and freedom for colonalised peoples became an issue
in international politics, and 'world opinion', as represented by the League
of Nations, and perceived United States opposition to colonialism, all
combined to make it easier to retreat from the colonial adventure. British
decolonisation policy was therefore not well planned in advance, and had
no definite policies for decolonisation when the process started. Its idea of
developing national institutions to take over the government of the
colonies was to strengthen the districts as the base of national institutions.
Whether this strategy would have led to the evolution of viable
national institutions in the long run is open to debate. What happened
was that independence came before these local institutions, based on
district councils, were integrated, with the result that there was an
institutional void at the centre. Neither the prewar concept of
"trusteeship" for the gradual development of African politics under
British control nor the panic "training for self-government" policy adopted
after the Second World War, had planned a rapid transfer of power to
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Africans at the national level, which the African nationalists demanded,
and which was conceded to them only in the late 1950s. (Throup 1978).
The political developments of Uganda and Kenya between 1945 and
1960 were characterised by rapid succession of events. For the colonial
authorities, in the second half of the 1950s, the previous notion of
independence to the colonies in 30 or 40 years' time ha increasingly became
untenable. Britain realised it would have to grant independence to the
Africans sooner.
The question then became how best to hand over power to the
Africans. Britain saw itself as preparing the two countries (and its other
African colonies) for "responsible government". The exception here was
Kenya, because until the mid 1950s, part of the plan had been that the
colony would develop as a settler country, with perhaps selected African
elite class as junior partners. Before the outbreak of the Mau Mau struggle,
therefore, the pressing problem for the colonial administration was not
African nationalism, but settler pressure for "self-government" (Throup
1987:16-21). The outbreak of the Mau Mau struggle however interrupted
and made the plan untenable.
The Concept and Policy of 'Good Government'
The policy adopted towards the colonies was that of continuity and slow
evolution to independence. In Uganda the adopted policy was that of
promoting the gradual evolution of 'good government'. (Lee 1967). There
were two broad objectives in this policy. The first was to engineer local
government reform throughout the colonies as a prerequisite for
independence. This was designed to close the gap between government
and the people in time for independence. As we have already seen, the
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colonial state up to 1945 remained an alien institution stationed among
the Africans. (I use "stationed" rather than the more common
"established" or "imposed" because the latter gives the misleading idea
that the colonial state was forcibly but somehow effectively established
among the African peoples. In fact the colonial state hardly had any roots
within the societies and had a life of its own, independent of local
conditions. It is more appropriate to see it as having been stationed there).
Hence the need to develop a political institution from the local level to tie
up with it.
With these objectives, the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent out
a famous dispatch to all the colonial governors in Africa, in February 19474.
This document formed the basis of local government reform in Uganda
and Kenya. The general thrust of the policy was the establishment of
efficient and and democratic local institutions, 'capable of managing the
local resources ... and commending the respect and loyalty of the people'
(Apter 1961: 236). It was hoped that the national institution that would
somehow result from the convergence of these local institutions would
likewise 'command the respect and support of the people' of the whole
countries and thus be a viable national institutions. The attempt to create
the Legislative Council at Entebbe out of the members of the various
kingdom governments was seen as a way of achieving this.
However, the practical implementation of this policy, similar in
Uganda and Kenya in their general thrust, had the opposite effect, in both
territories, as I will show in a moment. It merely further solidified ethnic
particularism. The reforms included the introduction of direct elections to
both the district and legislative councils; the emphasis on the district
rather than the province as the most important political unit; making the
4 Dispatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors of the African
Territories, 25 February, 1947.
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legislative assemblies more representative by increasing the number of
directly elected members, ' 'africanisation" of the civil services, and
appointment of Africans to minor ministerial positions. The reforms in
Uganda proceeded more or less according to plan, and consequently
succeeded in solidifying local identities more than that in Kenya, in part
because the kingdoms were already solid political units. In Kenya the
reforms were overtaken by a dramatic growth of African nationalism
from 1945-50, when it flared up in violence. (History of East Africa
1976:65:140). To this we now turn.
Local Government Reforms and the Rise of Local Notables, 1945 to 1960
Local government reform, the process by which the district governments
were made more representative of the people, started seriously in Uganda
in 1949, when the Local Government Ordinance, 1949, was enacted. This
ordinance formed the basis of the progressive empowerment of the
kingdom and district councils. But before that time some tentative efforts
had already been made towards that end, by gradual and controlled
introduction of non-Europeans in both the Legislative and Executive
Councils. The Executive Council was first opened to non-Europeans in
1947 when an Asian was nominated to it as an unofficial member.
The African Local Government Ordinance granted more
responsibility and executive powers to the district councils which had
hitherto been only advisory bodies since they were established by the
African Authority Ordinance of 1919 (Burke 1964:38-9). The main feature
of the 1949 ordinance was that the other districts outside the kingdoms
were given similar executive powers that had existed in the kingdoms.
District councils were formally set up in all the districts in the country,
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with powers to make binding by-laws for all the Africans in the district,
and direct election to the district council was increased so that on average
every 1,000 inhabitants had one elected representative.
In 1948, Provincial Councils were set up above the districts, thus
constituting, it was hoped, a physical growth of the institution of
government from the local to the territorial level. But by this time the
districts had institutionally developed to such an extent that they had
become the focus of loyalty; the Provincial Councils seemed somewhat
artificial institutions above them (Apter 1961:238-9). Since most districts
geographically coincided with ethnic spread while the provinces
encompassed several districts, and District Commissioners were closer and
more directly involved with politics at the district level than the distant
Provincial Commissioners, the provinces were largely decorative
institutions. The districts became the institutions of the people while the
provincial administration together with the colonial government at
Entebbe, then the capital, remained, in their view, the "English
government". Burke (1964:39) is right in concluding that the 1949
Ordinance in effect provided 'a legal basis for the institutionalisation of
parochial tribally based local institutions'.
The District Administration (District Councils) Ordinance 1955,
provided for the enlargement of the district council in which the majority
of members would be directly elected, thus introducing the element of
active competition for positions in the councils. The introduction of
elections to the district councils and the focus of political activity at the
district level, in themselves serious setbacks for the evolution of
territorial institutions, was followed by two other developments that
added to the weakening of the centre. The first of these was the 1955
Ordinance provided for appointment boards to be set up in each district for
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the purpose of making all appointments in local government. (Burke
1964:41; Apter 1961:299; Relationships Commission Report, 1961:19-21).
Members of the boards, who had the additional power to discipline and
dismiss officials, were to be elected by and from the district councils. In
both political status and direct political influence, the districts became
more important. The second was that the 1955 ordinance provided for
the election of African representatives to the Legislative Council and
made the district councils electoral colleges, and thus effectively the
gatekeepers for any political advance from the districts to the national
level. The Kingdoms nominated their representative while the secular
districts, the district councils were responsible for the elections. Of the
kingdoms Buganda had 5 representatives, Busoga and Ankole each had
2, while the eastern, northern and western provinces each had 3. (Apter
1961:400-413). The effects on factional politics will be discussed in Chapter
5.
Direct elections to the Legislative Council were held in 1958 in most
districts of Uganda, but not in Buganda as the lukikko (parliament)
boycotted the elections. This election increased the membership of the
council, as it was meant to (Relationships Commission Report, 1961:22-4).
But the enlarged council was in effect the various district councils
combined. Members were not only elected by the district councils, but in
many cases those elected were sitting members on the district councils.
Milton Obote and C. Obwabgor, later to be prominent members of UPC,
were both chairmen of their respective district councils in Lango and Teso.
The Buganda representative was the katikiro (prime minister) of the
lukikko, Michael Kamalya-Kagwa (son of former Katikiro Apollo Kagwa).
Notable members from the districts include: George Magezi (Bunyoro);
John Bahiiha (Toro); John Lwamafa (Kigezi), and Caesar Katiti and Grace
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Ibingira (Ankole). As we will see in due course, all these men, except
Katiti, were to become heavyweight local notables in the UPC under Obote
after independence. (Chapters 4-5).
In Kenya, as already noted, the progress of local government reform
from 1945 was frustrated by settler politics. The reforms were therefore
largely, until 1952 at any rate, a product of the struggle between the
Colonial Office and settlers in Kenya. (Throup 1987:53-6). From 1952 it was
the Mau Mau struggle which had become the greater challenge to the
colonial administration, and consequently had greater impact on the pace
and magnitude of constitutional changes thereafter. (History of East Africa
1976:109-155; Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:227-319).
African representation in the Legislative Council by Africans began
in 1944, when the Governor appointed the first African, Eliud Mathu, a
Kikuyu, to it. (As noted on pp. 50-1, since 1924 African interests had been
represented in the council by one European appointed member). It had
become clear by this time that the notion of Kenya as a settler country
could not be achieved in the face of African opposition. The policy of the
Governor, Sir Philip Mitchell (1944-1952) now aimed at the development
of Kenya on a multiracial basis, in which all racial groups would be
represented, but with the Africans as "wards" of the European settlers
(Rosberg and Nottingham 1961:198-200; Throup 1987:46-7).
In pursuit of this policy, in 1948 the number of nominated Africans
was increased to four members, and then to six in 1951. But multiracialism
meant very little in practice, because before 1950 there was no elected
African member, and the appointed members were not the true
representatives of the people since their very appointment depended on
their agreement with, or at the least their being amenable to, the
administration's strategy. Also it was not until 1951 that the first African
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was appointed to the Executive Council. (Colony and Protectorate of
Kenya 1953:150).
But at this time the constitutional process was overtaken by African
protests over land rights, and agitation for more representation in the
Legislative council (Rosberg and Nottingham 1961:212-6). Two events lay
behind these agitations and more active political behaviour among the
African population. The first was that in 1944, the KCA was reconstituted
into KAU, a new and more effective political party. The second was
Kenyatta's return from Britain in 1947 and his election as president of
KAU.
For the Africans, it was KAU rather than the nominated members
who truly represented their interests, because Mathu and his colleagues in
the Legislative Council had been unable to effectively address their land
grievances or take up the issue of kipande, a version of South African pass¬
books which Africans had to carry, introduced in Kenya in the 1920s.5
KAU's effort to achieve political change by reform was frustrated
since it was outside the political process. African agitation for land rights
however continued and by 1950 had turned to violence. The Mau Mau
struggle had in effect already begun. The government associated the
growing violence with KAU/Mau Mau. When for example in June 1952 a
local chief denounced the increasing violence and crime at a meeting
organised by KAU, he was later killed, which confirmed the government's
suspicion that KAU was coordinating Mau Mau: the chance for KAU and
the government working together was lost. (Ingham 1962:406-7; Spencer
5Kip an de was actually a policy or system of controlling the movement of Africans in
order to provide cheap labour to European farms. The Africans naturally objected to the
policy and especially its physical symbol, a 'registration certificate placed in a small,
solid metal container, which ... hung from the neck of the owner on a piece of string. To the
African they were a perpetual reminder of their inferior status' in their own country. The
kipande 'remained a political issue up to and throughout the emergency' (Rosberg and
Nottingham 1966:45).
78
1985:202-235). It was in these circumstances that the new Governor, Evelyn
Baring, declared a state of emergency over Kenya in October 1952.
Major constitutional reform during the emergency included the
Lyttelton Constitution of 1954. This constitution was in effect an attempt
to practically implement the policy of multiracialism pursued by
Governor Mitchell. In particular it proposed the setting up of a multiracial
government, with one African, two Asians and three Europeans, to be
followed by the election of eight African representatives to the Legislative
Council directly by their constituents, but on a restricted franchise: the
richer one was, the more votes one could cast. It was a conservative
constitution and discriminated in favour of the rich at the expense of the
overwhelming majority of the people. The African nationalist politicians
cooperated because in their view the holding of direct elections in itself
was a significant step forward, and not with the method of the elections or
the constitution. But since the organisation of territory wide political
parties had been outlawed and Kenyatta in prison, the elections, held in
1957, merely established the local notables (the political big-men) in their
respective areas. Men like Daniel arap Moi (Rift Valley), Oginga Odinga
(Nyanza) Ronald Ngala (Coast), were the first elected members.
As far as the development of national political parties was
concerned, the election of these Africans at the heads of the provinces was
a curse rather than a blessing. They thereafter entrenched their holds over
the provinces. Back in 1953 the government had banned KAU and
outlawed all territory-wide political organisations. Further, with the Mau
Mau struggle at its most intense from 1953, and the most politically active
people especially in the Central Province in detention centres, organisation
of political activities beyond a district or location was impossible. (Bennett
1963:132-145). Moreover, the arrest and detention of Kenyatta and most of
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the KAU leaders in 1953 had created a leadership vacuum in Kenya in the
same way as the banning of territory-wide political organisations created a
general political vacuum. It was these vacuums that the provincial
notables rose to fill when they were elected to the Legislative Council. The
case of Tom Mboya was slightly different, because he was not a provincial
notable: he was more of an urban (Nairobi) notable and his constituency
was the city population and the trade union movement. But he was still a
notable like the others (Goldsworthy 1982; Bennett 1963; Sandbrook 1972:3-
27).
Thus, like in Uganda, local government reforms in Kenya served
mainly in strengthening the periphery and weakening the centre. The
colonial administration failed to mould the disparate political forces in
each country and to give them a common identity and destiny. For the
result of this failure was that with the approach of independence the
political leaders, since they had no national bases, relied on their local
bases of power, and led to the emergence of local-based political parties
from the mid 1950s in both countries. This in turn led to factional politics
among the parties as well as among the individual local notables within
the parties.
Political Parties, Nationalist Leaders and Factional Politics
In Kenya, because of the ban on national political parties during the
emergency, political party organisation on territorial basis started only in
1960, and KANU and KADU were formed. When KAU was banned in
1952, all African political organisations were prohibited until 1955; and
even after that no party was allowed to organise above the district level.
The result was the emergence of many district based political parties
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between 1955-1957. As we will see in the next chapter, these parties had
already became locally prominent, with a corresponding rise of local
notables in the districts. The result of this development was that of the 11
major parties that contested the 1961 elections, only KANU campaigned
for national unity. The rest actually campaigning in favour of localisation
and against nationalism (Bennett and Rosberg 1961:120-125) 6.
The exception here was Mboya, because the notable in his Nyanza
province was Oginga Odinga. Mboya, however, was also a notable of sorts,
except that he had a more national political power base, especially in
Nairobi and to some extent Mombasa, in the trade unions he had built
during the 1950s. His local political party was the NPCR ( Sandbrook
1972:6-27; Goldsworthy 1982: Chapters 1-2). It was in fact the NPCP which
ensured his election to the secretary-generalship of KANU in the face of
stiff opposition from Oginga Odinga and the other notables, and he won by
a single vote over Oginga's preferred candidate, Arthur Ochwada.
(Goldsworthy 1982:144).
In Uganda the first national party was the Uganda National
Congress, formed in 1952 by Ignatius Musazi. Although the UNC preached
and made attempts to organise nationally, it was not successful in this
attempt. Due to the emphasis on local developments already reviewed,
the idea of a national political party pressing for self-government for the
whole country at that time was not taken seriously. It was in fact none
other than Obote, then member of the Lango District Council, who in 1954
attacked the UNC's nationalist ambitions, and wrote that what was needed
6 Notable among the parties formed during this period were the Nairobi District
African Congress of Argwings-Kodhek (with a trade union backing); the Nairobi Peoples
Convention Party (a breakaway faction of Argwings-Kodhek's party, led by Mboya);
Mombasa African Democratic Union; Central Nyanza African Democratic Association;
South Nyanza African District Association; Nakuru African Progressive Party; Taita
African Democratic Union, and various others with ethnic an district bases (Bennett and
Rosberg 1961:31-40; Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:313-9).
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was 'immediate Local Self-Government in Uganda' rather than a national
one (Karugire 1980:150). The Democratic Party, formed in 1956 was the
second national party, but its close links with the Catholic Church made it
unpopular in Buganda and may have hampered its efforts to expand
nationally. The DP and UNC may therefore be seen as opponents on
religious grounds. After the Legislative elections of 1958, the elected
members formed another national party, called the Uganda National
Union (UNU) in 1958. But since these were merely district
representatives, factional interests were already rife among them and the
UNU broke up almost immediately between "radical" and "conservative"
wings, respectively led by "commoners" like Obote and Obwangor and
"royalists" such as Grace Ibingira, George Magezi and W. Nadiope. It was
the radicals who came together to form the UPC in 1960, and elected Obote
as its first president. How he fared in this position in an independent
Uganda will be discussed in the next chapter.
Low (1962:12-3) blames the 'tardy emergence of political parties in
Uganda' on the quality of leadership, and the lack of knowledge of 'western
political organisations' by the party leaders, as none of them had spent
years studying overseas, like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Nnamdi
Azikiwe of Nigeria did. This argument is untenable, because in the first
instance, as the above review shows, the leaders were themselves captives
of the political history of the country, which rendered them largely
ineffective in realising their aims. The same historical conditions
hampered Kenyatta, with all his legendary leadership qualities and in spite
of his 'political training' in Britain for ten years.
The emergence of factional politics and its attendant variables of
clientelism, spoils politics, dictatorship and corruption may therefore be
explained by the fact that, to use Colin Ley's phrase 'the idea of a national
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interest was weak because the idea of a nation was new' (Leys 1970:341).
Attitudes towards the central government as an alien institution did not
change. Was the independent government any more their's than the
colonial one? Chinua Achebe's poignant comment about the attitude of
elite Nigerians to their independent government in the early 1960s is very
telling in this case. In No Longer at Ease (1960) he writes: 'In Nigeria the
government was always 'they'. It had got nothing to do with you or me. It
was an alien institution, and people's business was to get as much from it
as they could without getting in trouble', (p.30). Although to some extent
these attitudes were shared by the officials who performed public duties in
the kingdoms, chieftaincies and the colonial administration, the fear of
punishment from the ever present representatives of these institutions
(the king, the chief and the colonial administrator) acted as sufficient
deterrent. At independence there was however no guardian angel. In the
next chapter I will discuss the effects of factionalism on the politics of
Uganda and Kenya from 1960 to 1964.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Trappings of Factional Politics and its Effects, 1960-1964
During the first few years of independence, the politics of Uganda and
Kenya were trapped in factional politics and both the ruling political
parties and their leaders were in relatively weak positions. It was
suggested in earlier chapters that institutional weakness leads to
factionalism because it encourages and enables political leaders to pursue
personal and sectarian interests, and not the collective interests of the
government, party or the state. The ideals of nationalism, that is, the
promotion of the good of the state as the end of politics, is thus sacrificed
for the practical and more attainable goal of promoting one's own interests.
In this process, alliances based on ethnic and regional identities
would emerge, each pressing for its share of the national cake. Allen
(1987:3) has rightly observed that, in such a situation, the 'factions
endeavour to control the regional [party] leadership, if not the national
leadership positions, in order to ensure that the faction concerned can
control as much as possible [of the state resources] for allocation to its
members', a process which in turn 'creates lines of division within the
party'. Even when the ruling party emerges in a dominant position and
establishes control over all the influential offices which exist, it becomes
the battlefield of the struggles by its own members, which will weaken it
as a party and renders it incapable of evolving into an effective institution
of government.
In a multiparty political system, such as in Uganda and Kenya at the
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time of independence, the struggles may be both intra-party (within the
dominant party) and inter-party (between it and other political parties
which are themselves similarly divided). As one party struggles against the
other, divisions within the states are increased, since the parties would in
any case have been formed on ethnic and regional basis. (For a more
detailed discussion of this process, see Sandbrook 1972b:105-6). The result is
that the centre becomes weak as it struggles to meet or oppose the claims
of the various factions. The positions of the leaders of the ruling parties are
also constantly under threat. Political development is therefore trapped as
the various leaders struggle 'to gain or conserve power' in order to control
the vital apparatuses of the state (Bayart 1993:210-2).
This, as I will show in a moment, was the situation in Uganda and
Kenya between 1960 and 1964. It led to the fragmentation of the
nationalist political parties in both countries in 1960: for example both the
UNC and KANU split up in various factions. Struggle among the notables
for the leadership of especially UPC was also widespread, notably between
1960-1964 (Mujaju 1976:450-1). To some extent the notables in Kenya also
struggled briefly for the leadership of KANU before Kenyatta's release from
prison in August 1961 (Odinga 1967:181-204; Goldswothy 1982:101-6, 111-
148). The result was that in 1960-1964 UPC and KANU struggled against
regional and district factions, and Obote and Kenyatta, as leaders, also
fought to assert their authorities over the parties or at least the state.
Consequently, resolution of factional conflicts preoccupied the leaders and
their political developments were trapped. It can be said that, in general, it
was the product of factional politics that propelled the politics of the two
countries forward during this period, and not any planned political
programme.
In this chapter I will discuss the magnitude and effects of
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factionalism on the politics of the two countries between 1960 and 1964.
There are four short sections. In the first I will discuss the division of the
political leaders into different factions and parties on the eve of
independence and its effects. In the second I will discuss factionalism
within the UPC and KANU, and the effects this had on the positions of
Obote and Kenyatta. In the third section I discuss various claims made by
these factions on the centre and how this contributed to its weakness. The
last section is a general commentary on the implications of factionalism
for the political developments of the two countries. How the
governments responded to the problem of factionalism will be discussed
in Chapter 5.
The Split of the Political Parties
One of the first major effects of factionalism was the division (or rather
fragmentation) of the political parties on the eve of independence. The
splits occurred because as independence drew closer in 1958-9, the political
leaders jockeyed amongst themselves to secure strategic positions. UNC,
the first nationalist political party in Uganda, broke up in 1960. The three
main factions within it were UNC-proper under Ignatus Musazi, UNU of
the notables from the west of the country, and the nationalist wing led by
Obote. Each became a separate party of sorts. But in March 1960, UNU and
Obote's faction merged to form the UPC (Low 1961:18-46). The same thing
happened in Kenya when KANU also "broke up" almost before it was
formed in 1960, with Ronald Ngala and Daniel arap Moi, who had both
participated in previous meetings to prepare for the formation of an
"Uhuru Party" left, disappointed by the positions on the executive council
they were elected to during their absence. They subsequently formed
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KADU as the vehicle for their political ambitions (Gertzel 1970:10-19).
It has sometimes been suggested, presumably on the basis of
pronouncements by the breakaway leaders, that these splits were somehow
based on principle. The breakup of UNC, for example, is said to have been
caused by the fact that it was dominated by Baganda, and 'the
undistinguished leadership' of Musazi, its founding president (Low
1961:31; Mutibwa 1992:13). In Kenya it was said that KADU emerged
because KANU not only neglected the interests of minority ethnic groups,
but was also threatening to dominate them too since it was led by Kikuyu
and Luo politicians (Bennett and Rosberg 1961:37-40).
But in both cases, these excuses were covers for the pursuit of
personal political ambitions. The breakaway leaders had previously been
members of the parties (or the same nationalist movement in the case of
KANU) when independence was still far off. In the case of the UNC,
though the leading members were from Buganda, the party itself was
opposed to Buganda isolationism. In fact within Buganda it was regarded
as an enemy especially by the Mengo establishment (that is, the lukikko
and the chiefs who supported the Kabaka) (Low 1962:17-22). For another,
although the party had Baganda leadership and was largely based in
Buganda, it was a nationalist party and had opened branches in most
districts throughout the country when it was formed, including in Acoli
District and Obote's own district of Lango where a branch was opened in
1952. Its expansion outside Buganda, especially in Lango district, was a
great success. In Lango the party grew so fast that by 1960 it was the largest
and best organised party in the district. In the 1960 district council
elections, for example, it was able to field a candidate for each of the 43
seats in the council, and won 38 seats against only 2 by DP and 3
independents. (Burke 1977:255; Gertzel 1974:34-45). Indeed Obote himself
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was elected to the Legislative Council in 1957 as an UNC candidate. In
theory, therefore, UNC, with the additional advantage of its capacity to
carry a substantial portion of the Baganda with it, might have provided the
basis of integrating the nationalist politicians in the country if it had not
been for the force of factional interests. In any case the fact that UNC was
never able to organise into a cohesive political party was due in the first
place to the growing factionalism in it, especially after the 1958 Legislative
Council elections when non-Baganda politicians (the representatives of
the districts in the north, west and east of the country), joined it. (On this
see Sathyamurthy 1986:394-7). Musazi's 'undistinguished leadership' itself
was more likely a result of the other leaders refusing to be led than a case
of personal shortcomings. The problem was factionalism not domination,
because even if the other leaders feared domination, such fears were a
result of factional interests.
As for Moi and Ngala, the idea of a protest against Kikuyu/Luo
domination was made a political issue merely to save their faces. For just
under a year after independence, in November 1964, they voluntarily
dissolved the party when they realised it was not, in opposition, going to
give them any control of state resources or power. Both men thereafter
rejoined KANU and became prominent members in it. Moi in particular
became the most staunch supporter of Kenyatta within KANU (See
Chapter 6).
Factional politics of this kind has been observed elsewhere in Africa
at the time of independence. In Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leonean Peoples
Party (SLPP) of Milton Marghai, which was already 'a very loose coalition
of local elites', broke up as independence approached and Siaka Stevens
eventually formed his own All Peoples Congress (APC), so that at
independence in 1961 he become leader of the opposition, adopting the
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hinterland as his main political cause (Clapham 1976:14).
For the moment I will take leave of the other political parties, DP
and KADU, and follow the factionalism within UPC and KANU. For as
parties of government and controllers of all the state resources, they
became the arenas of competition and factional struggles.
Obote and the UPC Notables
As we have seen, the UPC was a product of factional struggles within the
UNC and the Legislative Council from 1958 to 1960. It was basically a party
of leaders because the notables who formed it were the elected
representatives of their respective District Councils. But from its
foundation in 1960 to the end of 1962, it presented somewhat a united and
nationalist front, and took pride in its claim to be the only nationally-
orienated party that at the same time represented African nationalism
within the country. (Low 1962:46-8; Sathyamurthy 1986:394-7). A number of
factors accounted for this early show of unity. The external appearance of
unity in the party was however largely due to circumstances other than
any wish or desire for unity on the part of the leaders.
The first was that the exact shape of Uganda's political future was
not yet settled and the course events would take was not known. The
leaders adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Secondly, the party was outside the
political arena. After the 1961 elections political power and its attendant
resources were in the hands of the DP who formed the internal self-
government (1961-1962). There were as yet no spoils to fight over. Third,
Buganda and its isolationist tendencies as projected by the Mengo
government was still sufficiently threatening. The very powerful position
of the Kabaka compelled them into a sort of union. The point may be
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made here that if there was no external pressure on the notables, the UPC
might well not have progressed to the stage of forming the first
independent government of Uganda in October 1962. The party was held
together by 'negative' forces pushing them together from outside. For
instance, the famous alliance with the Kabaka Yekka (KY) party which
brought it to power, like its formation in 1960, was forced upon both
parties by negative politics: their hatred for DP and desire to wrest power
from it at all costs.1 The KY hated DP because they felt that the DP leader,
Benedicto Kiwanuka, insulted the kabaka by setting himself outside, an
potentially above him. Kiwanuka was also a Catholic and a "commoner"
and the prospect of him becoming prime minister was not acceptable to
supporters of KY. "Feeling against DP in Buganda remained intense',
Mutesa later wrote, 'and it was our vision of life under [a DP] government
as the worst of all possible futures that led us astray' (Mutesa 1967:159-160).
But after UPC formed the government in October 1962 on the backs
of KY, the fear of Buganda rapidly receded and disappeared altogether in
1964 with the breakup of the alliance with KY. It had been strengthened by
defections from DP and KY members throughout 1963, and since the
opposition DP had been reduced through defections to only 16 MPs from
the original 24, the DP posed no political threat. The grudging cooperation
that had hitherto, in public at least, characterised the relationships among
the notables now gave way to open hostility, particularly over the issue of
leadership. Perhaps the logic was that Obote had served the purpose for his
election in 1960 and it was time he made way for those waiting in the
wings. Or, more likely, he was accumulating too much power and
entrenching his position in the leadership.
1Kabaka Yekka means "the Kabaka Alone". It was a party formed in 1961 by the
chiefs of Buganda and was almost exclusively committed to the promotion of Buganda and
the protection of the Kabaka's position.
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Four of the notables - Ibingira, Magezi, Nadiope and Kirya - who
had elected Obote leader in 1960 had became dissatisfied with him for one
reason or another. Ibingira had been a leading member of UNU before its
merger with Obote's wing of UNC in 1960. He had ambitions for the
leadership of UPC himself and from the beginning he regarded Obote as
unsuitable to be leader (Ibingira 1973 256-272; Mujaju 1976:456-7). Magezi
had been Secretary-General of UNU, and the first Secretary General of
UPC (March-August I960), but in August he was defeated for the post by
John Kakonge, a younger man also from Bunyoro. As Secretary General
Kakonge was theoretically the second most powerful man in the party. To
Magezi in particular the idea of Kakonge replacing him as Bunyoro's "Big
Man" was not welcome. Nadiope, who by his own admission had
supported Obote for the leadership in the hope that he would be
'controllable and usable' (Mujaju 1976:456), had failed to get Obote's firm
promise that he would become the President of Uganda in 1963 when the
Governor General left.
By 1963, therefore, the factionalism in the party had been articulated
into two broad factions: one led by Grace Ibingira, Minister of Justice, and
the other (a more uncertain one) around Obote. (Mutibwa 1992;
Sathyamurthy 1986. See also the recently launched and Kampala-based
magazine, Veteran Yearbook June-September, 1993, pp. 5-10). As a relative
of the king of Ankole and thus a "real" notable, Ibingira was backed by
some of the notables as Obote's replacement. In time Nadiope, Magezi and
Kirya, for their different but related reasons, became his associates. The
objective of the Ibingira faction was the removal of Obote from power.
This faction had the added advantage of having Mutesa and the entire
Mengo establishment on their side. As already noted, Mutesa had agreed to
the UPC/KY alliance as the lesser of two possible dangers and his relations
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with Obote had never been cordial. Moreover, he had not yet given up the
idea of Buganda independence, and saw Obote as a stumbling block to it.2
To make matters worse, Obote's strength in parliament had increased due
to defections from DP and KY, and he was in a position to hold the
proposed referendum that would return the "lost counties" of Bungagaizi
and Bugaza to Bunyoro in or after 1964 as stipulated in the constitution.
The two counties, together with a large swath of land between Bunyoro
and Buganda, had originally belonged to Bunyoro, but were annexed and
given to Buganda by the British in the late 1890s as a reward for Buganda's
assistance in the fight against Kabarega, the king of Bunyoro. The Bunyoro
had repeatedly but unsuccessfully petitioned the colonial administration
for their return.
At independence it was recommended that the independent
administration should, at least two years after independence, hold a
referendum to determine whether the people in the counties wished to be
reunited to Bunyoro or remain a part of Buganda. Since the population of
the two counties was overwhelmingly Banyoro, there was no doubt about
the outcome of the referendum. Mutesa therefore needed no persuasion
to support any anti-Obote faction. Ibingira also had allies in the army. His
brother, Major Barnabas Katabarwa was a high ranking officer at that time
and worked directly under the army commander, Brigadier Shaban
Opolot, another of his allies, and a friend of Mutesa (Omara-Otunnu 1978;
Mutibwa 1992. See also the recent account of the events at that time by
Opolot himself in Veteran Yearbook, June-September, 1993, p. 8).
Thus, in Uganda in 1960-4, we have a situation where the cabinet is
divided into hostile factions and the president and prime minister are in a
2 Already Mutesa had declared Buganda independent twice: in 1960 and again on 8
October 1962, the eve of Uganda's independence. The date is particularly telling and
indicates Mutesa's desperation at that time. In his opinion, Buganda had entered an
association with Uganda on 9 October as an independent state (Mutibwa 1992:34-5).
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state of enmity. Smooth functioning of government became difficult. More
ominously still, factionalism had spread into the armed forces, as was
evident by the suspected and feared alliance between Ibingira, Mutesa and
the two army officers, Opolot and Katabarwa. Obote's alliance with Idi
Amin from 1964 (see Chapter 7), was itself a part of this polarisation of
forces between the two factions. What we need to note here is that the
growing factionalism reduced Obote to resorting to the same measures as
his opponents were doing, such as the forging of conspiratorial alliances
for survival. He held power but no authority over the other leaders, the
concept of undisputed undisputed and authoritative leader had eroded.
How he responded to this threat and with what consequences will be
discussed in the next chapter.
Another factor that contributed to Obote's weakness was that the
UPC was organised in such a way that he could not use it for control, as
Kenyatta was able to do with KANU (Chapter 6).
Organisational Weakness of UPC
Structurally, UPC was organised almost as if to ensure that the centre
remained perpetually weak. In a small country like Uganda it might be
expected that a party committed to national unity would have led the way
in demonstrating the spirit of cooperation and unity to the people. But this
was not so. The force of personal interests in the party was reflected by the
fact that when elections of party officials was completed, four vice-
presidents were elected, one for each region, as follows. John Babiiha of
Toro kingdom for the Western Region; Nadiope from Busoga for the
Eastern Region; Oola from Acoli for the Northern Region and Luande
from Buganda for Buganda Region (Mujaju 1976:455).
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Since the party was hardly organised at that time, the creation of so
many prominent positions (designed to satisfy as many of the leadership
as was possible), was a serious liability to Obote as the national leader. The
result was that Obote was merely a co-leader, and cut off from the regions.
A clash with any of the leaders meant the loss of the entire district by the
party. For example, in February 1962 Chemonges, MP for Sebei county,
changed to DP when Obote failed to give a firm pledge that he would
establish Sebei as a separate district from Bugisu after independence (see
below). In the same year Nadiope threatened to pull out the eight MPs
from Busoga from the party unless Obote and the party supported him
for the office of president of Uganda at the departure of the governor
general in 1963 (Mujaju 1976:457). As Obote could not afford, because of
the UPC/KY alliance, to offend the Baganda by not giving the presidency to
Mutesa, he offered Nadiope the vice-presidency instead.
Y. M. Chemonges and Sebei District (1960-66)
The case of Y.M. Chemonges, the notable from Sebei District from 1960
until his death in 1966, may illustrate Obote's relationship with the UPC
notables during this period (on Chemonges see Young 1977:290-304).
Sebei was created a district only in February 1962 during the period
of internal self-rule by the DP. It had been one of the counties of Bugisu
District throughout the colonial period. Bagisu men were appointed
chiefs among the Sebei by the colonial administration during indirect
rule, but the Sebei did not seem to mind this: it was a colonial institution
and the Sebei probably felt it had little to do with them. But after Bugisu
District Council was given wider powers and responsibilities for local
services and development projects by the District Administration (District
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Councils) Ordinance of 1955 (above), the Sebei became interested in what
the council's activities and in who ethnically the councillors were
(Uganda Protectorate 19613). Sebei resentment against Bagisu "domination"
grew as they felt that the Council neglected their needs in developing
roads, health services and other development projects (Young 1967:294).
They also now resented the appointment of Bagisu chiefs and teachers in
Sebei. In 1960, in order to reduce expenditure in accordance with a central
government directive, the Council withdrew planned road extension
projects a promised ambulance to Sebei. The incident led to a demand for
a separate district by the Sebei.
It was at this stage that Chemonges, a Sebei who had worked as an
inspector in the Kenya police, took up the case of a separate district for
Sebei. According to accounts, in December 1961 Chemonges, with a spear
and shield in hand, confronted one of the assistant district commissioners,
and demanded that Sebei should be proclaimed a district on the spot.
Chemonges was tried and fined, but his boldness made him popular
with the Sebei, and encouraged more acts of defiance against Bugisu
District, including the refusal to pay taxes from 1962 (Young 1967:296). In
the 1961 elections which established self-government in Uganda,
Chemonges stood as the UPC candidate in Sebei county and won about 85
per cent of the votes over his two Bagisu opponents. But when Benedicto
Kiwanuka, the DP leader and prime minister of Uganda during the brief
internal self-government period before full independence in October 1962,
created Sebei a separate district in February 1962, Chemonges changed to
DP, so as to be in a position to tap Central Government resources on behalf
of the district, and because Obote was opposed to the creation of more
3 This is also known as Sessional Paper No. 3 of 1960, Report of the Commission of
Inquiry into the Disturbances in Certain Areas of Bukedi and Bugisu Districts of the
Eastern Province During the Month of January 1960, Entebbe, Government Printer, 1961.
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districts which he felt encouraged ethnic particularism. Again in the 1962
elections which brought KY/UPC to power, Chemonges won 86 percent of
the Sebei vote as DP candidate; but DP was not in power this time , so he
changed to UPC again. In 1962 Sebei elected its constitutional head, the
Kingoo, and Chemonges was elected to the post unopposed. He was now
an MP, a minister, and chairman of the Sebei District Council and and the
constitutional head, all rolled in one. The significance of this was that, as
the sole political lord of Sebei, UPC and even Obote were in no position to
operate within the district without Chemonges' cooperation.
Thus, in Uganda, between 1960-1966, Obote had no control over the
UPC notables, just as the government he led had little to no control over
the districts, which remained the fiefdoms of the notables. This led to a
situation where, from 1963 to 1966, UPC had a collective leadership, but no
effective leader (See, for example, Sathyamurthy 1986:430-451; Mujaju
1976:443-467). Accordingly, the period was characterised by intense struggle
for the leadership of the party and country, between two loose factions that
developed around Ibingira and Obote. Behind Obote were those ministers
from non-kingdom regions of the country, such as Adoko Nekyon from
Lango, Felix Onama from Madi, while Ibingira's allies were from the
kingdom regions, notable among whom were George Magezi from
Bunyoro and Nadiope Mathias Ngobi, both from Busago. It was the
antipathy between the two men, and their struggle for the leadership of the
party and country, that more or less influenced the political development
of Uganda in the early 1960s.
Various alliances were forged for or against one or the other. Obote's
support for Kakonge can be explained by the fact that both of them were
"minors" compared to the other notables. Kakonge in particular depended
on his abilities to survive politically. As already noted his parliamentary
96
seat in 1961 had been in Buganda and not Bunyoro. He therefore did not
have the kind of local power base the others had. It was a case of the weak
coming together for survival in the face of threats from the strong. In 1965,
after Ibingira's detention, Obote appointed Felix Onama, another minor
notable, to the post of Secretary-General of the party for the same reason.
He dared not appoint anyone with stronger political power base than
himself, for fear that he might be elbowed out of power by the appointee.
Kenyatta and the KANU Notables
As in UPC, factionalism was rife in KANU in 1960-64. That is to say,
factional struggles continued unchecked In fact, factionalism within
KANU was more widespread than in UPC because while UPC was a
coalition of local leaders, KANU was a coalition of both local leaders and
local political parties. (See Chapter 3). In all delegations from 30 political
organisations attended the meeting at which KANU was formed
representing the district political parties.
Factional conflicts in KANU had two main bases: ideology and
personal/ethnic, although the two bases often overlapped. Factionalism
that arose over ideology was inherited from KAU. When Kenyatta
returned from Britain in 1947 and was subsequently elected president of
KAU, frictions arose between him and the more radical members of the
party, led at that time by Bildad Kaggia. KANU thus all along had radical
and moderate wings, which after independence continued to be a basis of
friction (Spencer 1985:145-200; Kaggia 1975:80-3). Oginga Odinga became
associated with the radicals, and the rest of the leaders remained on
Kenyatta's side. However, since the moderate group around Kenyatta were
able to undermine the radicals through 'isolation and exclusion' from
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positions of power, the ideological divide of the party was more of an
irritant than threat. (Good 1968:115).
Of greater impact on KANU's weakness was the personal/ethnic
factionalism. There was Oginga Odinga at the head of the Luo, Gichuru
representing the Kikuyu and Ngei and Ngala respectively the Akamba
and Coastal peoples. There were also men like Mboya with urban power
bases in Nairobi, and Moi, who represented the interests of the smaller
ethnic groups. From 1960 to Kenyatta's release in August 1961, the party
nearly broke up due to the struggle for the leadership. Mboya, who was
suspected of scheming to become leader of the proposed "Uhuru Party",
started quarrelling with the other leaders even before KANU was formed,
since 'at least some of the party's founders intended to exclude him from a
position of national leadership' (Bennett and Rosberg 1961:38). When
eventually the executive council was elected, Oginga Odinga became vice-
president, James Gichuru acting president and Mboya secretary general,
but they continue to quarrel. Early in January 1961 Gichuru for example
suspended Odinga from his post, on the grounds that Odinga was
allowing foreign interference in the affairs of the party. It was only
Kenyatta's election to the leadership of the party that perhaps preserved it.
Good's assessment of his role is accurate when he writes that if 'any single
leader held responsibility for KANU's development, it was Kenyatta'
(Good 1968:116; See also Gertzel 1970:16-7). However, Kenyatta did nothing
more than keep the party from actual disintegration, because factionalism
within it continued unchecked.
What perpetuated factionalism in KANU also had to do with its
organisation. Since KANU was a coalition of district notables with their
parties, its branches remained stronger than the headquarters even after it
was in government. In 1961, it had as many as 30 branches. This was the
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number of delegations that had formed it at Kiambu the previous year.
The chairmen of the branches were the district notables, and were
moreover represented on the party's governing council. In terms of sheer
numbers the branch chairmen could, if they wished, outvote the few
members of the elected executive council. Election to the executive council
was moreover done by a delegates conference, consisting of delegations
from the branches selected by their respective chairmen. The party was
hooked on the districts and the centre remained weak, encouraging
indiscipline and factionalism.
The party as a means of serving Kenya was only a secondary
consideration, after personal and factional motives. The issue of personal
motives in politics is complex. A politician may fight to become leader of
his party, but not necessarily because he believes in the party ideology or
the good that the party can do for the country. More likely it is because he
knows that a position of leadership would enable him to acquire personal
rewards, such as wealth. In terms of personalities, KANU's weakness was
due to the fact that it was made up of men who were, or considered
themselves and acted as if, they were bigger than the party. The party
existed to serve these men rather than the other way round. The party's
rules and constitution were disregarded4 . Bennett and Rosberg (1961:42),
sum up the problem of personalities that beset KANU during this period
nicely, in the following words.
Factions were fostered in a competition for influence and control of
the party; they then became an end in themselves ; their success
being more important to certain leaders than the success of the party
as a whole. As KANU branches evolved from previous local district
associations, many took on the characteristics of local autonomous
parties, sending delegates rather than representatives to the national
4 KANU in fact did not have an 'authorised' constitution. According to Bienen (1974:82),
there were in the middle 1960s a number of different versions of the party's constitution. As
these versions were not dated, it was not possible to know which was the authoritative one.
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governing council.
But while factionalism in the party kept it weak and disorganised,
this did not undermine the position of Kenyatta, nor encourage the other
notables to challenge him. The party's weakness as an organisation
likewise made it useless as a route to challenge the leader, through, as we
will see in Chapter 5-6, Kenyatta was able to use as an agent of control. This
was the great difference between the positions of Obote and Kenyatta as far
as party factionalism was concerned. Since he could not stop it, Kenyatta
allowed factionalism to flourish in KANU, but carefully set the
government above the party (Bienen 1974:81-7). Therefore, no matter how
weakened the party was, and no matter how powerful a notable became
within a party, neither was in a position to pose a threat to Kenyatta.
KADU's early dissolution also made KANU the only political arena, so
that a notable who had ambitions for party leadership faced the difficult
task of forming a new party.
Whereas in Kenya most local politicians needed to associate
themselves with Kenyatta even in their own districts to enhance their
own popularity (the clear exception here was Oginga Odinga, who, as I
show below, was politically self-sufficient and did not need any association
with Kenyatta), in Uganda Obote the leader needed the local notables more
than they needed him. Factionalism and the weakness of KANU proved to
be an advantage to Kenyatta, while the weakness of UPC and factionalism
were to Obote's disadvantage. For instance in 1965 KANU also created 8
vice-presidents, (one each for the seven regions in addition to Oginga
Odinga). But this was designed to undermine Odinga Oginga, who since
1960 had been the sole vice-president and built some following within the
party. The arrangement strengthened Kenyatta's position because it
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ensured that there was no alternative focus of power so close to him in the
party. Moreover, whereas Kenyatta imposed the diffusion of power from a
position of strength, Obote had to accept the same from a position of
weakness.
Oginga Odinga and Nyanza Province
Nyanza Province under Oginga Odinga provides a good example of
regions as political fiefdoms of the notables. Odinga's stronghold Central
Nyanza District, subsequently became the political nerve centre of the
whole of Nyanza Province. He had started building himself in 1946 when
he set up the Luo Thrift Trading Corporation, to help Africans to establish
small businesses in Kisumu, where, according to Odinga (1967:80) , Asians
dominated trade and 'Africans did not own a single business'. It opened a
string of shops and a few hotels in the town and other centres in the
province. It also owned and published a weekly paper, the Nyanza Times.
By the 1950 Odinga had established himself as the undisputed leader of
Nyanza and the Luo people: in 1953 he was elected president of the Luo
Union, their "national" political party.
Following the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954, and opening of the
Legislative Council to directly elected African members, Odinga was the
obvious choice for Nyanza. It was through Odinga that KANU spread to
Nyanza Province after the party was founded in March 1960. Indeed at first
it was thought that KANU was a part of the Luo Thrift Trading
Corporation because the party branch offices were set near, and often
operated from the offices of the former. (Lonsdale 1968:146n). Although he
portrayed himself as a nationalist (Oginga 1967), the substance of his
politics, as that of other politicians in Kenya (Chapter 5-6), was provincial
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and local. During the campaign for the 1963 elections, for example, Odinga
concentrated his campaign speeches mostly on rural development issues
in Nyanza, such as cooperative farming and small trading enterprises
(Gertzel 1970:101-2).
In Chapter 6 we will discuss how his strong hold on Nyanza led to
the development of conflicts between him and both Mboya and Kenyatta,
and how it led to his eventual expulsion from the party in 1966,
Factionalism and the Independence Bargains
Besides increasing conflicts among the political leaders and the effects of
this on the ruling parties, factionalism trapped political development by
the demands it placed on the centre to satisfy district and provincial
particularism. The reason for this was that in the pursuit of their
interests,the politicians adopted their respective ethnic groups and districts
as their causes. In a more conventional political setting, the pursuit of
political ambitions can produce positive results for the state because
political competition revolves around issues other than personalities. In
the Western democracies, for example, a politician may pursue his or her
ambitions by adopting a certain ideology or issues like the provision of
education or health as the cause. The adoption of the districts had the
unfortunate effect of pitching the districts in Uganda and provinces in
Kenya against the central governments, just as the political notables were
pitched against Kenyatta and Obote.
It was against the background of these factional struggles, and in
order to accommodate or contain the claims of the various factions, that
prior to independence the leaders in both countries had to bargain hard
amongst themselves on the "terms" of independence at the Lancaster
102
House constitutional talks in London between 1960 and 1963: Kenya in
January 1960 and February 1962; and Uganda in November 1961 and again
in June 1962. (Kenya Colony and Protectorate 1960; Uganda Relationships
Commission Report, 1961; Gertzel et al 1969). The result was that the
constitutional settlements at these talks were not only confusing and
unworkable, but left the central governments, in legal terms, under
considerable control by the provinces and districts. Uganda's relationship
with Buganda was for example described as federal, that of the kingdoms of
Toro, Ankole and Bunyoro were semi-federal, while the other districts had
normal or unitary relationship with the central government. Kenya had a
similarly decentralised and even more confusing constitution. These are
discussed below.
Federal Constitution and the UPC/KY Alliance in Uganda, 1962-1964
Uganda's independence constitution of 1962 represented a considerable
surrender to the periphery and surrender to the demands of Buganda.
Uganda was formally divided into 5 kingdoms and 10 districts,each with
varying degrees of autonomy. The kingdoms were defined as federal states
within Uganda, with their own governments and services. Although the
National Assembly was described as supreme, the legislatures of the
kingdoms were in fact above it. It was stated that after 'full independence,
the Assembly would become a sovereign legislature, subject always to the
entrenched rights of the kingdoms and other restrictions in the
constitution (Relationships Commission Report, 1961:62, emphasis added)5
The Buganda lukikko in particular was given 'exclusive powers' to make
laws for Buganda with regard to the public service, taxation, the powers
5The Constitution of Uganda, 1962, adopted the recommendations of the Relationships
Commission Report, 1961 ( usually referred to as the Munster Report).
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and duties of ministers of its government and its own national holidays
and festivals. The few areas in which the central government had
jurisdiction within Buganda were external affairs, defence, passports,
professional qualifications and external trade (Uganda Protectorate 1961:34-
5; Sathyamurthy 1986:416-7). It was granted twenty-one members in the
National Assembly (formerly Legislative Council), which it had the option
to elect directly or nominate through the lukikko (its parliament), and 3
members for Kampala to be directly elected.
The constitution also provided for the election of constitutional
heads in each district to raise their status to a par with that of the
kingdoms. The secular districts 6 were not granted the right to indirectly
elect their representatives, but this was not a problem since the notables in
each district and the district councils were in a position to ensure that the
notables themselves, and nobody else, were always elected. As a result,
none of the districts objected to Buganda indirectly electing its
representatives. Only the DP, and for its own interests, opposed the plan
and stood for direct elections nationally, and for a strong central
government.
The most significant immediate direct result of these constitutional
provisions was that the elections of June 1962, held to determine the
independence government, had an inconclusive outcome. None of the
parties (UPC, DP and KY) were able to form a government alone, leading to
the ill-fated UPC/KY alliance (1962-1964). Anticipating such an outcome,
the two parties had at the end of 1961 made a plan under which UPC
undertook not to contest any seats within Buganda in the 1962 elections so
that the twenty-one places granted for Buganda under the constitution
6/'Secular districts" to distinguish them from the kingdom districts. Before the abolition
of kingdoms in 1966 and breaking of Buganda in 3 districts, the kingdoms also constituted
administrative districts.
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would be filled by the lukikko's nominees.
The scheme worked and KY was able to nominate all twenty-one
representatives to the National Assembly. The DP won only 3 seats within
Buganda and 21 elsewhere in the country. The UPC/KY alliance therefore
formed the government, with DP in opposition. The strength of the
government in the National Assembly at independence on October 1962
was 67 seats against the DP's 24.7 Although the alliance was consistent with
the politics of factionalism, it was unfortunate because it undermined the
government's freedom of action. In theory, if KY-Buganda had not been
granted as many as 21 indirectly elected seats, the alliance might not have
been necessary since either DP or UPC could have emerged strong enough
to rule alone.
The constitution lasted for a while because the UPC was in no
position to change or even threatened to change it. For within the UPC-
led government, the KY members could defend it as a way of safeguarding
Buganda interests. Their support was necessary for any constitutional
change, which required a majority of 75 per cent in both the lukikko and
the National Assembly. Furthermore, within the government itself,
Obote's fifteen member cabinet included 5 KY members, two of whom
held the important ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs (Jorgensen
1981:218-9). As representatives of the lukikko they could not support any
anti-Buganda move by UPC.
The main preoccupation of the central government was sheltering
itself, and ensuring that it did not collapse. This effort necessarily involved
appeasing the notables whose demands were the reason for the centre's
weakness, and this again involved giving additional powers to the
districts. As I will show below in the case study of Sebei District between
Actual result was UPC, 37 seats; DP, 24 seats and KY 21 seats. But the constitution
provided for 9 specially elected members. Of these the UPC had 5 and KY 4.
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1860 and 1964, the politics of factionalism led to the accumulation of
power by districts and district notables which they did not have at the time
of independence.
Regionalism in Kenya
Like Uganda, Kenya started independence with a severely decentralised
constitution known as majimbo (or regionalism). This provided for a
power-sharing between the central government and regional
governments. The country was divided into 7 provinces: Nyanza
Province, Southern Province, Northern Province, Coastal Province,
Central Province, Rift Valley Province and Nairobi Province.
Constitutionally the provinces were almost autonomous mini-states with
their own governments, each of which had the attributes of a national
government: they had their own regional assemblies, with both
legislative and executive powers; separate police force; independent
financial control, and control over land.
The regions derived their power direct from the constitution, not
from the central government. The central government itself was divided
into a lower and an upper houses (or the "commons" house for Kenya as a
whole and the "lords" house for the provinces). Members of the lower
house were elected directly by their constituents, but the upper house was
indirectly elected by the districts.
To change the constitution in any way required a 75 per cent
majority in each house, and to change it in ways that would affect 'the
entrenched rights of regions or districts' a majority of 90 per cent of the
upper house was required. (Kenya Colony and Protectorate 1961:129). The
upper house therefore held virtual powers of veto in regard to
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constitutional amendments, and by projection over policy formulation.
The only areas in the regions where the central government had
unrestricted jurisdiction were defence, international trade and major
economic development projects. Even for the purpose of maintaining law
and order, or in order to pursue criminals, the central government could
legally act only at the invitation or consent of the regional government
concerned.
The complex legal details of which power belonged to which level of
government did not by themselves present KANU with many problems.
At any rate, the party did not implement the majimbo constitution, or
adopt it as the legal instrument. That the majimbo constitution remained
on the books as long as it did was due to the fact that KANU lacked the
constitutional means of removing it. If the party ha its way, the majimbo
constitution would never have entered the legal books of Kenya. The
main reason for the brief operation of the constitution was that as a party
KANU was too divided to implement policies that, individually, the
members approved of in principle, out of fear that their cooperation might
strengthen their opponents within the party itself.
From the time of internal self-rule and the whole of the first year of
independence, the Kenya government was in no position to act decisively
against the constitution because most of the politicians fought for their
local power bases at the expense of the centre, KANU sought without
success to establish its authority over the regions and ambitious ministers
within the parties of the coalition. Moreover Ronald Ngala, the KADU
leader, was at that time the minister of regional administration,
responsible for centre-regional relations. As KADU supported regionalism,
Ngala was in a position to frustrate KANU's declared policy of destroying
the regional assemblies, and actually tried to weaken the centre even more
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in favour of the regions. According to Oginga Odinga, the vice-president,
Ngala was able to 'dismantle the centralised machinery of administration
and transfer it to the regions' (1967:234). While this, coming from Ngala's
opponent, may be an exaggeration, it does show the amount of frustration
within the KANU leadership against the regions.
Implications for Obote and Kenyatta
Although the weakness of KANU and UPC as parties of government was
not the most serious problem the new states faced during their first years
of independence, their central roles as governing parties made their
abilities or weaknesses crucial to the immediate and future development
of the two countries. It fell on them to manage the new states. The manner
in which they set about the task of 'nation building' have had important
bearings on how the states have developed since.
It was the the manner in which the leaders of the parties sought to
overcome their weaknesses that led to the forging of clientelistic ties.
Obote was, from the beginning, unable to establish a formal or recognised
pattern whereby resources necessary for the maintenance of patron-client
relations could be seen to be controlled and dispensed by him. To put it
another way, he was unable to gain direct control over political resources,
and became a competitor in patronage politics. His problems were
compounded even here by the fact that, as a minor notable, he had to
compete with other other notables with more established holds on local
politics in their districts. The other prominent politicians within UPC
remained his equals or superiors; as a result the party had a sort a
collective leadership, which only increased factionalism. Kenyatta, on the
other hand, guarded his position as the grand patron, with unwritten but
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clearly understood rules of who would get political resources and who
would not. Kenyatta also had the option to use the constitution as a
political weapon if necessary, and this increased his existing strength, an
alternative not open to Obote. The terms of the UPC/KY alliance tied
Obote's hands: for the time being the constitution was not a weapon he
could use. This was the essential distinction between the two leaders as far
as the construction and management of patron-client relations was
concerned.
A final point to note is the availability of political resources to
KANU and UPC. This is important when considering why Kenyatta was
more successful in establishing and managing clientelism than Obote.
In this regard, the extent to which the two governments controlled
economic resources was critically important. The government of Kenya
had control of substantial economic resources, including control of land.
In the next chapter we will discuss how Obote and Kenyatta responded to
the problem of factionalism around them between 1964-1966.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Politics of Local-Central Relations and its Effects, 1964-1967
We have noted that the strength of the party notables in both Kenya and
Uganda derived from their dominant positions in the districts, in
particular from their control over, or at least influence on, the district
administrations. This was especially so in Uganda. The danger of there
being several mini-states within the two larger ones was becoming a
reality.
The response of the central governments to this situation was to
attempt to wrest control of the district aministrations from the notables. In
the two years from mid 1964 to mid 1966, the central governments
systematically undermined the relative autonomy of the provinces and
the districts, and UPC and KANU had become, in different ways and to
different degrees, the dominant centres of power. In Uganda, by the end of
1964 the party's strength in the 92-member National Assembly had
increased to 60 from the original 41 at independence and all the district
councils were controlled by UPC councillors (Sathymurthy 1981). In Kenya,
the dissolution of KADU in November 1964 left KANU the only political
party, and Kenya had become a de-facto one party state.
But there were important differences between the positions of Obote
and Kenyatta after the undermining of the oppositions. Due to the
different methods used in overcoming opposition to the centres, the
impact of the assertion of central control on factionalism in the two
countries was quite different. Factionalism intensified in Uganda and the
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notables become potentially more dangerous to Obote, while in Kenya
Kenyatta's position was strengthened and made more secure.
In this chapter I will discuss the process and methods by which UPC
and KANU undermined the power of the districts and provinces, and how
Obote and Kenyatta asserted their control (through not authority) over the
parties. There are three main sections. In the first I will demonstrate how
the assimilation of the districts in Uganda strengthened rather than
weakened the notables against Obote. In the second I will show how, in
contrast, the undermining of the provinces in Kenya through the civil
service strengthened Kenyatta's position against the notables. In the last
section I will comment on the implications of the ways in which
factionalism was contained, and assess the relative positions and strengths
of Obote and Kenyatta within their respective parties and governments.
Increased Factionalism and the Power of the Notables in Uganda
As already noted, in Uganda the districts were the most important political
units, their positions being constitutionally entrenched in the
Independence Constitution of 1962. The political importance of Uganda's
district councils, as far as their relations with the Central Government was
concerned, had rested to a large extent on their powers to make
appointments to public offices in the districts. After the District
Administration (District Council) Ordinance of 1955 (discussed in Chapters
3 and 4), local appointments boards were set up in each of Uganda's 15
districts under the control of the District Administration. The district
councils therefore controlled all the important resources in the district,
such as jobs, contracts and licensing. As we will see in a moment, this was
in stark contrast to the developments in Kenya, where these very resources
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were shifted in the hands of the Provincial Commissioners; and since the
Provincial Commissioners were directly appointed by Kenyatta, he
retained control of the resources. Also in Uganda, provincial councils,
which could have provided alternative source of employment and
patronage as in Kenya, were abolished in 1955 The supervisory post of
Provincial Commissioners were abolished in 1962 and the roles taken over
by District Commissioners. (Burke 1977. See Figure 5.1).
Furthermore, as in most developing countries, there was hardly any
prospect of meaningful employment outside the civil service. District
administrations became the key to anyone's advancement. And herein lay
their political importance to the notables: whoever controlled them
politically was assured of power. With the commitment of the UPC
Government to a strong central government, control of the district
councils was therefore an important objective in the calculations of
national politicians. As a result from 1962 the party notables, with the
active support of the Government, became heavily involved in district
council politics. But it is important to stress that it was individual
ministers, often on their own behalf and in their own districts, who
established UPC as the dominant party. This helps to explain why, even
when the UPC had severely undermined DP influence in politics after
1964, Obote as leader remained weak, while Kenyatta remained strong as
leader although KANU was a weak party organisationally
In terms of hierarchal set up, a district administration at that time
was divided into two branches. One was the legislative branch (the District
Council) and the other was the executive branch (the District
Administration). After independence the practice during the colonial
period continued, and the district councils were democratically elected
within the districts, and made local laws in addition to providing local
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services (see Chapter 3). But the implementation of Central Government
regulations, the signing of contracts and any liaisons with bodies outside
the districts, were the responsibility of the District Administration, a body
consisting of three non-councillor officials - the Secretary-General was
the chief executive, assisted by the Assistant-Secretary General and the
Financial Secretary. The positions of these officials were laid down in the
Local Government Ordinance of 1962, enacted before full independence by
the DP caretaker government, and retained by KY/UPC after
independence. It was stipulated that these three officials were 'elected by
the district councils by a direct majority' (Sathymurthy 1981:51).
But this changed in 1962 when the District Administration was
placed under the Ministry of Regional Administration. It was by the
simple expedient of taking away the power to elect these officials from the
district councils that UPC control was established over the district. The
UPC notables wanted to eliminate DP influence from the districts. For
while in the National Assembly the government held a comfortable
majority of the DP, and KY members in the coalition posed no threat to
UPC, the situation in the districts was different. In Acoli District, for
example, DP was the majority party, and the struggle between the two
parties made administration impossible for long periods. Inter-party
struggles and quarrels over the election of the three officials in Teso, Kigezi
and Bunyoro similarly affected the smooth running of administration.
(Leys 1967:92-5; Sathyamurthy 1981:105-120; Burke 1977).
By 1964 the Minister of Regional Administration had taken powers
'to choose the Secretary General and the Financial Secretary from a list of
names submitted by the council' (Sathymurthy 1981:51). Even the District
Council Chairman and Administrative Secretary (the latter being the
executive officers), were now appointed by the Minister in this manner.
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Figure 5.1
Structure of Local Government in Kenya, showing direct control from the



















Note: Since 1968 the third tier (local Councils) have been abolished
Source: D.G MacDonald. 'The General Pattern of Local Government in
Kenya'. In Gertzel et al, 1969.
Figure 5.3b
Structure of Local Government in Uganda, 1962-1973, showing no direct
control by the Chief Executive













Source: Sketch by the Author, from Robertson, 1982
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The Minister also took powers 'to speak ... at any council [meetings] and to
appoint a chairman to any council which failed to do so [and] keep such a
chairman in office in spite of any council resolution to remove him.
The ministers who held the Regional Administration portfolio
between 1962 and 1967, C. Obwangor (1962 -1964) and J. Lwamafa (1964 -
1967), were largely responsible for extending UPC control over the districts.
But this "party penetration" was uncoordinated by the party, and resulted
in strengthening individual UPC MPs rather than the party, and less still
Obote. (See Burke 1977; 1967; Sathyamurthy 1981). The basic characteristics
of the UPC as a coalition party of powerful district notables was not only
maintained but also promoted., with a corresponding weakening of
Obote's position.
The Ministry of Regional Administration was thus able to ensure
that in each district these important offices were filled by active UPC
supporters, which in this local setting meant the supporters of clients of
the district UPC notable. Also, the criteria for their appointments were
party affiliations and support, and the recommendation of the notables,
and not merit. In February 1964, for example, Obwangor, acting on behalf
of Felix Onama, the MP for Madi District, appointed T. Akuti as District
Financial Secretary even when the whole council opposed his
appointment (Bundy 1977b:279-84). As Sathymurthy (1981:50-51) has noted,
the appointment of civil servants for the purpose of political expediency
had led to the complete politicisation of the Uganda civil service even
before the 1967 republican constitution. As already noted, these
appointments in the final analysis merely increased the powers of the local
UPC MPs. For while in theory the politicisation of appointments in the
civil service helps in strengthening the position of the leader, as it did in
Kenya under Kenyatta, the effect in Uganda in relation to Obote's position
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was different. This was because the appointees remained the clients of the
respective district notables, not Obote's direct clients. As such his
opponents within the party were strengthened, which further weakened
his position.
Two conclusions may be drawn on the assumption of the
appointment powers by the local notable in the name of the Central
Government and the ends to which they applied these powers. First, UPC
dominance was established in the districts and DP influence was
undermined in district politics through these political appointments. In
every district the Minister of Regional Administration naturally used his
powers to the benefit of the local UPC notable even if there was no direct
personal benefit for in it for him. Secondly, a sort of order was imposed on
district politics through the elimination of DP influence and neutralising
the disruptive activities of uncooperative UPC members in district
politics, especially in districts like Acoli. The segmentary pre-colonial
political system of the Acoli had promoted loyalty at the clan level, so
when districts were imposed over several clans, intense clan and sub-
county competition made district government almost impossible. (Leys
1967; Bundy 1977). But their most important effect remained the
strengthening of the local UPC notables against the centre. (Compare
Figure 5.3)
An example of how the position of local notables were strengthened
may be noted here. In 1964, Obwangor appointed Lakidi, MP, and Obita for
chairman and deputy chairman respectively to the Acoli District Council
in the face of opposition of the majority of the councillors. Obita's support
in the district council was only half that of the other candidate, Akera: but
since Akera was an opponent of Lakidi, and had aligned with the DP in a
previous vote of no-confidence in the UPC Secretary General of the
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council, P. Oola. Obita's appointment thus eliminated both DP and anti-
Lakidi influence in the council. (Bundy 1977:36-7). Also in 1965, in the
face of fierce opposition from the members of Kigezi District Council,
Lwamafa, the Minister of Regional Administration and Kigezi UPC
notable, chose his friend, Bitakaramire, as chairman of the council.
(Connor 1977:236-7).
In Madi District, although the District Council was predominantly
-to
UPC, and all the names submitted the minister were those of UPC
A
members, some council members did not like the eventual appointment,
on the grounds that one official had only recently defected from DP, and a
delegation went to Kampala to protest. But the minister, Obwangor,
'simply told them that he had consulted the Honourable Onama, the
Minister of Internal Affairs [MP for the District], who had agreed to the
appointments, and so the decision was final'. (Bundy 1977b:283).
Sathymurthy (1981: Chapter 3) recounts intervention by the Ministry of
Regional Administration in similar situation in Kigezi and Toro during
the same period.
The last Central Government legislation designed to perpetuate
UPC hold over the districts was enacted in 1967 - the Local Administration
Act, 1967. This act primarily aimed at incorporating the former kingdom
areas, including Buganda, into a uniform local administration system with
the rest of the country after the crisis of 1966 and the subsequent abolition
of kingdoms. Buganda was divided into three districts - West Mengo,
Masaka and Mubende - which brought the total number of districts in the
country up from 15 to 18. But a significant, though somewhat unnecessary,
clause was the requirement that henceforth teachers could not become
district council members. It was not particularly necessary because the UPC
was already in an unassailable position in the districts. The significance of
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the act was that the removal of teachers from district council politics was a
severe blow to the DP. At both national and local levels DP politicians were
mostly teachers. Although teachers were fairly well represented in Uganda
politics as a whole - for example 34.6 per cent of the candidates in the 1962
National Assembly Elections were teachers (Uganda National Assembly
Elections, 1962) - most of them tended to be DP and Catholic. In Acoli
District in the same year, 'all 21 elected [DP] councillors were Catholics -
and about 80 per cent of them teachers in Catholic schools' (Bundy 1977:32).
Effects of UPC Success on Obote's Position
The success of UPC in undermining DP and extending its control over the
districts in 1962-1964 led to increased conflicts and factionalism within the
party leadership. As the party became "externally" stronger with increased
resources, competition for the control of these resources among the leaders
increased proportionately. They supported the party and even praised
Obote in order to use both of them. The leaders flocked to the party
merely because it was the best-resourced arena, not to support a cause or
the party itself, but to compete over the resources. They now more or less
controlled the party rather than the other way round. Glentworth and
Hancock (1973:240) accurately describe this situation and Obote's position
during this period:
Ministers, district commissioners arid even some permanent
secretaries saw themselves, and were regarded, as the chief patrons
and protectors of their localities, and in accordance with the system
their relatives and clients came to Kampala or gathered at district
headquarters to claim their appointments, promotions and financial
rewards...For ... Obote it meant that as chief patron he could widen
his power base [but] without being completely secure or certain about
his following.
118
It was this situation which undermined Obote's position as leader,
forcing him to throw himself in the on-going factionalism in order to
survive. His intervention was a critical step because it effectively put his
position as one of the prizes in the factional struggle. In fact, as I will show
in a moment, it was precisely his intervention, and the effort to settle the
leadership question, which precipitated the series of events leading to the
1966 crisis. For until 1966 the question of who was the effective (rather
than the formal) leader was not settled.
Establishment of Presidential Control in Kenya
In Kenya, the problems of central-local relations was resolved in a simple
but highly effective way: by eliminating the "relationship" itself, so that
the Central Government and the various units of local administration
became one and the same thing. The provinces, which the majimbo
constitution had made as the political fiefdoms of the notables, were taken
over by Kenyatta, and turned into administrative rather than political
institutions. This undermined their importance to the notables since they
no longer provided routes to the top. The notables were, so to speak,
rendered politically homeless because the ground was cut off from under
their feet. They thus needed Kenyatta's support more than the other way
round. What Kenyatta needed and used was not therefore the notables, but
the Provincial Administration; and not KANU or Parliament or even the
Cabinet, but the Presidency itself (On this see Bienen 1974; Gertzel 1970;
Mueller 1976; Karim and Ochieng 1980; Throup 1987). Below I look at these
two important instruments of presidential control, the Provincial
Administration and the Presidency, in some detail. In shifting these two
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agencies, Kenyatta was able not only to avoid reliance on the party, but also
to actually control it, or when convenient, to ignore the factional struggles
within it.
The Provincial Administration
At independence in 1963 Kenya inherited a well developed Provincial
Administration. The Provincial Administration had acted as the major
agent of control to the colonial Governor especially during the difficult
days of the emergency and "Mau Mau" uprising, when the colonial
administration used it 'to ensure stability and the continuation of British
rule' (Mueller 1984:402; See also Bienen 1974). The administration of
Home Guards, detention centres, and new villages set up during the
emergency had required the strengthening of the Provincial
Administration, so that at independence it had become a highly efficient
machinery of government.
Besides, the Provincial Administration that Kenyatta inherited was
to some extent more powerful than it had been during the colonial days.
The KADU-led coalition government during internal self-government
(May 1963-December 1963), due to its commitment to and in order to
make the majimbo constitution work, had sought to weaken the centre by
transferring powers to the regions (Odinga 1967). Constitutionally,
therefore, the provinces constituted sorts of mini-states within Kenya
during that brief period. But Kenyatta, rather than dismantling their
powers (which in any case he could not have easily done), chose to 'take
them over' and turn them into his agents. In terms of central-local
relations, therefore, Kenyatta was the colonial Governor reincarnated,
with the provinces as his agents rather than competitors. In fact Kenyatta
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has sometimes been described as "the last colonial Governor of Kenya"
because of this position (Bienen 1974:77).
The hierarchal set up of the Provincial Administration is shown in
Figure 5.2 (p 96 above). Under the provincial commissioners were district
commissioners at the head of each district, each with district officers,
senior district officers and assistant district assistants. Below the district
assistants were chiefs and sub-chiefs. Before independence and during the
period of internal self-government, it had been under the Ministry of
Home Affairs. But in 1964 it was transferred to the Office of the President,
presumably because Oginga Odinga, them Minister of Home Affairs,
attempted to turn it into a political weapon for his own use by seeking to
institute more direct links between the national executive and the civil
servants so as to undermine the Regional Authorities (Gertzel 1966:202-4).
Under the new arrangement, the Provincial Administration was
headed by the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, who was
also Secretary to the Cabinet, and who reported directly to the President
Kenyatta. The appointment of chiefs and sub-chiefs was the responsibility
of the President, who selected them from a list of names submitted by the
district commissioner concerned. The provincial commissioners, being
appointees, had no independent power base, nor could they create any as
they were not allowed to engage in any form of party political activity.
Unlike the District Administration officers in Uganda, the provincial
officers in Kenya were therefore not available as clients for the district
notables. The KANU notables were thus cut off from real political support
from their own areas because open support for a politician by a a civil
servant carried severe potential sanctions. They had to do Kenyatta's
bidding, even if that meant, as it often did, acting against the local KANU
party leader, MP or a minister. In 1965 Mboya spelt out these sanctions as
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including 'dismissal .. reduction of rank or seniority ... stoppage of
increment and retirement' (Gertzel at al 1969:357). Such threats from the
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, as Mboya then was, acted as
sufficient deterrent. This was why, as already noted, they did not become
the agents of local political notables as in the case of district officials and
UPC notables in Uganda.
In fact the two groups were in perpetual conflict because each
'believed that it was the legitimate representative of the people' (Gertzel
1966:202). The effect of this was that the strength of the provinces became
the strength of the President. And since the Provincial Administration
controlled political resources, for example licensing, registration of
business, societies and clubs, as well as issuing permits for the organisation
of meetings and rallies, they held effective power over the local politicians.
The Provincial Administration worked closely with the local agents of the
Registry of Societies, a branch of the Attorney General's Office, and
ultimately under Kenyatta's control.
The Presidency
Within the Government itself KANU notables were also deprived of real
power. Unlike in Uganda, all the important political functions in Kenya
were concentrated in the Presidency and in loyal hands. Just as Kenyatta
controlled the individuals in the Presidency from above, the Presidency as
an institution controlled the whole country, in an intricate clientelistic
network. KANU was relegated to the background. Its importance become
largely as a recruiting arena into one of these central institutions and into
politics in general. (I will return to this in Chapter 6). Now I turn to look in
some detail at the individuals who constituted the Presidency.
122
From independence in 1963 Kenyatta had built around him a small
but powerful group of confidants on whose loyalty he relied entirely. This
was the group sometimes called the "Kiambu Group", "KANU A", the
"Court" or the "Gatundu Group". The significant thing about the group
was that all the members came from Kiambu District in Kikuyu, and each
had an intimate personal relationship with Kenyatta, and collectively they
made up the presidency. (See Karim and Ochieng 1980; Murray 1968:44-8;
Throup 1987:46-50). It consisted of Mbiyu Koinange, Kenyatta's brother-in -
law and head of the Provincial Administration, the Special Branch (GSU),
and the Police; Njoroge Mungai, Kenyatta's nephew, personal physician
and at different times minister of defence and foreign affairs, and Charles
Njonjo, the Attorney General. Their relationship to Kenyatta was that
between a patron and his clients. Collectively Kenyatta could not do
without them because they were stronger than him and sometimes made
decisions without his knowledge 1 . But individually each depended on the
President. If Kenyatta wished he could dismiss or demote any one of them.
This was especially true of Mungai and Njonjo, because unlike Koinange
they had no independent political power base.
None of the other important politicians who at one time or another
assumed prominent positions in Kenya politics during Kenyatta's
presidency, such as Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga, Mwai Kibaki, Joe
Murumbi and Moi, were so close to Kenyatta. Moi, Mboya, Odinga and to
some extent Kibaki each had his personal power base in their respective
districts (unions in the case of Mboya) and could not be treated as loyal
clients. They were excluded from the inner cycle when convenient.
'This is important because it "sounds" as though Mboya's assassination in 1969 involved
some of Kenyatta's powerful clients, without his being able to anything about it, either
before or after. (See Goldsworthy 1982:264-279). In terms of the exercise of power,
Kenyatta's relationship with these particular notables was like that of a knight on his
impulsive horse in the wilderness: he could direct the horse but dare not hurt it seriously as
he depends on it to carry him home.
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(Bienen 1974:75-6; Throup 1987:47-8; Goldsworthy 1982:268-9).
The relationship between Kenyatta and the top politicians in the
government was demonstrated in May 1968 when the President had a
sudden heart attack. For two days no one except Mungai, Koinange,
Njonjo and Moi (then Vice-President) knew of Kenyatta's condition. 'The
other cabinet ministers were told nothing, and the government remained
silent...' (Murray 1968:44). It was these politicians within the government
who ruled Kenya on behalf of Kenyatta. His open disengagement from
everyday politics indicated his confidence in them as clients. Since his
political survival was also the survival of these clients, they worked to
ensure just that.
Even the dissolution of KADU and establishment of a republic in
1964, which in theory should have posed a threat to Kenyatta's position
because of the increased number of notables within one political arena, in
practice strengthened his position. The political paradox after the
establishment of Republic in 1964 was that the ruling party, KANU,
remained weak and poorly organised, while the government, centred
around Jomo Kenyatta, became progressively stronger. The weakness of
KANU as a party of government was thus amply made up for by and
simultaneously reinforced the strength of the government itself as the
organ of central control. The positions of these two organs of state, party
and government, were such that unlike in the more conventional settings
where the government depended on, and in theory derived its power and
essence from the party (for example in Uganda and Tanzania before 19702l
2 A myriad of examples of the importance of TANU in Tanzania can be cited. After the
1964 army mutiny, TANU established organisational links with the most important forces
in the country, such as the military, the civil service and youth organisations. The Arusha
Declaration required MPs to toe the party line. Also in 1962 Nyerere resigned from the
prime ministership specifically to reorganise the party: thus emphasising its importance to
the government. In Uganda, as already noted, Obote was unable to make his government
stronger than and (had he tried) independent from the party.
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the Kenya government derived its essence from, and depended on, the
Presidency. The government could, and to a large measure did, function
"without" the party. As such the widespread factional in-fighting within
the party did not affect the ability of the government to govern. Neither
did it lead to the weakness of the government as it did in Uganda. The
contrary was the case because the relative unimportance of the party meant
that the government became 'the real thing', able to build itself support as
it wished and on its own terms and without bothering about party
regulations.
The successful shift of power from the party to the government
early on is important in understanding the political stability of Kenya after
independence. For if power had remained in the party, the competition for
it among the politicians would have overwhelmed the political process (as
it did in Uganda), because of the absence of a well-evolved political
institution in the country to act as a reference point and the coalition
nature of KANU itself, coupled with the sheer diversity of Kenyan society.
The shift of power also made it easier for Kenyatta to establish patron-
client relations on a less risky and therefore more durable basis because it
was clear that no one except himself as head of government was in charge.
The diffusion of power among the notables who made up the UPC in
Uganda had led to Obote's weakness as leader since few needed him
politically as he was himself a competitor for the resources of patronage.
In Kenya Kenyatta avoided this trap.
The Positions of Obote and Kenyatta in a Comparative Perspective
In Kenya, the firm control over the Provincial Administration by the
Presidency, and Kenyatta's personal control over the Presidency itself,
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meant that the notion of political control was real. The concentration of
power at the centre in the hands of Kenyatta, not KANU, also meant that
in the final analysis there was an institution able to regulate political issues
at all times. Factionalism was not reduced, but it was dispersed to the
political periphery and kept there, because the Presidency (the institution)
and the KANU (the political arena) had became separate with the party
under, and not above, the Presidency. KANU became a tool for the needs of
the Presidency. The Government made no secret of where real power lay,
nor of the fact that KANU was considered relatively irrelevant compared
to the Presidency. This preference of the Presidency as the centre of power
was explained by Mboya in 1964 as follows. 'KANU leaders have decided
that it is the government that will be the ... authority in the land, and the
ruling party ... must become the instrument aiding the government in its
tasks and efforts' (Good 1966:119). This sent the message to any ambitious
politician that one's best chances of political advancement lay in being
loyal to the Presidency.
For Obote Kenyatta's position was a political luxury beyond his
wildest dreams. For reasons already discussed Obote was unable to
establish effective control over UPC and remained dependent on it. This
was one of the decisive factors which made the political developments of
the two countries so different after that date. "Centralisation" in Uganda
was not really centralisation because UPC dominated the country without
centralising power in the hands of the Government or Obote. Worse,
power was dispersed in different hands within the party. Therefore, once
the opposition parties were eliminated from effective competition within
this arena of power and state resources, competition within the ranks of
UPC intensified. Factionalism in Uganda was therefore tragically
concentrated at the centre. It important to bear in mind Obote's position of
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Figure 5.3
Patron-Client Relations in Kenya after independence, showing Kenyatta's
overall control
Figure 5.4
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weakness in understanding the manner he and the government
responded to the series of crises from 1964 to 1966. These crises included
the army mutiny of January 1964; the break-up of the alliance with KY
(August 1964); the resolution of the issue of the "lost counties" of Bunyoro
(November 1965); the "gold allegation", and finally the destruction of the
kingdom of Buganda in 1966. The last was followed by the establishment
of a unitary state in the interim constitution of 1966.
To a large extent all these crises were related, with one leading, often
directly, to the other. As leader Obote had to jump trains to reach any
destination. In view of both the number and seriousness of the problems
Obote survived, the period has sometimes been called a revolutionary
period, and seen as a blessing for Uganda. (Young 1966; Obote 1969; Adoko
1970). In the view of these writers, the period was the era in which
Uganda finally solved its major problems of regional and factional
particularism and achieved unity. It is true that by the end of 1966 the
central government had technically established its control over Buganda,
the army and to some extent the party, but in the final analysis these
successes were more of a curse than a blessing when the country's long
term interests are considered.
For regardless of Obote's temporary triumphs, Uganda's political
experience between 1964 and 1966 provided the basis of unstable political
development. What might have happened if Obote did not succeed must
remain anybody's guess. It was the manner of the resolution, and how they
provided the basis of further instability, rather than the resolutions
themselves, that need to be considered.
Obote's attempt to free himself from their control and establish his
domination became confused in a series of alliances from the very
beginning. Obote's first alliance was with Kakonge from 1960 to 1962. But
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he was forced to abandon Kakonge to the Ibingira faction in 1964 and from
that time he was more or less in a fluid position. From 1964, he had
apparently shifted his alliance onto his fellow-Langi politicians, Adoko
Nekyon, Akena Adoko and Felix Onama, and, by association, Idi Amin
and the army. The effect of these alliances on the party was that instead of
'growing' into a viable political institution, the UPC progressively
disintegrated
It was against the background of factional struggle for the leadership
of the party that the 1966 crisis broke out. While a number of events
contributed to the 1966 crisis, the most important event was the fall of
the UPC-KY alliance in August 1964, and the holding of the referendum
over the "lost counties" and their subsequent return to Bunyoro later that
year. One of Mutesa's reasons for agreeing to the alliance in the first place
had been the hope that it would act as a restraint and prevent Obote
holding the proposed referendum on the future of the counties and
returning the two counties to Bunyoro. To salvage his reputation within
Buganda, Mutesa adopted a confrontational attitude towards the Central
Government, and appears to have had both military and constitutional
plans for removing Obote from power. The constitutional strategy
manifested in the famous "gold allegation" motion brought in parliament
by Daudi Ocheng, with the encouragement of Ibingira. Daudi Ochieng
accused Idi Amin, and two of Obote's closest associates, Onama and
Nekyon, of illegally obtaining gold from Congo (now Zaire), and called for
for an investigation into the affair. Ocheng was the Secretary General of KY
and a close intimate personal friend of the of Mutesa. Ibingira, as Minister
of State, UPC Secretary General and Leader of the Cabinet, allowed the
motion to proceed after the UPC Parliamentary Group had rejected it off
hand when it was first suggested. (Adoko 1970).
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Obote's political weakness was further demonstrated by his response
to this threat. Instead of fighting back constitutionally and in parliament,
he opted (which he had to in order to survive), for the summary arrest and
detention of Ibingira and his associates, and thus put an end to the
debate.(Ibingira 1980; Mutibwa 1992). From the end of 1965 Obote resorted
to force and authoritarian measures to rule and retain power. His
unilateral suspension of the constitution of 1962 in February 1966, and
forcible arrest of five cabinet ministers to prevent an imminent vote
against him in the "gold allegation" motion were manifestations of
authoritarianism. The military action against Kabaka Mutesa three
months later, in May, was in his view the the final and triumphal act
against the Ibingira faction of the party. But contrary to the popular view
that Obote consolidated his hold on both the military and UPC after 1966
(Omara Otunnu 1987:66-90; Mutibwa 1992:42-69), what actually happened
was the destruction of the Ibingira faction; factionalism continued within
his own alliance. His relations with the military, which occupied most of
his time from 1966 to his overthrow in 1971, was less than that of a patron
and clients.
Conclusion
The success of Kenyatta as a patron, and therefore the basis of political
stability, also had much to do with the shifting of power within the
government. The shift of power from party to government represented
only the 'outer' level but in itself was not that important because without
any future shift of power the government would have been subject to
factionalism and collapse. The relationship between the government and
the presidency is therefore important in the understanding of patron-client
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relations. KANU depended on the government, which in turn depended
on the Presidency, which in its turn depended on the personality of
Kenyatta. This was the skeleton of political Kenya. Personalities came and
joined the various institutions, the party, government and Presidency, but
the institutional order remained unaltered. Even after Kenyatta's death in
1978, Moi simply stepped in the President's shoes. Despite claims that he '
destroyed' the "Kenyatta State" (Throup 1987) the chain of relationships
remained the same3, serving the state throughout the presidencies of
Kenyatta and Moi. Thus Oginga Odinga's "rebellion" proved ineffective
against the institutional skeleton (1966); the state survived the
assassinations of Tom Mboya (1969), J.M. Kariuki (1975), Robert Ouko
(1988), and an attempted coup d'etat (1982).
The enduring durability (so far) of the Kenyan state has been
attributed to the role of Kenyatta as a father figure around whom the
diverse forces in the country found unity. (Bienen 1974:72-80). While
Kenyatta enjoyed a high degree of popularity until his death and the
respect he enjoyed was a factor in Kenya's stability, this was not solely, or
mainly, due to the emotions of devotion. More important was the political
structures Kenyatta set under himself once he became leader in 1963. For
even if Kenyatta were to became a hated figure (as he became in some
sections of his own Kikuyu people after the assassination of J.M. Kariuki in
March 1975 (Weekly Review: 7 March, 1975; 9 June, 1975; Throup 1987:48-
9; Tamarkin 1978:309-300; ACR 1975-1976:B2201-2), those who might have
wished to threaten him politically would have to grapple with more than
just their loyalty to him. Loyalty was therefore a convenient but not the
3 This is not to say that it is the institutions - the presidency, government and party -
that have clients. It is to stress the importance of these institutions in the ability of the
politicians controlling them to recruit clients for themselves. For example, if power had
rested in the party rather than in the presidency, Kenyatta himself would have failed as a
patron.
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essential basis of political stability in Kenya. Kenyatta had constructed a
tight patron-client network that stretched from the presidency through the
government, KANU, to the rural areas. He had ensured that the heads of
all the important institutions of state were tied to him, directly or
indirectly through subordinates. More will be said about the management
of these relationships in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER SIX
Clientelism, Its Management and State Stability in Kenya
1966 -1975
As we noted in Chapter 5, clientelism had failed to evolve in Uganda due
to Obote's inability to assert his authority over the UPC notables. Factional
struggles not only continued but also expanded into other sectors of society,
for example the civil service and the military. After the crisis of 1966, but
especially after the introduction of the Republican Constitution of 1967,
politics in Uganda consisted primarily, to use Bayart's words, of 'forging
alliances in order to regain or retain power' (Bayart 1993:211) as an end. In
short, factional struggles had deteriorated into spoils politics, in which the
winning faction, Obote's wing of UPC, sought to exclude all other factions
from positions of power.
In Kenya, in contrast, Kenyatta had succeeded in generally asserting
his authority over the various factions. Factional struggles were
transformed into clientelism as a result. As the political experiences of the
two countries from 1966 have been very different, their experiences are
best considered separately. (See Figure 5.3).
This chapter is concerned with developments in Kenya from 1966 to
1975. It discusses how clientelism emerged as the principal system of rule
in Kenya and how it was maintained in that position, so that it remained
viable. It is generally a theoretical discussion of how clientelism as a
system of rule can be managed. It discusses how Kenyatta maintained it
through an elaborate system of control and rewards as well as coercion.
For control I suggest that the regime's access to economic and political
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resources made it possible for it to recruit supporters by offering these
resources as patronage to those who mattered to it. On the coercive side I
argue that Kenyatta succeeded in maintaining clientelism in part because
he was willing and able to continue using the constitution as a means of
control and also to eliminate his opponents physically if necessary
The easiest way to appreciate the role of clientelism in state stability
in Kenya is to see it as a political institution that under Kenyatta's
guardianship displaced the other institutions that in a conventional
setting might have been the primary agents of rule, namely, KANU and
Parliament, and the Cabinet. Under Kenyatta both KANU and parliament
were weak, and ceased to function as governing institutions. (Bienen
1974:64-78; Tamarkin 1978:297-320; Miller 1984:34-63).
"Institutionalisation of Clientelism" in Kenya
Clientelistic politics, on the other hand, was so well institutionalised that
it subordinated these formal institutions. It made them subordinate
because in effect parliament, KANU and the Cabinet became primarily the
means for recruiting clients for the regime, which controlled access to
both of them for this purpose. In this capacity KANU and parliament
served the regime rather than the country. Their primary roles were in the
regulation of the clientelist system as gates into and out of it; and therefore
also in institutionalising and maintaining clientelism. It was in this
capacity as the dominant institution that it ensured state stability. As
Huntington (1968) has argued both a viable institution and a degree of
participation by the population in that institution are necessary for stability
of a given state.
For a more detailed discussion on how clientelism as a system of
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rule may be said to be institutionalised/ see Chapter 2.t With regard to
Kenya, the displacement of the formal political institutions, KANU,
parliament and cabinet by clientelism was important and need to be
stressed. If, as in some countries (notably in Italy), clientelism becomes
merely an alternative institution alongside the formal state institutions,
the effect would be a perpetual instability. If each institution (including
clientelism) remained strong enough to undermine the others, the
consequence would eventually undermine the viability of each, and
ultimately destabilises the whole political system. For example, if Kenyatta
established his clientelistic network outside the provincial Administration
in Kenya, his agents and the provincial commissioners, performing their
formal duties, would be in perpetual conflict. Such competition was
avoided in Kenya because, as we have seen in the previous chapter, even
within the provinces the provincial commissioners, representing the
Presidency, were stronger than the local MPs, who represented KANU.
The viability of clientelism was also ensured, since though it was
supreme, it was not insensitive to potential opposition. It was above
KANU, but not in opposition to it. As such Kenyatta was able to absorb
substantial opposition forces within his clientelist system, at the same
time as he undermined those he could not absorb. KADU was dissolved in
1964 and its former leaders became Kenyatta's clients, so to speak. The
radical wing of KANU, led by Odinga and Kaggia, were undermined and
the leaders politically destroyed. Also when Mboya was assassinated in
l ^
1969, the emergence and possible institutionalisation of trade unionism as
a powerful organisation in Kenya was prevented. Instead, in recognition of
the dangers of opposition to the state and the rewards in supporting it, the
various factions became eager to show their support to Kenyatta, which
strengthened both his position and clientelism as a system of rule. The
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central position this development had accorded to Kenyatta in Kenya
politics is clearly borne out in the following observation by the Weekly
Review of 27 October, 1975:
The temptation on the part of the various political factions within
KANU has been to present themselves as more loyal to the
President than the other factions. It's an age-old process of politics ...
and has been a constant feature of national life since independence.
It speaks very well for the strength of the President, for he is looked
upon as a measure of national loyalty... (p. 4)
Management of Clientelism
But it was not enough merely to establish clientelism as the dominant
institution. Like other institutions it had to be managed by its own
unwritten laws to ensure its own stability in order to ensure that of the
state. The instability of empires and other feudal institutions arise from
the fact that they are controlled through static forms of clientelism which
are incapable of regulating themselves. In a patrimonial clientage, for
example, patrons and clients are 'fixed', often kinsmen. As a system of rule
it remains insensitive to the surrounding political environment. The
result is that the state becomes detached from the population as a whole
because of the lack of links between them. Since it has no mechanism for
absorbing sections from "outside" even on a minimal and periodic basis,
public discontent may grow and this is in turn often met by repression.
Repression in fact becomes the only state response to threatening
developments around it. Revolution would result in the long run. The
fall of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in 1974 is a good example. The
progressive disintegration of Zaire since the early 1980s and the political
stagnation of Malawi are other cases in which the institution of clientelism
136
has not been managed. (We will see in Chapters 9 and 10 how the failure to
properly manage clientelism under Moi led to this development in Kenya
from 1982) \
Clientelism in Kenya has however avoided becoming stagnant by
constantly reaching out for new clients. There were three major and
established systems in which this was done. The first was by the
distribution of land and other economic resources, such as retail trade,
from the early years of independence. By the 1970s, Kenyatta had already
established a narrow but powerful base of support for his regime out of
those who had steadily benefited from state patronage.
The second was the celebrated and officially-sanctioned Harambee
system of promoting rural development through self-help projects.2
These projects acted as the means of distributing state resources to the
people through selected politicians as the agents of the state. They
provided a machinery through which the people as well as the politicians
received the rewards of their support of the regime. (See Widner 1992:60-
62, and pp. 144-6 below for details).
Entwined with Harambee projects in the regulation of clientelism
were the regular elections to which politicians were subjected. As a
"movement" it became an important part of electoral politics: a part of the
campaign for politicians, and a basis on which the electorate judged whom
to vote for. Consequently, elections became the major means by which the
regime regulated clientelism because it was able to simultaneously reward
loyalty and punish dissent without appearing nepotistic and repressive.
1On Zaire, see for example Crawford Young's article, 'Zaire: the Shattered Illusion of
the Integral State.' Journal of Modern African Studies, 32, 2 (1994), pp. 247-263. On
Ethiopia, see Christopher Clapham's surgical study, Haile Selassie's Government. (London,
Longman, 1969).
2 Harambee is a Swahili word meaning roughly "lets pull together", and was used by
Kenyatta both as a political philosophy and a rallying slogan. (See Widner 1992:60-110;
Thomas 1985; Holmquist 1984, and many others).
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Thus elections, through essentially client-recruitment exercises, were an
important part of managing the clientelistic system.
Finally, the regime was able and willing to protect the institution of
clientelism from 'external' attack by ensuring that those it could not bring
under its clientelist umbrella were prevented, by any means, from
undermining the system. The fates of Oginga Odinga, Tom Mboya and J.M.
Kariuki, to which we will refer from time to time in this study, illustrated
this. (Goldsworthy 1992; Miller 1984; Tamarkin 1978),
Land and Trade Transfer Programmes
In Kenya, perhaps more than other African countries, independence
meant more than just the transfer of political power to the nationalist
politicians; it also meant the transfer of substantial economic resources
that were previously in settler and Asian hands. Thus the politicians who
gained power also gained control of economic resources to distribute.
Distribution involved the transfer of several categories of land as well as
retail and wholesale trade that had been in the control of Europeans and
Asians respectively. The Africanisation of the civil service, which opened
up career opportunities for Africans, also provided the government with
patronage to give.
Landlessness was a sore problem at independence, but it was
matched by the availability of land for distribution under the control of the
government. With the end of the Mau Mau struggle, former fighters
returned from the bush and needed land. European farmers also dismissed
most of the Africans who had been working on their farms out of fear that
after independence the government would either fix higher wages for
farm labour or enact laws making it impossible for them to dismiss the
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"squatters", thus adding to the landless pool. (Leo 1981:201-112). As for the
availability of land, in addition to land the government acquired as a result
of the land reform programmes of the 1950s, new lands came in its
possession with independence. Some European farmers, fearing what
they regarded as the "hazards" of African majority rule wished to sell their
lands and emigrate. The colonial administration's response was to
purchase land from the European farms for distribution to landless
Africans. Britain, the World Bank and the then Commonwealth
Development Corporation provided financial assistance to purchase farms
from Europeans for the purpose (Leo 1981:201; 1978:621-2; Wasserman
1973:133-48).
The use of land as a political weapon was not new in Kenya. The
massive land consolidation programme started in 1953-4 had aimed at
building up middle-class farmers, or "yeomen" as agents of the
administration. The idea was to give them property so that they would not
engage in subversive acts since they would have much to lose if violence
intensified or continued. The administration therefore started a policy of
registering land and giving titles of ownership to Africans more as a part
of the policy of winning the war against Mau Mau than promoting
agricultural production. (Berman 1990:366-8. See also Throup 1987a;
Rosberg and Nottingham 1966).
This was by no means the only land the government controlled.
Following the much discussed Swynnerton Plan of 1954, (See, for example,
Mohiddin 1981; Coldham 1978:614-627; Harberson 1971:231-251;
CO/822/9713), the colonial government had started a massive land
consolidation and registration programme designed to give titles and
tenure on land owned by Africans. The largest and by far best known of
3 This reference is to documents held at the Public Record Office, Kew, in Surrey.
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the land transfer programmes was the Million Acre Scheme, designed to
settle 35,000 families. This was designed to transfer parts of the formerly
"Scheduled Areas" to selected African farmers. (Wasserman 1973:133-48;
Harbeson 1971:231-151; Leo 1978:219-238, 1981:201-222). The various
settlement schemes brought under government control a total land area of
about 1.5 million acres, which included about a fifth of the former White
Highlands, and comprised as much as 4 percent of all agriculturally
suitable land in Kenya. (Leys 1975:74-5; Hazlewood 1979:29-52)
Implementation of the scheme started in 1961, with somewhat over
ambitious programme to settle some 2,400 farmers on small and large
categories of farms, or 'yeoman' and 'peasant' farms respectively.4 The
attempt was a failure, however, in part due to inadequate funds and only
small number of farmers were settled by 1962. Thereafter a series of more
manageable methods of land transfer were adopted. The programme was
hardly implemented by the time of independence and it was left to
Kenyatta to undertake its implementation.
In its implementation, land consolidation was subsequently used as
a form of political control on the lines started by the colonial
administration and openly employed during the emergency. Kenyatta
continued the policy of land control in the same way and it seems for the
same purpose that the colonial administration used it. He continued to
reward loyalty and punish 'opposition'. Bildad Kaggia, who advocated
scrapping the land consolidation programme altogether and giving land
free, fell out with Kenyatta and was dismissed as an assistant minister in
1965. (Odinga 1967). In addition there were smaller sub-divisional
settlement schemes under government control. These were for people
4
Large or 'yeoman' farms were those designed to yield income of £250 or more per year
and small or 'peasant' farms were those designed to yield around £100 per year after
repayment of loan and other charges. (Leys 1975:74).
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who previously had been squatters on European farms. According to the
1970 -1974 Development Plan, 'by the end of 1968 approximately 13,000 of
these squatters had been settled on a total of 29 squatter settlement
schemes in the Central, Coast, Eastern and Rift Valley Provinces' (p.207).
Yet another scheme involved the transfer of the government's 19 large-
scale, loss-making "collective farm" at Ol Kalou. The farms, 57,000 acres
in all, were bought by the government between 1964 and 1965 but had
failed to make the expected profit under central management. In 1968 it
was divided up among the 2,000 families 'living' on it. By the time
settlement of Africans in the Million Acre Scheme ended in 1970, about
34,000 farmers had been settled under the various programmes. (Kenya:
Development Plan 1970 - 1974, pp. 199-201).
Land consolidation did not involve transfer of land from one
control to another as did the Million Acre Scheme and the other schemes,
but the establishment of titles through registration meant a sort of
government control because it could, as it often did, deny registration to
anyone it chose through the land control boards responsible for
registration. Wilson (1972:133-5) in fact found that these land control
boards usually considered applications for titles on political rather than
economic grounds. Political control involved, as it did in the colonial
practice of the mid 1950s mentioned above, both courting favour and
punishing dissent. Persons suspected of opposing the government, like
those suspected of supporting Mau Mau, were prevented from getting any
land. The land control boards were under the provincial administration,
with the relevant provincial commissioners as chairmen. It was thus
ultimately under the control of the presidency.
The programme to expand African retail and wholesale trade
combined with the transfer of land to give the regime effective power of
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patronage. Although on a very small scale, the promotion of African
traders through the issue of licenses, provision of loans and credit by the
government meant that retail and wholesale trade became yet another of
the sectors the government was able to use its influence as a form of
patronage to those it favoured. Of the 17,000 - 19,000 licensed traders doing
business in Kenya at 1960, there were 'hardly any Africans' in the more
profitable ranks of traders, who were predominately Asians (Leys 1975:150).
The government set up loan programmes to 'move Africans out of [their]
marginal position on the unprofitable fringes of commerce' (Ibid). One
loan programme, called the Joint Loan Board Scheme, involved the
central government and local authorities and paid out loans of between
£200 to £300 to enterprising African traders. Larger loan programmes were
also available to qualified African traders. In 1967 the government passed
the Trade Licensing Act to protect these nascent African traders by giving
them monopoly over certain specified goods. But the major agent through
which government controlled retail and wholesale trade was the Kenya
National Trading Corporation, set up in 1965.
The political importance of the settlement schemes and trade
expansion were far more significant than the statistics suggest. The
political objectives in both trade and land transfer far outweighed the
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economic objectives. Wasserman (1973:136) has thus said of the land
transfer programmes: 'The land schemes were the government's major
method of "letting steam out of the boiling kettle'". Africans in Kenya had
been more severely deprived of economic resources during the colonial
rule than those in either Uganda or Tanzania because the economy had
been controlled by foreigners. Despite its comparatively large size, only
about 17 percent of the land in Kenya is suitable for agriculture; the most
fertile parts of which was taken up by the 'White Highlands' and
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'scheduled areas' from which Africans were barred. The opening up of
these created in the Africans a corresponding fervent eagerness to acquire
property. The Kenyatta regime was able to manipulate this situation to its
advantage by using the distribution of resources under its control as
patronage for political support.
A major feature of Kenya politics after independence has therefore
been the distribution of economic resources and other opportunities
under government control with political rather than economic objectives.
Beneficiaries from the land and trade transfer programmes have been the
supporters of the regime. The relationship between political interests and
economic interests in Kenya - that is, the relationship between the
'political class' and the 'economic class' - have always been very close.
Politics and capitalism have merged, or at least overlapped in both
objectives and membership. The regime in Kenya has always promoted
the interests of the capitalist class, who in turn have provided the regime
with its strongest support. (Tamarkin 1978:310 - 320; Swainson 1980; Leys
1978,1981; Langdon 1988).
A brief look at the origins of the capitalist class and political class
may make the relationship between the two clear. KANU was more than
just an off-shot of KAU and its predecessor organisations. It was KAU
renamed, with the same membership and objectives. The formation of
KAU in 1944 was encouraged by the colonial administration, which
wanted an organisation of 'responsible' - which meant propertied -
Africans to advise Eliud Mathu, the only African appointed to the
Legislative Council at that time, on the feeling of Africans in Kenya.
Despite the almost immediate emergence of militant and radical wings in
KAU, it was the moderates an elite organisation whose members were
judged to have an interest in the stability of the colonial administration,
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and headed by Kenyatta and Mbiyu Koinange, that eventually controlled
political power. (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966; Odinga 1967:79-99; Spencer
1985). The "true" KAU, that is, the moderate as opposed to the militant
and radical wings, later re-emerged into the core of KANU that constituted
the independent regime. The KAU militants, under Dedan Kimathi, had
broken away and formed the Land Freedom Army ("Mau Mau"). The
remnants of the radicals within KANU were led by Odinga and Bildad
Kaggia.
It was the elite class that primarily benefited from the land and
trade transfer programme both before and after independence. The
overwhelming majority of the Africans were not able to obtain the loans
and credits for the purchase of land controlled by the government.
Hazlewood (1979:35) has observed that government officials, 'by pressure
and trickery, or by taking advantage of official positions, ... acquire[d] large
holdings, often with the help of bank loans'. Critics of the government
were sometimes bought off by offers in land and business. The practice of
buying off critics and rewarding loyalty by offers of economic benefits was
clearly evident in Kenyatta's much discussed attack on Bildad Kaggia in
April 1965, when he criticised him for 'wanting free things' instead of
using his position to acquire personal wealth with the help of the state.
(See for example Bienen 1974:70-76). Kaggia, as we have seen, was one of
the radical 'socialist' politicians who had not sacrificed his principles for
the allure of personal affluence. Kenyatta was clearly scornful because
Kaggia continued to talk for others instead of enriching himself. This was
an open invitation to Kaggia to join the club of the elite-politicians.
Land and trade transfer programmes helped the regime to build up
a capitalist class as its base of support. But this base was too narrow, centred
in the urban areas and in the Central Province. The danger still remained
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of the regime becoming isolated and vulnerable to attack from politicians
if they take up the cause of the overwhelming majority of the people still
outside. The rise of J. M. Kariuki as champion of the people and critic of
the regime in the early 1970s illustrated this danger. As Widner (1992:100-
109) notes, in as wider sense, Kariuki tapped on the frustrations of the
disappointed and made himself their champion, and therefore a potential
challenge to Kenyatta's position. This was however forestalled by the
regime through Harambee projects, through which the rich gave (or at any
rate appeared to give) to the poor, and helped the regime to expand its base
of support around the country.
Self-Help Projects and Elections
A part of the wealth the politicians and businessmen received were
channelled to the people through self-help or harambee projects, which
since independence have became a part of Kenya's national life. For this
reason self-help projects have been seen as the major (sometimes the
only) link between the government and the people. (Thomas 1985;
Holmquist 1984:72-91; Barkan and Holmquist 1989:359-380; Lamb 1984;
Lonsdale 1992). These links are on a reciprocal, take-and-give basis. They
are not technical and dead wood ties like one finds in feudal systems
where the agents of the centre are merely planted in the rural areas. As
Thomas (1985:67) has noted, self-help projects in Kenya have acted as
mechanisms for the exchange of resources from the centre for political
support from the rural areas, and thus have 'permitted a marriage
between the desires of the elites for a strong power base in the rural areas,
and the desires of the local communities to promote and secure their own
interests'.
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Self-help projects therefore maintained clientelism in Kenya in two
major ways. One, because they facilitated exchange of resources between
the local communities and politicians. The state was thus linked to the
people in a reciprocal relationship. The people were able to make their
demands on the state and these demands had to be met somehow. Second,
self-help projects have acted as determining factor in elections which, as I
will show in a moment, were the major method of regulating political
clientelism. Candidates are often elected or rejected on the basis their
actual contributions or potential abilities in self-help projects in their
constituencies. The failure or poor record of an incumbent may also act
against him and in favour of a challenger. Self-help projects have have
thus made local politics real and meaningful to both sides, and become
'the principal activities by which political leaders and aspiring leaders
seek to obtain power and advance their political careers'. (Barkan and
Holmquist (1989:360)). As a favourable verdict of the population was
necessary for any political advancement, the projects have afforded the
population with power and ensured the flow of services and other benefits
at the same time. This is why self-help projects have been taken seriously
by the regime, the politicians and the people alike since independence 5.
The system worked to the advantage of the state because the
politicians who did not or could not contribute substantially to
development projects in their loyalties faced defeat at elections (below),
and since for a politician to contribute he had to "beg" the funds from the
Harambee Fund controlled by the Office of the President. Furthermore,
under the Public Order Act (see below), even MPs needed licenses to
address people or organise meetings in their own constituencies, In the
early 1970s, Harambee meetings were defined as political meetings and
5For a systematic analysis of the origins, philosophy, implementation and political
implications of self-help projects in Kenya since independence, see Thomas (1985).
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therefore subject to licensing by the district commissioners concerned.
Since the district commissioners were under the control of the Office of
the President, they could deny a politician a license under orders from
high. (Widner 1992:94-100).
By the mid 1970s, local lobbies, in the form of formal organisations
at the sub-location6 level, sprouted up all over Kenya, solely for the
purpose of lobbying politicians into assisting in self-help projects in their
respective communities. Each of Kenya's 40 districts had an average of 345 -
400 local self-help organisations. Any politician judged to be bad or
ineffective in delivering services to the area was unable to escape the
criticism of these watchdogs and stood at risk of retribution in the next
general elections. This forced the politicians to be responsive to the local
demands. Self-help projects therefore provided the basis of the bond
between the people and the state: a 'movement' which regulated and
'shaped the rules of Kenya's clientelist political system [and] imbued that
system with a measure of legitimacy' (Barkan and Holmquist 1989:361).
Self-help projects also have helped in promoting development in the
rural areas to the benefit local inhabitants on the one hand, and on the
other, of transferring the focus of politics away from the centre, to the
benefit of the regime.
Deflection of Criticism from the Regime
The close ties between elections and self-help projects made it necessary
for politicians to concentrate on local issues during campaigns, and
development projects in their constituencies while in office. It was
pointless to focus on national political issues, such as constitutionalism,
6 A sub-location is the 'smallest unit in the Kenya administrative system', in area about
'two to five square kilometres' (Barkan and Holmquist 1989, footnote, p. 361)
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socialism or Africanisation. Self-help projects therefore had the additional
benefit of deflecting criticism from the regime and confining competition
to the constituency level. This further strengthened Kenyatta's already
strong position in the country as it became pointless to criticise him and
his government. In the 1974 elections, the powerful and long-serving
Foreign Affairs minister, Njoroge Mungai, campaigned on the basis of his
achievements as Kenya's international spokesman and of being for ten
years in charge of Kenyatta's personal health and failed to win. (ACR 1974
- 1975) The restriction of debate to local issues had the effect of limiting
competition and challenge at the constituency. This shift of focus made it
easier for Kenyatta to dominate, while at the same time enhanced his
status as the grand patron who was "above politics", and made his
government more secure in a number of ways.
In the first place, discontent was kept local; the chances for a
nationwide anti-government organisation was eliminated. Secondly, the
regime was better placed to deal with its critics at the local level rather than
the national level, through the use of the massive machinery of the
Provincial Administration, the Attorney General's office, the Register
General of Societies office, and the Police. This was the political fate of
Oginga Odinga from 1965. Politicians who could not be frustrated at the
local level, such as Mboya and Kariuki, had to be assassinated to remove
the threat they posed to the regime. In each case these assassinations
reflected badly on the government and the regime. Self -help projects
therefore made it possible for the regime to avoid taking such extreme
measures against its opponents.7
7 Both Mboya and Kariuki had, or were building, what may be described as national
constituencies, and were too prominent to be controlled at the constituency level. In fact
before his assassination in 1969 Mboya fought off several attempts to strip him of power in
his 'constituency' - the trade union movement of Kenya. See Murray (1968). Compare this
with the case of Oginga Odinga, who was powerful but had his power base at the
constituency level and in Nyanza Province.
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Combined with the holding of regular elections, self-help projects
became an institution in the management of clientelism just as clientelism
was the institution in the managing of the state. To understand the
significance of general elections in Kenya, it is more useful to ask what
functions they had in terms of regime support than it is to concentrate on
statistical analysis. The elections in Kenya have been, with the exception
of the "Little General Election" of 1966 and the 1992 one, one-party
elections. As non-competitive or semi-competitive elections they offered
no opportunity to the voter to elect an alternative government, nor the
choice of policies or ideology, (for a discussion of semi-competitive
elections, see Hermet, Rose and Rouquiet 1978). The choice was among a
set of individuals. Their importance lay in the fact that one's success
depended on one's loyalty to Kenyatta and the government. The elections
were therefore a means by which the Government strengthened its
clientelist networks. (For more detailed discussion of general elections in
Kenya since independence, see Hermet, Rose and Rouquiet 1971; Hyden
and Leys 1972:389-420; Barkan and Okumu 1978, and Barkan 1987:213-237,
1979:64-92).
Following Oginga Odinga's attempt to establish the KPU as an
alternative arena for the pursuit of political competition in opposition to
KANU in 1966-1969, the electoral rules were tightened to ensure the
further strengthening of Kenyatta's position. Only those candidates
nominated by a registered political party may stand for election (thus
independent candidature was ruled out; independent minded and
'disloyal' politicians were quickly screened out by the KANU machinery).
Also all (KANU) candidates were required to swear loyalty to Kenyatta
and KANU, and to openly declare their support for the policies of the
party and the constitution of the country. (Barkan 1988; 1978; ACR 1974-
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1975:B234-8). If a candidate was technically disqualified for any reason, only
Kenyatta could grant such a candidate clearance to participate in elections
again. The prerogative exercised by Kenyatta in deciding who could contest
elections was important both psychologically and in practical terms. He
could also 'rescue' someone from the political wilderness.
It has been argued, principally by Scott (1972) that the dependence of
patron-client relationships on the continuous flow of resources from the
patron to the client is inherently unstable especially if the patron, as in the
case of Kenya, happened to be the state. This is because the need to satisfy
the clients deflects state resources away from other projects or even drains
them up altogether. Also commenting on Kenya, Barkan (1978:107) has
warned of the same danger, in the case of Kenya:
As a greater proportion of those winning elections in Kenya actually
seek to fulfil their constituents' expectations the total sum of
demands which these political entrepreneurs will make on the
centre, and on the clientelist linkage structures themselves, may be
more than these nascent [clientelist] institutions can bear.
The exhausting or decline of resources may indeed occur as the demands
on the state by MPs to satisfy their clients at the local level cannot be
consistently refused without throwing the whole relationship in jeopardy.
As state resources are limited, the need to satisfy client demands may
compel the state to take measures that hurt the whole country or even
render it bankrupt. To increase revenue the government may raise taxes,
reduce the salaries of its employees, lower the price of some important
commodity that it has to pay to farmers, all of which could lead to
widespread hardships.
However, these conditions did not lead to instability and state
collapse in Kenya because the regulatory role of elections in the clientelist
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system. In the first place, the dissatisfaction of the electorate would be
deflected from the state to their own MPs who failed to deliver goods
expected of him. The severest sanction from the the people have been the
replacement of an MP with a more promising one, and so on. The
regime's relationship with the people have been maintained by the
sacrifice of a number of the 'middlemen'.
Corruption is the more likely negative outcome of a clientelist
system. It would inevitably result since the diversion of state resources to
support the clientelist network will introduce competition among the
patrons themselves for access to resources. When this happens, the
number of beneficiaries are likely to become fewer and higher up in the
structure, posing a real danger of a alienation between the state and the
patrons. In Kenya, however, self-help projects and elections somehow
maintained the centre-local relationship.
Coercion: Defending the Clientelist Machine
The regime's willingness to apply coercion was also important in ensuring
state stability in Kenya. It was important because it protected the clientelist
machine through which the regime ruled the country. Clientelism in
Kenya might have remained a viable institution due to the regular
elections and self-help projects. But without the coercive measures it
would still have been vulnerable to attack from outside. This danger was
real in the case of Oginga Odinga and Mboya, who each had their own
clientelist machines under themselves. (Chapter 4). In response to this
danger Kenyatta employed coercive measures to protect the system and
avoided the dangers of destabilisation. The political destruction of Oginga
Odinga from 1964 to the banning of his KPU in 1969, and the fate of Tom
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Mboya in 1969 were but the few tragic manifestations of the coercive
measures. Mboya's death and the ostracism for Odinga in fact fitted the
regime's strategy and may have ensured stability. (For a discussion of the
use of coercive measures against government opposition in Kenya, see
Mueller 1984; Ghai 1967; Gertzel 1970; Tamarkin 1978; Goldsworthy 1982a).
Anatomically, Kenyatta's "carrot and stick" policy of state control
may be divided into three sections. On one extreme Kenyatta often made
use of his undisputed charm and patronage to lure supporters and
opponents alike into the regime by the offer of incentives — jobs, etc. The
holding of regular elections, and self-help projects, were integral parts of
this policy of offering rewards and distributing them. Next to this was a
grey area, a sort of a political limbo where, depending on one's conduct, a
politician may either be diverted to the benefits of the carrot or condemned
to the pain of the stick. Bildad Kaggia was in this grey area when Kenyatta
made his "What have you done for yourself" attack in 1965. Some have
interpreted this speech as proof of Kenyatta's involvement in and
encouragement of corruption (Ngugi 1981). But it was more likely that
Kenyatta was pleading with Kaggia (who was present with 'his' elders 8), to
see more sense and join the club instead of pursuing the fruitless policy of
'free things for everyone'. The last resort included severe sanctions,
including death (Tamarkin 1978).
Coercion acted as an effective protection for Kenyatta's clientelist
8 This mattered. Among the Kikuyu (as among many other African peoples), self-
asserting is considered as an important virtue. And this is measured in terms of what a
person actually does for himself, rather than by some fine speeches he may make about
social justice. Kenyatta's intention seems to have been to prod Kaggia towards the party
line by portraying him as a failure in front of his own people. People expected politicians to
'do things for themselves' and whoever refrains is considered abnormal and unworthy of
support. Compare this with the fictional situation of 'the man' in Ayi Kwei Armah's The
Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born (Heinemann 1969), and with the very contrasting
attitudes of the people of the village of Anata towards their corrupt MP and minister
Chief Nyanga, and his challenger, the honest and young Odili Samalu, in Chinua
Achebe's A Man of the People (Heinemann 1966).
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regime in two important ways. In the first place, the knowledge that the
state had the means of punitive sanctions and was prepared to use it
frightened away potential challengers. Secondly, dangerous opponents
were eliminated, in some cases physically, thus ensuring the survival of
the clientelist state. So even if coercion did not play a significant role in
recruiting clients, it at least enabled the state to protect itself from
disintegration.
Coercion, either through the threat or actual use of force is not
popularly accepted as a feature of clientelism because the resulting
relationships are not based on consent and benefits only one side, the
patron. In a traditional setting where the patron well-established and it is
the client who normally initiates the relationship (see Chapter 2), coercive
measures may not constitute clientelism. But in a more modern setting
like Kenya, where patrons face competition from, and are thus themselves
threatened by other patrons, coercion is an important factor, at least in the
maintenance of clientelism, but also in recruiting clients. For instance, the
mafia in Italy built clients primarily through coercion. Walston (1988:14)
notes that during elections in Italy, the people in Mafia areas 'quite
willingly' vote for the candidates of the mafia in order to be on the safe
side. The mere knowledge that the one seeking office was a mafia
candidate was 'enough to constitute a threat'.
The Instruments of Coercion
The most distinctive characteristic of regime control in Kenya has been,
under Kenyatta, the government's ability to portray its excessive powers
as legitimate and constitutionally exercised. Repression has been made
legal. Repression has not been due to the abuse of the constitution; rather
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it has been due to the exercising of the powers of an abused constitution.
The Kenya constitution has had a series of amendments since
independence, and each amendment increased the coercive powers of the
government. From a weak beginning at independence in 1963, the
constitution had by 1970 been transformed into a formidable instrument
of control. 'If the constitution of 1963 had erred on the side of a weak
government ... now it errs on the side a too strong a government' (Ghai
1967:11. It is true that even before independence KANU had vowed to
strengthen the constitution because of the trappings of the regionalism
structure, but the ability to change the constitution tempted the regime to
turn it into a weapon against its opponents. For example, amendments to
the constitution were made with a record breaking speed after Oginga
Odinga broke from KANU and formed KPU in March 1966. By the end of
that year alone no less than four amendments were made to the
constitution (Gertzel 1970:145, 174-6). The constitution became more an
instrument of control by the regime than an instrument for governance.
To begin with, some of the most coercive laws of the colonial
period were retained after independence, and used for the same purpose
for which they had been designed. Notable among these were the Societies
Ordinance of 1952 and the Public Order Ordinance of the same year.
(Okoth-Ogendo 1972) The Societies Ordinance and the Public Order
Ordinance were designed to fight against the "Mau Mau" uprising by
frustrating its organisation. The Societies Ordinance resurrected as the
1965 Societies Act. Political parties and all their branches were required to
apply individually for registration before they were considered lawful
organisations and allowed to organise. One of the requirements for
registration was that an organisation should not be prejudicial to public
order and should not hold views not in conformity with any law in force
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in Kenya at that time (Mueller 1984:409). The agents of the Registrar
General interpreted these already loose requirements in any way they
chose. Thus, even though KPU was registered as a political party by the
Registrar General, an overwhelming majority of its branches were refused
registration.(See Table 6.1). This explains in part the poor showing of the
KPU in the "Little General Elections" of 1966. (See Table 6.1)
Table 6.1
KANU and KPU branches registered and refused registration between 1966
and 1969
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Source: Utilised by the Author from a more detailed table on the pattern of
party branch registration, in Mueller 1984:411
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Apart from these retained laws, most of the amendments to the
independence constitution, as already noted, were openly intimidating to
anyone who did not support the government. The 5th Amendment to the
constitution, enacted soon after Odinga broke away from KANU in March
1966, for instance required any serving MP who changed parties to resign
from parliament and fight a fresh election. This was followed by the Local
Government (Amendment and Special Provisions) Act of 1967. This was
essentially an extension of the 5th Amendment Act (which only concerned
MPs) to the rural areas to control officials in the various levels of local
government. It required councillors and civil servants at the provincial,
district and county levels who supported or sympathised with KPU to
resign their council seats.
These were the major instruments of control at the disposal of the
regime, and were employed in the political destruction of two of the
regime's most threatening enemies, Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga.9
Odinga's break with KANU has often been attributed to his disagreement
with the government's general economic policy, or to his being a
"tribalist". A more likely cause, however, was the intense harassment he
was subjected to within KANU right from the time of internal self-
government in June 1963. As for the formation of KPU, as a national
figure he could not just have walked away from KANU into the political
wilderness. He needed a political party he could use both as a refuge and to
hit back at the regime. This played into the eager hands of Mboya, Njonjo
and Kenyatta, because it made the fight against Odinga legitimate and even
patriotic.
The zeal with which Mboya spearheaded the destruction of Odinga
9 For Odinga's fallout with Kenyatta, see Odinga's autobiography, Not Yet Uhurn
(1967). For a description of the actual events leading to the "Little General Election" of
1966, see Gertzel (1970). Also see Mueller 1984; Ghai 1967; Good 1968; Goldsworthy 1982a;
Murray 1968, and Throup 1987.
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from 1963 when he became Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs
was consistent with the political competition between the two in particular
and within KANU in general. Right from the beginning in the late 1950s
Odinga and Mboya were locked in a battle for the second position in Kenya
politics. By 1960 Odinga was openly accusing Mboya of trying to prevent
the release of Kenyatta so that he, Mboya, would become leader of
independent Kenya. Whether this was true or not, and some scholars have
discounted it (for example, Goldsworthy 1982), it is nevertheless consistent
with the politics of factionalism.
After independence Kenyatta established his authority over the
notables, but the degree to which each of the political notables came under
him, and considered themselves under him, varied widely. Mboya and
Odinga were the least assimilated of the leaders.10 Each of them had an
independent political power base - Mboya in Nairobi and other towns
through a network of trade unions which he headed, and Odinga in
western Kenya among the Luo as already seen. They therefore continued
with their old rivalry within KANU. Their struggle was made more
intense as the question of succeeding Kenyatta was always present after
independence. It was this which led to their undoing one by one, because
Kenyatta was able to play each off against the other when the time suited
him. Kenyatta stood to gain from the demise of both men because they
represented a threats to the clientelist institution he had set up, though not
directly to his position as leader while he lasted. This is why the fate of the
two men should more accurately be seen as the work of the clientelist
system under Kenyatta rather than that of Kenyatta personally.
10 The KADU leaders, Moi and Ngala, may have put up a brave show of independence
from Kenyatta in forming KADU, but this was a desperate and superficial act into which
they were pressed by settler interests and Britain. Their political positions were precarious,
as was confirmed by their quick return within the KANU fold and their becoming,
especially Moi, almost fanatical supporters of Kenyatta.
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This is an issue which needs to be stressed. Although Kenyatta made
a number of scathing attacks on Odinga and KPU, Odinga's real enemies
were the other members of KANU, especially the so-called conservative or
moderate wing of the party, (which happened to include both Mboya and
Kenyatta). It was this group which stood to gain most from Odinga's
demise. Kenyatta's 'fight' against Odinga was largely symbolic, although as
a member of KANU he worked as anyone else against KPU as a party.
The merger with KADU for a brief period had introduced a third
aspirant to the number two position. This was KADU leader Ronald
Ngala. As leader of a former opposition party, Ngala considered himself
the second man in the country and eventual successor to Kenyatta. His
efforts to put himself firmly in the second place from the start involved a
strategy to undermine Odinga's position with the aim of elbowing him
out. Odinga in fact attributes the origins of misunderstanding between him
and Kenyatta to Ngala's strategy. The assassination of his advisor and
tactician, Pio Gama Pinto, in February 1965, has also been blamed on a
group within KANU headed by Ngala (Odinga 1967:287). Part of the
strategy also included labelling Odinga as a communist. But these attempts
to undermine Odinga seemed to have failed. The causes he fought for -
the provision of land to the landless and Africanisation of the economy -
were real issues which the people of Kenya understood. There was a
danger he could seriously embarrass and undermine the government if
the amateurish campaign against him continued without being able to
effectively silence him.The famous 1965 Sessional Paper 10: African
Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya, was designed to take
off some of the sting of Odinga's attacks on the government's economic
policies. But this too had little effect on Odinga's popularity. Kenyatta was
therefore faced with the difficult task of having 'to keep Odinga under
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control without making him a martyr to [the] Luos' (Attwood 1967:239).
This was why the government finally chose constitutional means to
undermine Odinga, a campaign that was carried out almost faultlessly by
Mboya and Charles Njonjo, the Attorney-General, and culminated in the
"Little General Elections" of 1966.
Odinga's break with KANU has often been attributed to his
disagreement with the government's general economic policy, or to his
being a 'tribalist'. A more likely cause, as r>oU4, was the intense
harassment he was subjected to within KANU right from the time of
internal self-government in June 1963 Of this Odinga said in his
resignation letter to Kenyatta in March 1966 As for the formation of KPU,
as a national figure he could not just have walked away from KANU into
the political wilderness. He needed a political,party he could use both as a
refuge and to hit back at the regime. This played into the eager hands of
Mboya, Njonjo and Kenyatta, because it made the fight against Odinga
legitimate and even patriotic.
It was the political pragmatism of Mboya and Kenyatta that brought
them together against Odinga. In letting Mboya take on Odinga, Kenyatta
avoided getting directly involved in the old factionalism which could
have undermined his position as the grand patron. On his part Mboya
more than got even with his old enemy and promoted himself to the
number two position in the process. Also if Mboya was not centrally
involved in the fight against Odinga, there was the danger he might
strengthen himself independently of KANU and would become far more
difficult to control. A powerful Mboya outside the party was far more
dangerous than if he remained within the party fold where his abilities
were utilised to strengthen the party. But once Odinga was removed from
the scene, Mboya's abilities and ambition became less an asset than a
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liability and threat to the clientelist system.
This was a real dilemma for Kenyatta. He could not have taken
Mboya's side against his trusted clients in the presidency because
collectively they were more important to him than Mboya. Also if Mboya
was forced out of KANU like Odinga, there was the danger of his forming
(or reforming) his proposed Labour Party of Kenya. His assassination
meant continuity with the Kenyatta state, and may have, in theory,
contributed to stability in Kenya.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Spoils Politics in Uganda and the Fall of Obote 1967-1971
In Chapter 6 it was suggested that from 1967 Uganda's politics were
dominated by the continued struggle within the winning alliance in the
1966 crisis, and that this struggle deteriorated into spoils politics. It was
this development which continued for the next three years and climaxed
in the military coup of January 1971, when Obote was overthrown by Idi
Amin, the Army Commander.
In this chapter I will attempt to demonstrate that Obote's fall was a
direct result of factional struggles that had been a part of party politics since
and before independence. I shall argue that the coup was the result of the
conflicts within the UPC between Obote and his erstwhile allies who fell
out with him after the 1966 crisis, in particular over the concentration of
power in the presidency in the Republican Constitution of 1967. The
chapter has three sections.
First, as the coup has usually been seen in terms of Obote-Amin
conflict theories in isolation of other factors, I will critically review the
literature on the coup in order to put Amin's position within the
phenomenon of spoils politics in proper perspective. In the second
section I discuss the constitution of 1967 and how its imposition led to a
gradual division of the party in two pro-and anti-Obote factions, and show
how the military, but especially Idi Amin, become involved in the
polarisation of forces. In the third section I discuss Obote's feeling of
insecurity as a result of the division of the party, noting particularly the
political and military strategies he pursued to overcome the threat to his
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position, and then spell out how the coup happened in the process.
Amin Revisited
Due largely to the eloquence and truth1 of the famous 18 points issued by
the Army on the day Obote was overthrown, and charges issued by Obote
in Singapore and Dar-es-Salaam and counter-charges issued by Amin in
Kampala (ACR 1971-1972:B226-7), the coup of January 1971 is often seen as
the result of a power struggle between Obote and Amin, the Army
Commander, which Obote somehow lost. The divisions within the UPC
are sometimes acknowledged, but this too is often seen as the result of the
assumed power struggle between the two men. The overwhelming view
among scholars is that the coup was caused by the estrangement between
Obote and Amin. Gingyera-Pinycwa (1978:247) argues for example that the
coup happened because 'sometime in 1970 Obote and Amin, who had at
one time been personal and political friends...fell out'.
Other scholars have attempted to explain the coup in class and even
psychological terms. Martin (1972:87-8) sees it as the result of the Army's
long resentment at Obote's open favouritism of the General Service Unit
(GSU). Omara-Otunnu (1987:8-1) takes the view that Amin's closeness to
Obote since the 1964 mutiny played a part in the coup, due to what he
describes as "familiarity syndrome": the notion that Amin had become so
familiar with the corridors of power and the persons who held it that he
was no longer afraid to take it for himself. (See also Glentworth and
Hannock (1972); Mutibwa 1992)). Much of the debate on the coup has
1The 18 charges were, so to speak, true because Obote's government was involved in or
associated with the grievances the Army raised. But these issues were used as propaganda
to establish a rapport between the new rulers and the people. The military government was
to get involved in the very crimes, and more besides, after it came to power. It was first read
on Radio Uganda on 25 January, 1971. See Uganda Government,The First 366 Days,, Entebbe,
1972).
162
therefore focused on what precisely caused the rift between Obote and
Amin, and on which factors were more important than the others in
precipitating the coup, and not on whether the actual causes of the coup
lay elsewhere.
It is also important to note that from the beginning Amin said and
has maintained that he did not plan the coup. He claimed it happened
spontaneously when a certain major Musa discovered a plot against him
by pro-Obote soldiers and launched a counter attack against this 'coup'
initiated by Obote at Jinja the night of 24 January. (Mitchell and Miller 1972;
Twaddle 1972). Also according to Mitchell and Miller (1972:49-63) Amin
was out of Kampala, on a hunting trip at the Karuma Falls area in the
north, until late on the night of the coup. It is unlikely he would have
gone hunting in the north of Uganda on the very day if he had planned to
take over the government. Further, Amin's behaviour during the first few
days of the coup suggests he found himself in that situation by chance,
regardless of the immediate release of the carefully selected 18 points.
It was indeed not until 20 February, a whole month later, that Amin
took the title of president, before that time he was referred to only as
head of state. It seems he saw his goal as that of someone called upon to
reorganise the country then go back to the barracks. But some of the UPC
"old guard" apparently saw him as a figure head preparing the way for
them to take over. (Veteran Yearbook June-September, 1993). It was also
significant that the first council of ministers Amin appointed consisted
predominantly of civilians who were known opponents of Obote and his
allies, but only one army officer, Lt. Col. Obitre Gama, besides Amin. (For
a full list of Amin's first cabinet, see ACR 1971-1972:B228, and The First
366 Days,1972:2-4). This civilian domination has been seen as a honest
effort on the part of the Amin to tap civilian skills in running the country.
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But it was more likely a case of civilians who had assumed power behind
the armed forces still enjoying power under its protection. The coup had
put an end to an already ailing regime, and Amin's 'original idea was to
retain Obote's cabinet ministers, or at least most of them' and the Army as
a whole did not show interest in government until much later. (Kibedi
1974:46). A popular rumour at that time had it that Amin unsuccessfully
tried to make Onama president. The Amin-Obote conflict theory, by
treating the conflict independently, tends to give Amin a role in Uganda
affairs he did not play until perhaps 2 after the coup.
Obote's own explanation of why the coup happened also does not
tally with the theory of long-term conflict between the two men. According
to him, Amin acted to preempt prosecution for the embezzlement of
ministry of defence funds and the murder of Brigadier Pierino Yere Okoya
and his wife, who were shot with a high velocity gun at Gulu in January
1970. Before leaving Uganda on 11 January 1971 for the Commonwealth
Conference in Singapore, Obote was known to have demanded written
explanations of these charges by his return. (Twaddle 1972) This would
suggest that the the entire crisis leading to the termination of the
government was compressed within a period of days rather than weeks or
months.
Attempts have also been made to explain the coup in ideological
terms. Lofchie (1972:19-35 has for example suggested that the coup was a
class response to Obote's 'move to the left' crusade. According to this
interpretation, the Army saw Obote's socialist posturings as a threat to
their privileged position, and acted in order to safeguard its corporate
interests. Martin (1972:95-7) sees the coup as the 'termination of a long
2 'Perhaps' because even after the coup the extend to which Amin was effectively in
control and responsible for major actions or decisions is debatable. See Chapter 8. Also see
Grahame (1978).
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sequence of frustrations within the Uganda military establishment' He
argues that this frustration 'generated protest by the fact that the Army was
used as the main political support' for the regime without adequate
rewards.
These class and protest views are misleading because they miss the
point. Firstly, the Uganda Army was not a coherent force, and had no class
consciousness to take a class action even if they understood the 'move to
the left'. If there was any consciousness it was ethnic, not class in the Army
as well as in the general population. The more educated officers in the
Army, who could perhaps have felt apprehensive about their positions,
remained pro-Obote. According to Omara-Otunnu (1987) the Army found
the Common Man's Charter incomprehensible, if somewhat exciting .
Amin's supporters were predominantly from the Non-Commissioned
Officers (NCOs), few of whom could have even read the document
anyway. A class act would also have involved a longer period of
incubation and planning, which is wholly inconsistent with the
suddenness of the coup. (See also Chick (1972) for an effective counter¬
argument to Lofchie's class theory).
The protest theory: while it is true that from 1966 the Army was
used to enforce the emergency in Buganda, it was not the first time that
they have been used for such law-and order operations. From earlier,
especially between 1960-1964, the army was used to maintain order among
the Bakonjo/Bamba and the Batoro in western Uganda. (Martin 1972;
Veteran Yearbook June-September, 1993). It was also used in border patrols
along the Uganda-Sudan border in the north, the border with Zaire (then
Congo) at various points including West Nile, and on the Uganda-Rwanda
border in the south. While it is clear that the Army was overstretched by
these engagements, it is not clear whether this led to a serious frustration.
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On the contrary they may well have enjoyed the activity afforded by these
engagements. (It is also interesting to note that Mittelman (1975) has
suggested that it was precisely because the Army found itself unoccupied
around 1970 that it overthrew the government for recreational reasons!)
As for the inadequacy of rewards, the Uganda Army, especially the lower
ranks that carried out the coup, were the best paid at that time in the entire
east and central African region (Lee 1969). After 1966 the Army was
handsomely provided for in successive budgets. (Omara-Otunnu 1987:78-
91).
The protest theory is an attempt to see the coup in terms of the 1964
mutinies in Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika (as it was then called). The
mutineers in these cases demanded improvements in pay and conditions
of service, and as such their action might be described as class protest.
But the situation in 1964 was in no way applicable to the conditions of
Uganda in 1971. For one thing in 1964 the armies acted as one, and they
were protesting in the first instance against their British commanders, not
the governments. Indeed in Uganda, as in Kenya and Tanganyika, the
government was not able to find a unit opposed to the mutineers so that
to put it down British forces had to be flown in.
The Coup of 1971 in Perspective
It would be misleading to see the coup in isolation from the political
tensions that arose over the imposition of the 1967 constitution, and
without linking it to the divisions within the party and to Obote's
prominent opponents. If the UPC had been a united party, even mutiny
involving the commander of the Army would not have led to the sudden
and utter disintegration of the government. In 1964, for example, Nyerere
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was able to disband the army that mutinied and created an entirely new
force, the Tanzanian Peoples Defence Force (TPDF) in its place. The 1971
coup occurred and succeeded because the conflicts in the party had spread
to the Army. How this happened will be discussed below, after reviewing
the resentment of the notables at the accumulation of power in Obote's
hands in the 1967 constitution. Regardless of Amin's high profile role at
that time - (Tdi Amin provided a reassurance to all who hoped for a
decisive move from within against Obote' (Mutibwa 1992:93) - without
him a coup of sorts involving Obote and his opponents could have
happened in Uganda at that time. For factionalism among the politicians
ha weakened the government to such an extent that a major political
upheaval, leading either to Obote's fall or to the demise of his opponents,
had become inevitable. The coup was therefore a particularly disastrous
outcome of factional struggles (see p. 152 below).
Amin became Obote's opponent by his association with the "old
guard" (whose identity will become clear in due course), and until the
coup he remained, in the view of Obote, an obstacle to be removed or a
prize to be won in the political struggle within the party. For example, a
few days before the coup, Basil Bataringaya, the Minister of Internal
Affairs, sent his Permanent Secretary to Singapore to inform the
President did not regard Amin and the Army by themselves as dangerous
even at that late hour. Instead he 'gave orders for all those who had been at
a secret meeting [just before the coup] - they included two of his ministers
- to be arrested, but he specifically ordered that General Amin was not to
be detained but to be reasoned with after the arrests' (Twaddle 1972:105;
ACR 1970-1971:B189-90).
Parallells have correctly been drawn between the 1966 crisis and the
coup, as well as the Army reshuffle of 1965 when Amin was made Chief
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of Staff in place of Shaban Opolot, who was described as Chief of Defence
Forces, and the appointment of Suleiman Hussein as Chief of Staff in late
1970. Opolot, as seen in Chapter 5, was demoted in order to break the
power of the Kabaka and the Ibingira faction with whom he was aligned.
He was already openly identified, and was identifying himself, with the
Ibingira faction which was threatening to topple Obote. I suggest that it is
more plausible to see Amin's "upward demotion" in 1970 as a move to
deprive the other faction of a military ally. Obote had tried unsuccessfully
to remove Onama from the Ministry of Defence in late 1968 for the same
need to break up the alliance between the two men. (Kiwanuka 1979:26).
Amin and the Army were the means by which Obote was overthrown,
rather than the cause of his downfall. The estrangement between Obote
and Amin was merely the symptom of a deeper political malaise.
It is also said that Israel, Britain and the United States engineered
the coup because they were displeased with Obote for various reasons. On
this see Omara-Otunnu (1987:95-6); Nabudere (1980:71), and many others.
On the basis of comments by retired Israeli and Unites States intelligence
and military officers, Ibingira and Mamdani have concluded there was
foreign, especially Israeli involvement, however limited, in the coup.
(Mamdani 1983:29-32; Ibingira 1980:174-7). But whatever the degree of
foreign involvement, the causes of the coup were domestic. Foreign
'involvement' was probably limited to either declining to warn Obote,
misleading him about the true state of affairs or encouraging the anti-
Obote forces; and as such their collusion cannot count as one of the causes.
Ibingira's assessment of the real causes of the coup is therefore entirely
convincing. He argues (Ibingira 1980:177):
It is remarkable that the connection between the 1971 coup d'etat
and the 1966 crisis with its subsequent constitutions and policies
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seem to be consistently ignored or played down in assessing the
basic causes of Obote's fall. The causes in fact lay Uganda's history
and his [Obote's] assuming absolute power to impose a winner-take-
all philosophy on a diverse people... Without Amin's alleged
malpractice and his attempt to save himself in a coup and without
any foreign instigation, it is my considered opinion that there would
still have been several attempts to topple or eliminate Obote...
The Republican Constitution of 1967
The Republican Constitution of 1967 was basically an attempt to legitimise
and legalise the powers Obote had seized by force in the 1966 'revolution'.
The powers which Obote arrogated to himself in this constitution may be
justified during a state of emergency, but not in a free country at peace.
Contrary to his hopes of uniting the country by the concentration of power
in his hands, the constitution led to the disintegration the government,
the party and country.
Mazrui (1975:18-20) has claimed that the constitution was a
collective product of the UPC in a spirit of consensus and openness. In fact
it was a vengeful constitution imposed by force and designed to establish
and perpetuate authoritarianism. Even Mazuri admits that 'members of
the ruling party were expelled for their opposition' in these same 'open'
discussions. (Mazrui 1975:20). When Obwangor, the Minister of Planning
and Economic Development, disagreed in 1967 over the concentration of
too much power in the hands of one man, he was thrown in jail. Abu
Mayanja and Rajat Neogy, editor of Transition magazine, were detained in
October 1968 because Mayanja published his views on the constitution in
the magazine. Mayanja's article was highly critical of the powers Obote
took for himself in the constitution and predicted that the constitution was
not 'likely to result in national unity or the stability of the state, two of the
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objectives that,according to President Obote, [it was] designed to achieve
(Mayanja 1968:20. See also ACR 1968-1969:234-5)
We have seen (Chapters 4 and 5) that Obote's weakness against the
UPC notables had been in part due to the fact that the notables were the
effective dispensers of patronage in the districts. Obote now took exclusive
powers of appointments at all levels of the public service in Uganda.
Article 104 (1) provided him with the 'power to appoint persons to hold or
act in any office in the public service', whether in the central, district or
urban administrations in Uganda. He was empowered to 'exercise
disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices and to
remove such persons from office'. Even the appointment of chiefs in the
local and county councils were now his prerogative (Article 124). As if
these were not enough, Obote had the power to compulsorily retire any
person in 'any branch of the public service' so as to 'cause vacancies that
could appropriately be filled by other more fit persons' (Article 127 (1)).
(See The Constitution of the Re-public of Uganda, 1967).
In practice his powers were far more extensive than these technical
provisions convey. For instance, he appointed all permanent secretaries
to all the ministries, who in turn were responsible for recruitment in their
respective ministries. The heads of the (national) Public Service
Commission, Teaching Service Commission, and District Service
Commission, were also appointed by him (Article 103). As these officials
were responsible for every appointment within their domain, technically
Obote was the ultimate dispenser of patronage in Uganda. The question
was not whether he intended to use his powers of appointment in this
way; but rather that he had the potential to do so, and that his opponents
believed he would do so.
The emergency powers provided for in the interim constitution of
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1966 were resurrected into the Emergency Powers Act 1967. This gave the
president unlimited powers of imprisonment and detention without trial.
He could order the restriction or deportation of any person, even legally
take possession of their property, all in the name of public safety. (ACR
1968-1969:230-235). The inspector-general of police, whom he appointed,
was by law obliged to carry out any arbitrary or otherwise directions the
president may give, and the 'question of whether any, and if so, what
directions have been given shall not be inquired into in any court of law'
(Article 69 (1-3)). It should be noted that at that time the whole of Buganda
was under a state of emergency, with road blocks manned by the Army a
daily fact of life. The GSU under Akena Adoko also had agents in every
public office, or so it was believed. The effect of all this was directly to
Obote's disadvantage. He became the personification of state power. As
that power was not diffuse, he was held responsible for every repressive act
done in the name of the state. His almost complete abandonment even by
his ministers at the time of the coup, and the joy with which the coup was
received in the whole country, bore testimony to the hatred he had
generated in the country because of the concentration of power in his
hands in the constitution.
The problem for Obote, and which may have led to a more
confrontational style on his part, was that he was unable to induce
obedience in spite the powers he had. Even the knowledge that he was
prepared to use them against his opponents failed to imbue him with the
"natural" authority which Kenyatta for example enjoyed. Kenyatta had
ensured that at least his real opponents were in no position to challenge
him. Obote's closest allies were not his clients and he had no authority
over them. He held power but not much authority to sanctify the power
and its use. This point needs to be stressed because it is crucial to our
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understanding of why a coup happened in Uganda, but not in Kenya
where Kenyatta held similar if not more power. The manner in which
Obote took his power was a factor: it was taken during competition from
among his equals. Since the notables did not give up their right to it,
power continued to be a matter of competition, and the coup should be
seen as Obote's loss of that power in the competition.
Concentration of Power and Disintegration of UPC
As far as state stability was concerned, the concentration of power in
Obote's hands had an overall negative effect. It has been wrongly suggested
that the concentration of power in Obote's hands had a positive effect as
the president used his new powers for reconciliation (Mazrui 1975:7-21;
Gingyera-Pinycwa 1978:133-4). This view appears to be based on a highly
flawed understanding of what genuine reconciliation in the Uganda of the
day should have involved. Mazrui writes thus:
Even the decision to abolish all the kingdoms, instead of just the
kabakaship, was a venture in reconciliation. There was a feeling that
the Baganda would be less ready to accept the abolition of their king
[sic] alone than the ending of all kingships. Collective republicanism
was a more reconciliatory gesture than discriminatory
republicanism, (p. 19).
Even if this had been Obote's honest belief, the fact remains that neither
the Buganda nor the other kingdoms accepted their abolition.
The concentration of power at the centre led to intensification of
conflict between Obote and the notables within the party on one hand, and
to a multiplication of the points of conflict in the country at large, on the
other. These conflicts in turn led to open confrontations and
destabilisation. As Barongo (1989) has rightly pointed out, because Uganda
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is a plural state, political stability can be ensured in it only through a
constitution that is tolerant to pluralism: a constitution that pays
attention to some degree to the interests and demands of the various
groups. But the concentration of power at the centre in the 1967
Constitution was inconsistent with plural harmony. By making everything
happen at the centre, the various groups were brought into direct conflict.
Before, for example, a person had the chance to look to his local notable, or
get a job in the local government system in both kingdom and non-
kingdom areas without reference to the centre (Chapter 5). But now all
had to compete with one another at the centre to get a job (say) in the
public service. Competition over the limited jobs available led to
insecurity, hatred and actual as well as assumed nepotism. Local conflicts
were no longer resolved locally but found their way to the centre. The
powers of appointment in the district administrations was particularly
important as a source of conflict.
As already noted the major reason for Obote's weakness had been
the power of the notables, which was based on their control over their
respective districts. It was not surprising therefore that notables like
Obwangor were totally opposed to the constitution from the start. They
had enjoyed considerable autonomy from party and government control
(Chapter 5), but the constitution now threatened to deprive them of this
autonomy by eliminating the concept of local notables altogether, in the
name of national unity. In taking powers of appointment in district
councils in direct challenge to the notables in their own territories, Obote
stirred hornets' nests. The president could now legally enforce decisions
in their political fiefdoms without any reference to them: their powers and
credibility as local patrons were eroded. Given that the constitution had
made Obote and any of his decisions above the laws of the land, and in
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dread of the Emergency Powers Act, the notables had no legitimate and
formal means of getting back at him. The only course open to them was to
revolt. To this I will return in a moment.
A general alienation and detachment of the people from the state
was another unfortunate result. According to Mutibwa (1992:66), the
relationship between the people and the government was so bad that
'many businessmen, lawyers, teachers, doctors and others from all walks
of life (including students) were detained'. In this climate, even some non-
political detentions were liable to be interpreted as political ones, which
did not improve the people's perception of Obote and his government.
Rather than encourage Obote to explore new avenues of cooperation and
methods of winning the people over, his unpopularity propelled him
towards even more forceful measures.
Spoils Politics and Polarisation of Power
It was in these circumstances that the hitherto underground opposition to
Obote from the aggrieved notables within the UPC began to appear in
more articulate form in the polarisation of forces within the party, the
country and the Army, leading to the coup three years later. Had there been
some degree of power-sharing with the notables, some of Obote's excesses
might have been checked. Also he might have kept some of his friends
who had stood with him during the crisis of 1966. But he chose to rely on
the constitution instead. It did not take long for an alliance of the
oppressed, including Buganda and a section of the Army, to emerge against
him and to oust him from power. (For this development, see Gukiina
1972).
During 1968 anti-Obote feelings in the party had already articulated
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into a visible if somewhat dormant opposition. This splinter group came
under the informal leadership of Felix Onama, the powerful Secretary
General of the party and Defence Minister. He was also one of Obote's most
ambitious ministers.
Besides his known ambition for leadership of the country,3 there
was also a constellation of several factors which contributed to the
emergence of Onama as leader of the anti-Obote elements. The first was
that as Secretary-General of UPC he was the second most powerful man in
the party and government, but more crucial was the fact that he was in
control of the Army. His powers alone were sufficient grounds for a
conflict between him and Obote. Thus Onama's fears for his own
position and future may have forced him to look for protective alliances.
In this his close relationship with Amin and the Army was very
important, and seems to have been the main cause of the fallout between
him and Obote. The almost legendary notion that the Uganda Army had
been under Obote's personal control and that he had nurtured it for
political support since the 1964 mutiny or earlier is misleading in detail. It
was Onama who had been, in the first analysis, Amin's mentor, and
therefore in more direct control of the Army.
He was the only minister responsible for the Uganda Army from
independence until the end of Obote's government. It was Onama who
had agreed without consulting Obote to the increase of wages for the Army
at the 1964 mutiny (Grahame 1980:78). It was to Onama that Amin had
looked for protection, (and who had protected him) during the famous
gold allegations in 1965-6 (Mitchell and Miller 1972:59). Furthermore, as a
fellow "Sudanic", Onama and Amin were ethnically closer than Obote and
3 Shaban Opolot, former Commander of the Uganda Army, for example has described
Onama as 'a very ambitious man who wanted to rule the country' (Veteran Yearbook, June-
September 1993, p. 9).
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Amin could be. True, as long as Onama also supported Obote, the President
could be assured of the full support of the Army; but in a conflict between
the two, it was not difficult to see where Amin's first loyalty would lie.
Nobody knew this better than Obote and Onama did. The establishment
and promotion of the GSU as an alternative armed force under Akena
Adoko was linked to this situation. Obote wanted to have access to an
armed force direct rather than with the cooperation of another possibly
hostile minister. With Amin fearing for his position in the Army and
Onama for his in government, the two men were naturally drawn
together for protection. And this unexpectedly provided hope for the anti-
Obote faction in the party.
There was no clear anti-Obote faction to speak of at that time:
however, as we have seen, the concentration of power in Obote's hands in
the Republican Constitution had divided the party and gradually a pro-
Obote and 'the rest' factions had emerged. This other group were known in
Uganda as the 'old guard'. Twaddle (1972), who searched for the identities
of the 'old guard' came up with no definitive answer. 'Upon inquiry this
category of... politicians proved somewhat elusive, sometimes being
defined as those politicians who had supported Obote only halfheartedly
during the confrontation with Mutesa II in 1966, sometimes being equated
with those currently [in 1970] rivalling him for supreme power' (p.102). At
the beginning of 1969 it was observed that 'Onama was operating on behalf
of elements within this [anti-Obote] group in order either to reduce Obote
to size or remove him'. (Mujaju 1976:462; Mutibwa 1992:71; Willetts
1975:299; Kiwanuka 1979; ACR 1970-1971:B187).
If Obote had been patient after 1966 and used his new powers
carefully and in collaboration with the other UPC notables, he might have
preserved his position at least for a while. His mistake was to try to take all
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from all, including from the notables who had been on the 'winning' side
in 1965-6. This, instead of reproducing spoils politics which might have
provided a limited degree of stability, still further destabilised the regime,
and threw spoils politics itself into peril. For like clientelism spoils
politics can be managed to at least prevent the collapse of the state. With
skilled leadership it can even be transformed back into clientelism. In
theory at least, and subject to local variation, a 'spoils' regime can prolong
its tenure in office under certain conditions and may even create and
maintain a semblance of state stability. Factors as the leadership skills of
the head of state; military support (either domestic or external or both);
sudden economic windfalls, can prevent the regime from plunging into
utter chaos. The weakness of the regime's opponents can also help in this.
Sierra Leone under Siaka Stevens (1968-1986), Sudan under Ja'afer
Numeiri (1969-1985)4, and Zaire under Mobutu are examples where spoils
politics had become the established 'system'. In 1967 Obote had none of
these and his legendary leadership skills failed him. For in taking power
away from the UPC notables as well Obote in effect invited revolution, and
with himself as the object of that revolution, which in this case happened
to be a military coup.
This development was quite consistent with the dynamics of politics
of spoil. Revolution is one of two ways (the other is reform) in which a
country can recover from the malaise of spoils politics. Obote tried reform
and failed, a revolution was therefore the next logical alternative. That this
revolution was carried out by the Army was somewhat coincidental and
owed to Uganda's peculiar circumstances at that time.
In response to the growing factionalism in the party and Army
4 These ideas are condensed from teaching model worked out by Chris Allen, of
Edinburgh University's Politics Department. I am most grateful for this and his other
works on the subject of clientelism.
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sometime during 1968, Obote was forced to explore ways and means
(which I will discuss in more detail a moment) of putting up another
alliance he could more confidently rely on. He had realised that the
Army was no longer in his camp, so he pursued two complementary
political and military strategies. These were designed to establish his
control over the Army and the party.
Obote's Strategies for Dominance and Fall, 1968-1971
The political strategy was the attempt at social engineering, the whole
range of which was encompassed by the "move to the left" policy adopted
by the UPC in 1968. The military strategy was to undermine Amin's
potential as an ally to his opponents, by removing him from effective
control of the Army and at the same time forging an ethnic-based alliance
between himself and the Army. The estrangement between him and
Amin came about as a result of this dual policy. Amin had became the
target because for both the military and political strategies to succeed, it
was necessary to either neutralise or eliminate him first.
Obote's political strategy was to present himself as the
unchallengeable leader of the party, and thus publicly undermine his
opponents. The starting point was the much discussed UPC Annual
Conference in Kampala in June 1968. (See Mutibwa 1992: Gingyera Pinycwa
1978; Omara-Otunnu 1987; Mittelman 1975, and many others). The leaders
of Tanzania and Zambia, as well as high level delegations from Kenya and
Zaire attended. In a gesture to the Army and Police, and to demonstrate
that the party encompassed everybody in the country under his leadership,
Obote arranged for Amin and the Inspector-General of Police, Erineyo
Oryema, to address the conference. But what was directly relevant with
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regard to his relationship with the Onama faction was that at this
conference Obote was reelected party president for a further period of
seven years. It was further established that the party president would
automatically be the president of the republic, which shut the door to the
leadership ambitions of his opponents for the next seven years. Also in a
direct challenge to the authority of Onama, the organisation of the party,
including the power to appoint its officials even at the branch (county)
levels, was transferred from the Secretary-General to the President.
(Branch officials were until then elected within the counties). Onama was
deprived of the means to use the party to his advantage.
The period from 1969 to the end of 1970 was filled with political
activity, with Obote trying to carry out this political strategy. In addition to
frequent tours 'to meet the people' around the country, Obote produced 5
political papers in his 'move to the left' programme. According to the
flagship document, the Common Man's Charter, the aim of the whole
programme was 'the creation of a new political culture and a new way of
life, where the people of Uganda as a whole... are paramount'. (Clause 11).
The primary aim of the document was political because it sought to
destroy the power bases of the notables. Omara-Otunnu (1987:88) has
rightly observed that the 'move to the left' was Obote's 'response to the
threat to his leadership from the right-wing of the UPC' and was designed
'to broaden [his] political base in the country'. Hence the emphasis that
the people, and not their representatives, was paramount. It only
succeeded in arousing his opponents into more articulate and open
opposition. The major legacy of this document is that it led to the
heightening of tensions in the country, with everyone feeling threatened.
Even more important in the continuing war was document number
5, entitled Proposals for New Methods of Election of Representatives of
179
the People to Parliament, and published in July 1970. The main provision
was that candidates would have to stand in four parliamentary
constituencies all at once - a 'basic' constituency and the three others
'national' constituencies - one in each of the four regions of the country.
(Cohen and Parson 1973; Willetts 1975:286-298; ACR 1970-1971:B190-2). A
Presidential Election Commission, a committee of five 'wise men'
appointed by Obote and not by the party, was to screen and approve all
candidates. This committee had the power to overrule the party-appointed
Electoral Commission. Obote justified this arrangement on the grounds
that the Electoral Commission, being a party organ, 'would be subject to
influence by sitting MPs and could not be relied on' (Willetts 1975:190). It
was a well known fact that only a handful of Obote's opponents would
have retained their seats if the elections had not been interrupted by the
coup. African Contemporary Record noted that 'the President ... did not...
make any secret of his hope that the elections would rid him of at least 50
per cent of his present colleagues' (ACR 1970-1971:B187). Mujaju 1976:426).
The military strategy was less complex. This was essentially a
strategy to drive a wedge between Amin and Onama. It began late in 1968
when, as already noted, Obote unsuccessfully tried to remove Onama
from the Ministry of Defence in order to cut his link with Amin.
(Kiwanuka 1979:26). His removal would have at a stroke separated him
and Amin, leaving Obote to deal with them one by one, but particularly
to detain or dismiss Onama without fearing any retaliatory action by
Amin. The attempt and its failure (Onama had refused to be moved) in
fact constituted attempted coups of sorts by both men against each other.
Onama's reluctance to be moved, and his ability to actually refuse to be
moved, from his ministry also testified to both his fear of and strength
vis-a-vis Obote. This event set the two men on an irreconcilable course
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and may have helped bring Onama and Amin even closer together. If
before the two had been professional and perhaps 'ethnic' friends, now
they became political friends as well, in a mutually defensive alliance
against Obote. Obote, in turn, became fearful and obsessed with them.
As happened prior to the 1966 crisis, the battle for the control of the
Army now started in earnest. And since Amin and Onama, united in fear
and 'well armed' could not now be separated, Obote sought to undermine
Amin. The strategy was if possible to win over the Acoli in the Army and
place the whole Army under largely Langi officers. To promote the
comparatively younger and less experienced Langi officers over the heads
of the more experienced Acoli officers when the Acoli made the bulk of
the Army was a dangerous gamble. It risked turning the Acoli in the Army
from their hitherto passive grumbling into his active enemies as well. For
despite their numerical superiority, very few Acoli men were in high
ranking positions, something they resented very strongly.5 'Obote
overcame [this problem and] the well-known hatred and mistrust between
the Acoli and the Langi by presenting the presence in the army of the
Sudanic people, headed by Amin, as the 'external' threat to all the Nilotics'
(Mutibwa 1992:71-2).
The extent to which this tactic succeeded in bringing the Acoli and
Langi together or turning them collectively against Amin and his allies at
that time 6 can only be guessed. It is however clear that, having rightly or
5Later in July 1985, Obote was overthrown by Acoli officers because he had the
effrontery to appoint Smith Opon Acak, a Langi as Chief of Staff to replace another Langi
(Oyite Ojok). The Acoli wanted Bazilio Olara Okello for the post. It was Bazilio Okello
himself who drove for three days from Gulu to overthrow Obote in Kampala (Omara-
Otunnu 1987:157-169).
6,At that time' because some of the most chilling manifestations of ethnic politics in
Uganda's history have been attributed to this 'policy' or at least interpreted along this
line. This includes the wanton slaughter of Acoli and Langi in the Army and outside during
Amin's regime (1971-1979), and the almost complete destruction of life in the West Nile
region during Obote's second regime (1980-1985). (See Gingyera-Pinycwa 1989 and Ibingira
1980). This however belong to another aspect of ethnic politics and it is not my intention to
pursue it in detail here or later in this study.
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wrongly drawn this conclusion, both Amin and Onama believed it and
their fears of a Langi-Acoli ethnic alliance directed specifically against
them increased. In this climate of fear every slight move by either camp
was bound to appear enormously significant. For instance when Obote
asked whether Amin was, as alleged, responsible for the murder of
Brigadier Okoya in January 1970, the later went livid with anger. (The
lively exchange which took place between the two men is reported
'approximately' in Mazrui 1975:153). He saw it as a part of Obote's plans
of turning the Acoli in the Army against him. In fact he must have
believed from the start that Okoya was killed for this purpose. Speaking
with some feeling in 1971 in Okoya's home town of Gulu in front of Acoli
elders, Amin said:
He [Obote] planned the same [1966] tactics against me with regard to
the murder of Brigadier Okoya whom I recruited in the Army.
Okoya was a houseboy before. I am telling you this today. I was the
one who promoted him. I regarded him as my son. Obote and
Akena thought the killing of Okoya and his wife would unite the
Acoli and the Langi in order to crush the rest of the people of
Uganda. And because of the death of Okoya, Obote succeeded to pull
all the Acoli to his side. (UG 1972:52).
The next strategy was to put the Army, like the GSU and Special
Forces, under Langi leadership. In September 1970, in 'the most far-
reaching reorganisation of the military' (Omara-Otunnu 1987:90), Amin
became (by definition advisory) Chief of Defence Staff; Brigadier Suleiman
Hussein, an Obote supporter, was made Chief of Staff, thus effectively in
command of the Army. Other notable promotions and appointments were
that of Tito Okello and David Oyite Ojok (who were later to command
Obote's guerrilla army against Amin). Oyite Ojok was promoted from a
Major to Lt. Colonel and appointed Quartermaster General at the Uganda
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Army Headquarters. In the words of one scholar, this was 'intended at one
blow to take the wind out of Amin's sails by shifting him from [the]
position of effective command of the army'. (Kiwanuka 1979:36-8).
Although this observation is technically correct, it does not tell the
whole story because it sees no link between the reshuffle in the wider
context I have suggested at the beginning of this chapter. I draw attention
to this again here because such observations perpetuate the Amin-Obote
conflict theory as the cause of the coup. In the same way Willetts (1975:299)
is rather too modest when he says this was done 'so that less reliance
needed to be placed on Amin'. The aim of the reshuffle was more than
that. It was calculated to eliminate Amin's potential as an ally to Obote's
opponents. Willetts may however be right in adding that 'At some point
the two men [Onama and Amin] decided to work together and strike at
Obote'. They may well have done this, although it seems their aim was to
wait for Obote to take the first move, and then defend themselves. Obote's
mistake was to forget that if you threaten a cobra, it is more likely to strike
at you than glide away cowed. The slightest move of the finger is liable to
precipitate retaliation. And this was what happened in January 1971.
The Coup: Precipitating Factor
What precipitated the coup was Obote's sudden decision to bring charges of
murder and corruption against Amin in January 1971, and his demand
that a written reply to them should be ready by his (never to be) return
from Singapore. The way Amin perceived this move has already been
discussed. But Obote decided to bring charges against Amin at that precise
time for slightly different reasons. For in the final analysis the charges
were a part of Obote's strategy against Onama, in which hopefully Amin
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too would have fallen. He would have killed two birds with one stone. If
Amin was convicted of the murder of Okoya, Onama's political teeth
would have been knocked out. Also if Amin appeared in court, as the
minister of defence, Onama was bound to be dragged in court as well to
explain the disappearance of funds and thus be disgraced. Even if he
escaped imprisonment - a very unlikely prospect - he would certainly
have lost all chance of being elected in the proposed elections in April
1971.
There are two points which confirm the above conclusion as to why
Obote brought the charges at that time. First, Okoya had been murdered a
whole year before and no such written statement had been demanded
from Amin. Indeed when Obote asked Amin whether he was responsible
for the murder a year earlier, Amin had denied and even offered to go
voluntarily to Luzira Maximum Security Prison if Obote believed he was
responsible, whereat the president dropped the matter (Mazrui 1975:153).
Secondly, the financial irregularities in the Ministry of Defence, as well as
other ministries, have been widely known facts in Uganda all along
(Mutibwa 1992).
Equally important was the surprising decision to charge Amin, and
not Onama, for the financial irregularities of the whole ministry. As
Amin was not in charge of Ministry of Defence accounts, it was clear that
the matter would have crept to Onama. When the Permanent Secretary to
the Ministry of Defence, Oboth-Ofumbi (soon to be Amin's minister of
defence), was called before a parliamentary public accounts committee in
December 1970, he explained that 'the Ministry of Defence had taken a
decision that no figures would be given out and the Ministry of Defence
means everybody who is a part of the Ministry' (Mitchell and Miller
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1972:63).7 It is clear that the charge was a tactical move to smear (or expose)
Onama, and both men knew it. It probably took so long for Obote to raise
the matter because he may not have had the guts to openly challenge
Onama. The Army reshuffle of September 1970 had however tactically
changed the realignment of forces under the two men. It seems that in
January 1971, having been emboldened by the recent Army reshuffle,
Obote felt in a sufficiently strong position to go on the offensive against
the Onama faction. The charges against Amin constituted the tactical
opening shot by Obote. Unfortunately Amin interpreted this as the long-
expected move to remove him from his job, and fought back, thus
precipitating the coup.
The following is, it seems to me, the sequence of events that
culminated in the 'coup'. 1. Being fully aware of the consequences of
bringing Amin to court, his supporters - including two cabinet ministers
- meet at Amin's house to consider what to do. The meeting is
discovered although it is not known what they have decided. 2. Basil
Bataringaya, Minister of Internal Affairs, his Permanent Secretary Ntende,
Inspector-General of Police Oryema, Chief of Staff Suleiman Hussein and
Col. Oyite Ojok meet to discuss the meeting at Amin's house. Ntende is
sent to Singapore to brief Obote. 3. Obote issues orders for the arrest of the
'plotters', possibly with instructions on how to prevent Amin interfering
with the arrests.
As the last involved a strategic deployment of Army units out of
Amin's control, it led to Army movements. Amin is informed and,
because of fear, must have believed it was the long expected move against
him by Obote. To protect himself and his position as Commander of the
7For further details of this, see Republic of Uganda. Report of the Auditor-General:
The Public Accounts of the Republic of Uganda in the Year Ending 30 June, 1967. Entebbe,
Government Printer, 1967, especially pp. 27-31.
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Uganda Army, he decides to remove Obote to institute another, more
friendly government with himself still the commander of the Army.
The coup has to be seen as the result of a triple failure in Uganda's
political development since independence. First the failure to evolve a
political institution which could have resolved conflicts. Second, the
failure of clientelism to evolve as an alternative institution, as it did in
Kenya. The failure of clientelism had plunged the country into spoils
politics which Obote somehow failed to manage, thus throwing the
country into chaos, with the various factions engaged in a perpetual tug of
war with each other. The brawl between the pro-Obote and Onama/Amin
forces that led to the coup the night of 24 January, 1971 was the first
military clash in the tug of war between the two factions that had started
in 1968.
We have to accept that Amin was correct in saying that he did not
plan a coup, although he must have planned some kind of action against
Obote designed to preserve his post at the head of the Uganda Army. The
effects of politics of spoils had paralysed the political process, and created
deep fear and suspicion. It was this climate, more than anything else, that
was responsible for the coup. Consequently Obote's fall was a direct result
of the failure of clientelism in Uganda.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
The Successor Regimes: Problems and Prospects
The different political developments of Uganda and Kenya during the first
decade of independence continued to affect and shape their politics even
after the change of regimes, respectively in 1971 and 1978. The change of
regimes (the manner of the change in the case of Kenya) influenced by
their past legacies. Both the manners of succession, and the prospects and
challenges of the successor regimes represented a continuation of the past.
Thus spoils politics continued in Uganda and the clientelist system in
Kenya remained viable at least during the first two years, of the change.
Also the efforts Moi and Amin made to "break with the past" during the
early stages of their rule (discussed below) were not successful, and in each
case they were dominated by the past. Uganda's spoils politics continued
on its downward spiral and deteriorated into chaos during the first few
years of Amin's rule. In Kenya, the past, or "Kenyatta's shadow" was so
strong at the beginning that Moi found it necessary formally and
forcefully to acknowledge that he was merely "following the footsteps of
Kenyatta" by adopting the slogan Nyayo ("follow the footsteps"). (Widner
1992; Tamarkin 1979:21-37; Khapoya 1980:55-6). As I will argue below, it
was only after 1980 that Moi appeared to have redefined Nyanyo to mean
following his footsteps.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the political changes under
the two successor regimes during the first few years against the background
of the developments of the past. The aim is to demonstrate the resilience
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of spoils politics and clientelism once they became established "systems" of
rule. I will first discuss Amin's regime from 1971 to 1974, and explain how
and why Amin was unable to establish a new political order that was
more accountable than Obote's despite his promise to do so immediately
after he took power. After noting that his regime was a continuation of the
spoils politics that started under Obote and equally beset by factional
struggles, I will explain how he nevertheless came to last for a relatively
long period in power.
The section on Kenya discusses the continuing legacy of the past on
Moi's leadership from 1978 to 1980. I will first discuss those factors prior
to Kenyatta's death which made Moi's succession inevitable, so as to stress
further my argument that the well-established clientelist system in
Kenya dominated and circumscribed political action. We will then look at
Moi's first efforts to break free from the grip of the 'old' system and his
attempts to forge new alliances and make himself the effective and
undisputed patron in the same way that Kenyatta had been. The political
backlash which resulted from this in the form of a challenge to his
authority from his erstwhile fellow-clients in the Kenyatta state (notably
from Charles Njonjo) a will be discussed in Chapter 9.
UGANDA
Mere Change of Guards, 1971-1974
As already noted in Chapter 7, Amin's coup was a product of spoils
politics and not a response against it. For this very reason his regime
failed to put an end to it; instead spoils politics became even more
manifest under him. Therefore, although in theory the coup, to the extent
that it was a change of regime, could have institutionalised a new order, in
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practice this became impossible. In understanding Amin's failure to take
advantage of the opportunities afforded by the coup to establish a new
order, Uganda's immediate political experiences needs to be emphasised.
The effects of spoils politics, authoritarianism, and the forging of negative
ethnic based alliances practised under Obote especially from 1967 to 1970,
proved a liability for the military. Even before the military regime could
consolidate its hold on the country, the old political rivalry appeared on
the scene, threatening to relegate it into the background. The Army
therefore responded and became a distinct faction in the struggle for
power. This, combined with Obote's looming shadow from Tanzania, kept
Amin under threat and survival rather than political programmes
became his main preoccupation. The third factor was Amin's personality
and policy contradictions, which made it impossible for any consensus to
be formed around him or with his participation. We now look at these
factors in some detail.
Resurrection of Factional Politics and the Army's Response
The coup was in fact merely the defeat of the pro-Obote faction in the
competition for power after 1967. After the coup the leadership of this
faction moved into exile, but had supporters inside the country (repeatedly
purged by Amin). Immediately after Obote's fall, however, the defeated
Ibingira faction of the early 1960s surfaced, intent on reestablishing itself in
power either behind or in the place of the military (Kibedi 1974). Amin
had announced that his aim was to organise elections and hand power
back to civilians, which encouraged factionalism still further. Therefore,
although Obote's overthrow evoked popular support for Amin (Uganda
Government 1972), especially in Buganda, the Baganda celebrated the fall
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of Obote rather than the rise of Amin, and the happy honeymoon did not
lead to a lasting marriage between the military and the civilian
population. (For a comment on celebrations in Buganda in support of the
coup, see Mutibwa 1992:83-4).
At first it looked as through a workable and positive partnership
was emerging between the Baganda and the military government,
especially since Amin's first political moves were all popular in Buganda.
He unbanned political parties and invited exiles to return home. He
released 55 prominent politicians that had been imprisoned by Obote,
including Ibingira and his fellow former cabinet ministers, and members
of the Baganda royal family. (ARB January, 1971; ACR 1971-1972; Uganda
Government 1972). Amin also lifted the state of emergency that had been
over Buganda since 1966 (and the rest of the country from December 1969
after Obote was shot and wounded in Kampala). The very day after the
coup he announced that the body of Mutesa, who had died in poverty in
London in 1969, would be brought home for state-burial, and on March 31
the body arrived at Entebbe Airport and was buried according to Buganda
custom on 4 April.
Amin also moved swiftly and scored some notable goals with the
business community and (by Uganda standards) the rich, who again were
mostly Baganda apart from the Asian business class. For example, in
March 1971 Amin reversed Obote's socialist policies enacted during the
"move to the left" period and decreed that the 60 percent state ownership
of private enterprises Obote had set would be reduced to 49 percent instead.
This pleased the business class, the industrialists and those politicians who
were opposed to the move to the left. (Omara-Otunnu 1978:102). Trade
union leaders in Kampala and even students at Makerere University,
came out in support of Amin. (Mutibwa 1992:84). (Langlands 1978:8;
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Uganda Government 1972).
However, it soon became clear that it was not a blank cheque of
support for the military regime. Competition for influence in the new
regime amongst those who had crowded around Amin became intense.
Wanume Kibedi, a self-proclaimed socialist and Minister of Foreign
Affairs in Amin's government from 1971 to 1973, later noted that at the
initial stage the 'conservatives' tried to take over effective power from
Amin. He wrote:
Reactionary politicians of the right were around Amin in those
early days, and even before the cabinet was appointed , they were
pressing him to revoke the republican constitution and revert to the
1962 pre-independence constitution' (Kibedi 1974:46).
The military saw a threat to its own position because Amin appeared to be
too amenable to the demands of the politicians. As already noted, there
was only one Army officer, Lt. Co. Obitre-Gama, in Amin's cabinet at that
time. This realisation altered the relationship between the soldiers and the
civilian politicians from that of (in theory at least) cooperation to
competition. Senior officers, keen to preserve their new positions in
power, fought back.
While it is not clear if Amin personally was aware of these schemes
and concerned about them, the army officers who had put him in power
were. Their response, as already noted, was to enter the competition
themselves and decisively behind Amin. On 20 February, in a long and
carefully worded statement (Uganda Government 1972:41-5), the army
officers declared their 'full confidence' in Amin, promoted him to the rank
of full General and 'urged' him to take the title of president. In a clear
snipe at the politicians the officers warned 'everybody that the period of
political activities has been suspended in the national interest and
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everybody (sic) engaging in political activities during such period of
suspension would be dealt with severely'
The brief honeymoon was over, and whatever chance there might
have been for a military-civilian cooperation or partnership, was gone.
Now if spoils politics was to be checked, it had to be done by the efforts of
the Army alone, and this was how Amin's personality contradictions
became a factor in the continuation of spoils politics. He was neither used
to nor cared for the form of procedure of government and his intervention
prevented the evolution of any form of system under which an
institution could evolve. Instead he opted to rule by decrees. In mid
March 1971, Amin enacted the Armed Forces (Powers of Arrest) Decree.
This decree gave powers to any soldier to arrest persons for offences
against public order, and even to search the homes, offices and motor cars
of suspected persons. As Mazrui (1973:3) has observed, by this decree the
regime 'sought to claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of force' as a
political weapon. The Army had made itself the master of the situation: as
the most powerful faction, it took all from all.
The Penal Code (Amendment) Decree of 17 March, 1971 decreed that
'unlawful gathering' was henceforth a felony punishable by seven years of
imprisonment. What constituted 'unlawful' gathering was up to any
soldier to determine. The Armed Forces (Powers of Arrest) Decree of 17
March, 1971 (see above), granted full powers of arrest and search of any
person without warrant to any soldier in uniform. The Suspension of
Political Activity Decree of 17 March, 1971 'abolished' politics. Under this
decree, any form of political activity, except by the soldiers, was suspended.
All persons previously associated with political activity were required to
get permission before leaving the country.
As Omara-Otunnu (1987:103) has commented, the army 'took
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advantage of the situation to engage in indiscriminate harassment of the
civilian population for their own ends'. In pursuing their own interests
thus, the army set itself against the civilian population, and put an end to
the possibilities of genuine cooperation of the people with the regime.
The Army as a Faction Under Threat
Amin did not feel secure, however, despite the powers of the Army and
his own unchallenged position at the head of the Army and the
Government. An important factor in this was Obote's looming shadow
from Tanzania The former president still had allies both inside the army,
the country and outside. Amin's feeling of vulnerability influenced his
actions and style of rule (such as the killings of real or imagined enemies),
which in turn became a factor in the political development under him.
True or not Amin believed that Obote had united the Acoli and
Langi members of the Armed forces against him, and since these two
groups still made up the bulk of the Army, his feeling of insecurity was
real. Four of Uganda's immediate neighbours, Sudan, Tanzania, Rwanda
and Burundi had denounced Amin and proclaimed their support for
Obote. (ARB February 1971). Support for Amin came only from West
Africa (Ghana especially). The danger existed that these external forces
would link up with the pro-Obote section in the army. Indeed, according
to the Uganda Government, plans for a three- or four- pronged attack on
Uganda involving Tanzania, Sudan, Somalia, Burundi and Rwanda and
possibly Zambia were already being worked out in Dar-es-Salaam. The
countries implicated all denied this claim (ARB February 1971:201-5), but
Amin certainly feared such a possibility.
In February 1971 Obote visited Sudan from Tanzania. There, with
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the cooperation of President Nimeiri, he opened a military training camp
for his guerrillas at Owiny-KiBul, in the south, 45 miles from the Uganda
border. 'From there he contracted soldiers and civilians in Uganda ... to go
and join him in the Sudan' (Mutibwa 1992:87). At about the same time,
some 1000 soldiers loyal to Obote followed him to Tanzania and joined a
training camp near the town of Tabora. (ACR 1971-1972). Though it now
appears the Sudanese support for Obote was primarily designed to put
pressure on Amin to end his own support of the Anya Nya guerrillas
fighting against the regime in Khartoum rather than an undiluted support
for Obote in the same lines as that of Tanzania, it nevertheless put pressure
on Amin since he was once again feeling as trapped as he felt just before
the coup in 1969-70. This fear was understandable considering that
Tanzania and Sudan virtually hemmed Uganda between them in the
north and south.
Furthermore the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had refused
to recognise his regime. Uganda's delegation to the Addis Ababa Council of
Ministers meeting late in February, led by Foreign Affairs Minister
Wanume Kibedi, was refused admission. (ARB February 1-28, 1971). At the
same time the venue for that year's OAU summit, planned to be held in
Kampala, was changed to Addis Ababa.
Amin's Personality and Policy Contradictions
These developments put Amin in the same situation, as far as his feeling
of insecurity was concerned, as the one before the coup. His response was
not to be cowed, but to hit back at real or imagined enemies. The result was
the almost wholesale slaughter of Acoli and Langi in the armed forces, and
many outside, in a series of waves of killings that began immediately after
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the coup (ACR 1972-1973; Omara-Otunnu (1987:104-7); Mutibwa (1992:87-8;
Decalo 1976:211-2)
Kibedi (1974), who knew Amin intimately, attributed the subsequent
disintegration of the country to Amin's personality. He describes Amin as
having a dual personality. One side of him was charming, friendly and
reassuring. This side was also endowed with immense capacity to
convince. But the other side of Amin was ruthless and brutal. While this
is largely true, it is not altogether adequate to explain Amin's
transformation as described above. Of far more importance in
understanding his subsequent moves was his other duality, that of being
both a soldier and a politician at the same time. This came about after and
as a result of the coup. The combination of these two functions in a man of
Amin's nature and office at that time was to produce extraordinary
contradictions in his policies both at home and abroad. This politician-
soldier duality was important in understanding the way he responded to
the problems he faced once he became president.
The problem was that Amin lacked the skills of the politician he
had inadvertently became. He was a political joyrider who got caught up
in a traffic jam he could not negotiate through. Since the factors I have
touched on above mitigated against returning the country to a civilian
administration, he was forced to rely on the skills of the soldier in him to
do a politician's job. As if to emphasise the dominance of the soldier over
the politician in him, the entire cabinet was enrolled in the Army and
subjected to military drills every morning before starting work (Ravenhill
1974). Military drills were introduced in many departments of work and in
every school throughout the country, including, (if not regularly),
Makerere University (Langlands 1977).
Amin was thus unprepared and unsuitable for the political tasks
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that events had tragically conspired to place in his charge. He literally set
out to run the government by action and force, elevating 'action' and
'force' into policy and even sanctifying them into a sort of principle. But
Amin's method of control and governance through force was so erratic
and lacked pattern1 . It cannot be reduced to the Machiavellian principle
of control through fear rather than love, because his rule was simply
without method or plan. Failure was therefore inevitable. Mazrui (1973)
touches on this issue when he writes:
For many Ugandan soldiers [and Amin] the coup was their first
moment of national heroism... They were trained in the techniques
of killing and maiming... But a coup is not a system of acclamation.
It is an event. When the event receded into history, the soldiers had
once again to face the issue that their training had been for
manipulating fear rather than manipulating love' (p. 10).
The Army's intervention in the political process was catastrophic,
although not entirely surprising. A number of factors can account for the
poor performance of the Uganda Army in government, which was
particular to the development of the Uganda Army itself. For not all
military governments in Africa have been so bad, or led to the
destabilisation of the state as it did in Uganda. General Olusegun Obasanjo
for example ruled Nigeria from 1976 to 1979, and his regime can be
considered a success by Nigerian and African standards. For instance in
1979 he peacefully handed power to a democratically elected civilian
administration of Shehu Shagari. Also Gamal Abd el-Nasser's rule in
Egypt (1954-1970) was even more successful: Egypt became prosperous
because of his social reforms. One factor for the poor performance of the
1 For a humorous, somewhat colourful, treatment of Amin's use of force as a method of
government, see Wole Soyinka's play, A Play of Giants, (London: Methuen, 1984). Besides
Amin's character, there are characters representing other brutal African dictators, Mobutu
of Zaire, Bokassa of the Central African Republic and Macias Nguema of Equatorial
Guinea. For a more academic account of the psychology of tyrants, see Samuel Decalo's book,
Psychoses of Power: African Personal Dictatorships, 1989.
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Amin regime was that the Uganda Army was developed essentially as a
back up force for politicians in the factional struggles since independence,
and lacked the character of a professional army. (Omara-Otunnu 1987;
Decalo 1976:173-230). Moreover, within the Army it was the most
unprofessional NCOs that took over power. The regime therefore
succeeded only in bringing out the worst of factional politics. It can be
compared to Samuel Doe's administration in Liberia from 1980 to 1991.
Doe was only a Master Sergeant when he took power in 1980, and to the
end of both his regime and himself in 1991 Liberia remained very
unstable.
The prominent, above-the-law position to which the Army has been
elevated was another factor in the continuation of instability. For having
failed to develop a partnership with the politicians, the Army still had the
option to penetrate the general population. This it attempted from 1973,
but the attempt, rather than winning the people, alienated them from the
regime.
The Administrative Reorganisation of 1973 and its Effects
Just as Obote had retained his position by 'allowing' the UPC notables to
do as they pleased before 1966, army officers in Amin's Uganda were
generally above the law. Therefore, although Amin centralised the chain
of command in his own hands, his immediate subordinates remained
largely independent, and authority within the Army itself disintegrated.
The granting of the powers of arrest without warrant to soldiers reduced
the effectiveness and even relevance of the police force, who in theory at
least, still represented the concept of civilian authority.
At the beginning of 1973 the regime made an effort to re-establish
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the system of representative government abolished in 1971. In January
Amin announced a programme of administrative reorganisation to bring
the military nearer to the people and perhaps improve relations between
them. He claimed that Obote's government had been too aloof from the
people and declared 1973 'year of the people'. (For the 'philosophy' and
details of this administrative reorganisation see Amin 1976; Mutibwa
1992:108; ARB 10, 191973; ACR 1973-1974; Martin 1974). In February the
five regions into which the country was administratively divided were
further divided into ten administrative units called provinces. Each
province was under a military governor appointed and directly responsible
to Amin instead of the minister of provincial administration. Each
province was further divided into new districts under either military or
civilian district commissioner. The number of districts was 38. There was
at least one military unit in each district, under battalion commanders. It
was these battalion commanders, rather than the administrative district
commissioners, who were directly responsible for the districts in their
areas (ARB October 1973:2760). The battalion commanders also controlled
the local branches of the State Research Bureau (SRB), the most powerful
and feared of Amin's security organisations. Both the Military Police and
another security organisation, the Public Service Unit (PSU), were above
the regular police force.2 They were answerable not to the district
commissioner but to the provincial governor, and thus ultimately
responsible to Amin.
It should be noted here that even before independence, the Uganda
civil service was a well-developed system, with well-trained and
competent district commissioners. The district commissioners were
generally on good terms with the people and were looked to as protectors.
2 For a discussion of the roles and functions of the various security or paramilitary
organisations under Amin, see Khiddu-Mukabuya (1989).
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Had Amin utilised the existing local administration system as partners of
his regime in the administrative reorganisation of 1973, a more
meaningful link between the regime and the people might have been
established. For in theory, the reorganised administration had the
potential to establish a working relationship between the regime and the
people. The subordination of the district commissioners to the battalion
commanders made this impossible.
At the end of 1973, before the new system was properly established,
the battalion commanders dismissed all the county chiefs and organised
the 'elections' of new ones, with only 'suitable' candidates eligible to stand.
In Madi district, for example, 24 out of 25 existing chiefs were dismissed
and replaced by new ones, many of them soldiers from other parts of the
country who did not understand the language and customs of the people
they represented. All in all about 720 soldiers, many of them of the rank of
private, were appointed to act as chiefs throughout the country. (ACR
1973-1974:B291). According to some accounts the sitting chiefs who had
been appointed on political party basis, especially those who supported
UPC, were killed by the soldiers (Martin 1974:216).
The civilian police had during 1972 ceased to have any influence.
As a contemporary record noted: 'The police - looked upon with mistrust
by Amin - was repeatedly purged in 1972; their officers were as little
immune from the SRB as were civilians'. (ACR 1972-1973:B273). In May
1973 Amin the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under which the police fall,
was made a mere department within the Ministry of Defence. The
Military Police, another agent of state control, became the primary law-
enforcement agency.
From the regime's point of view, the attempt was successful because
it spread the military presence in all the districts down to the county level.
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It fulfilled one of Amin's aims, that of controlling the country through
the Army as opposed to the civilian local government organs. But for the
other declared purpose of the reorganisation, the re-marriage between the
regime and the people, the attempt was not only a failure but had the
opposite effect. It merely improved the state's capacity to repress the people
in the most remote areas. It was the completion of the military occupation
of the country.
The Expulsions of the Asians, Israelis and British
During the second half of 1972, Amin made one major political decision
which, in combination with other events at that time, affected the future
of his regime and that of the country as a whole. These included the
sudden expulsion of his erstwhile friends, the Israelis, from Uganda in
February 1972; the expulsion of British as well as some Ugandan Asians in
late 1972, and the invasion of the country by Obote's People's Army from
Tanzania in September. Also early in early 1973 Amin expelled the British
from Uganda. With the exception of the expulsion of the Asians and
Obote's abortive invasion attempt, these developments had largely
external ramifications. The importance of the expulsion of the Asians lay
in Amin's use of their abandoned properties as patronage within the
Army, and a few selected civilians who became the ally of the regime. On
the expulsion of the Asians, see Twaddle (1975; Uganda News, September
1972, pp. 3-16; Mutibwa 1992:80-92; Mamdani 1983:38-94; ACR 1972-
1973:B303~6, and others).
The significance of the expulsions as far as the survival or support
for Amin's regime was concerned was that after the Asians left, all the
businesses formerly owned by them were taken over by the government
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and distributed as patronage within the country. Reliable figures are hard
to come by, but according to estimates between 3,000 and 4,000 businesses
were distributed within three months early in 1973. (ACR 1972-1973:13304-
5). Besides businesses, the homes of the departed Asians were also given
away, as well as 'tea and coffee estates, garages and large hotels.' And this
'system of personal patronage ... produced a new class of entrepreneurs.'
(ACR 1972-1973:B303). In addition to the direct distribution of business to
individuals, the regime had the chance of rewarding support by
appointments to management positions to the larger businesses it had
taken over. This category of large businesses included the giant Madhvani
Industrial Group, the Mehta Sugar Estates. Added to this were the British
and American companies nationalised when Amin expelled them from
Uganda in 1973. Also in an effort to show that the regime was winning the
"economic war" and actually creating "black millionaires", Amin ordered
banks to give loans to support business ventures by Ugandans. The
Uganda Commercial Bank in particular, and others 'were pressurised to
support uneconomic companies against their will' (Commonwealth
Secretariat 1979:113). However the government succeeded in setting up
new companies in this way. For example, many new private and public
companies were set up in Uganda during 1974 (For the list see
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1979:114-5, Table 9.1).
The State Trading Corporation (STC), which held a total monopoly
of the export-import trade, had already became a subject of competition
among the officers. In response to this competition, Amin had, at the end
of 1974 broken the STC into eight specialised companies. This was done in
order to provide patronage to more officers: for the break-up made it
possible for most of the leading officers to control at least one company.
And as I will show in Chapter 9, business rivalry among the officers, later
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played a role in Amin's fall in that it encouraged the emergence of
"business associations" and potential political factions within in the
military at the time the crisis with Kenya's closure of its border after the
Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport in July 1976 3.
The economic war enabled the regime to penetrate society as a
whole and thus recruit a tiny class of civilian support. With the
administrative reorganisation just discussed in place, civilian recruitment
was comparatively easy. The newly installed local chiefs, members of the
civil service and other professionals around the country received shops
and small businesses free from the state. (Mutibwa 1992:115-7). These
subsequently identified their interests with that of the regime. These were
the so called Mafuta Mingis, whose aspiration, in Amin's words, was to
become 'black millionaires'.
But a distinction needs to be drawn between the civilian and
military beneficiaries of the economic war in their relation to the regime
(or more precisely Amin). The concept of reciprocity defined the
relationship between Amin and his military supporters, but not that with
the civilian opportunists. These were simply used, and consequently
dispensable if the need arose. But as they owed their properties solely to
the regime, and their association with the regime had alienated them
from the people (mainly as a result of envy), they came to identify
themselves and their survival with that of the regime, as dependents.
Many became informers or full-time agents for the SRB and PSU.
3The new companies, with their specialisation, were the following. 1.Uganda
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (for the import and distribution of all drugs). 2. Uganda Motors Ltd.
(export and distribution of all motor vehicles and spare parts). 3. Food and Breweries Ltd.
(exporters and distribution of food and beverages). 4. Transocean Uganda Ltd. (for
transportation between Uganda and other countries).5.Uganda Hardware Ltd. (for
importation and distribution of building materials). 6. General Merchandise Ltd. (for export
and distribution of goods of "general nature"). 7. Inter-African Traders Ltd. (for the export
of Uganda goods), and 8. National Industrial Machineries Ltd. (for the import of
agricultural an industrial machines). (ACR 1974-1975:B322).
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(Mamdani 1983). Even if they did not help in the breakup of any genuine
anti-government nests, their association with the government through
the SRB, and the fact that the local battalion commanders did not bother to
check any information they received and meted instant 'justice' on
whoever was accused, meant that the Mafuta Mingis to a large extent kept
the fear of the regime alive throughout the country. They therefore
contributed in making it possible for Amin to lord it over the people for so
long. As a base of support the mafuta mingi class was not of much
significance, since few people benefited directly. The importance of the
economic war was the fact that, as in Kenya, the knowledge that the
regime had patronage to offer, which led to a more ostentatious showing
of support by those who wanted rewards. As I will show in Chapter 9, the
real support for the regime, and the reason for its relatively long survival,
lay elsewhere within the top ranks of the Army.
KENYA
Survival of Clientelism and Continuity (1978-1980)
In Chapter 6 we have noted that the basis of political stability in Kenya was
the clientelist system centred around Kenyatta, and that as an institution
in its own right this system had developed to the extent where it was able
to defend itself, that is, it had become self-regulating while remaining
viable as a system of rule. (See also Tamarkin 1978; 1979; Leys 1975; and
Khapoya 1979) It is true that Kenyatta dominated this system during his
time, but it is also true to say that Kenyatta himself was dominated to a
large extent by the system as everyone else, in the same way a vehicle
carries both the passengers and the driver. Stability had become dependent
on playing the rules of the system right: Kenyatta might have been able to
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disrupt the system if he chose, but this would not have been either in his
or the country's interest.
Since the clientelist system was self-servicing and had become a
stabilising force, only its disruption would have led to chaos, and not the
demise of one of the members, however prominent. This is why, as we
shall see in a moment, Moi succeeded Kenyatta without disrupting the
system. In fact it was those who tried to prevent his succession who were
defeated: first in the "Change the Constitution Campaign" in 1976, and
again in an alleged coup plot in Nakuru at the time of Kenyatta's death in
August 1978. (ACR 1978-1979:B267; Karim and Ochieng 1980; W R 18
October 1976; Widner 1992:115-137).
But just as the past legacy helped Moi to succeed Kenyatta, it also
made it difficult for him to break from the system during the first few
years, or to be 'his own man'. For instance, the first cabinet was purely
Kenyatta's last cabinet. Even the ministers of the previous regime, with
the exception of three whose ministries were either abolished or merged,
remained unchanged after the succession. Only one new minister was
brought in the cabinet, Stanley Oloitiptip, to take over the Home Affairs
ministry vacated by Moi himself. (ACR 1978-1979:B272-3 and ACR 1977-
1978:B266-7; Khapoya 1980; Tamarkin 1979). Contrary to arguments by
Jackson and Rosberg (1985:45-70; 1982:1-25) that "personal rulers" in
Africa's "weak states" dominate the political system and that the systems
respond to the whims of the leaders, the case in Kenya, and to some
extent that in Uganda, demonstrated that the systems hold sway over the
leaders. It was the system rather than its operators that was, in the final
analysis, the most influential actor. For example, (see Chapter 7), in 1969
Obote was unable to use his authority as leader of the government to
remove Felix Onama from the Ministry of Defence. Had the 'system' of
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spoils not weakened Obote's position and strengthened that of Onama,
there would have been little problem in shifting him to another ministry
or dismissing him altogether should he refuse to be moved.
Moi's previous weak position within the clientelist system was
another factor in the preservation of continuity. As an 'outsider' he was
not in a position to disrupt it when he came to power, and became for the
first few years even more dependent on it than Kenyatta had been. In
understanding Moi's succession and the peaceful transition the legacy of
the past needs to be emphasised.
Domination of the System
The first factor that helped the transition process was the fact that Moi
was the heir apparent. The widespread view that Kenyatta died without
naming a successor may be literally correct4, but is analytically misleading.
Moi's position was so self-evident that there was no need to make
announcements about it. As Khapoya (1978:17) has pointed out: 'Moi was
really the front runner to succeed Kenyatta from the very beginning [of his
vice-presidency in January 1967]'. When Mboya emerged as an alternative
front runner, he was eliminated in 1969, an act which, as noted, was a part
of the preservation of the system.
While real power in Kenya had always been in the hands of the
Gatundu court under Kenyatta, the stability of that power in their hands
was safeguarded by a delicate alliance involving Gatundu and the rest of
Kikuyu, as well as two of the most important peripheral ethnic groups -
the Kalenjin and Akamba, and headed respectively by Moi and Paul Ngei.
It was this Gatundu/Kikuyu-Kalenjin-Akamba alliance that had helped to
"This is a recurring theme in the discussion of pre- and post-Kenyatta politics in Kenya.
See for example Murray (19&§); Khapoya (1978); Leys (1975).
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create stability in the country. (Throup 1987:34). Given the importance
Kenyatta attached to unity since and before Kenya became a Republic in
December 1964, his commitment to the alliance with these two leaders was
understandable. To have left Moi outside the system posed the dangers of
an anti-Kikuyu alliance comprising the various peoples of the Rift Valley
Province and Nyanza Province, the second and third largest ethnic groups,
respectively the Luo (14.6 percent of the population in 1969) and Luhya
(13.6 percent). The 1966 ostracism of Oginga from KANU and the
assassination of Mboya in 1969 had eliminated effective Luo representation
in Kenyatta's state, and turned them into something like an opposition to
the state itself. (On this see Goldsworthy 1982a). If Moi was not
incorporated into the state, the danger existed of an anti-Kikuyu alliance
involving in particular the Kalenjin, Luhya and the Luo, who are in any
case closely related and inhabit a continuous geographical area. Such a
development would have pitched the Kikuyu against "the rest".
Besides Kenyatta had good reasons for fearing such a development
because since he joined KANU in 1964, Moi had provided a bridge between
the Kalenjin and Kikuyu peoples, and this prevented land clashes between
them. Under pressure for more land, the western Kikuyu had expanded
into the Rift Valley at the expense of the Kalenjin, but more especially
Moi's own Tugen, in whose territory (or so they claimed) the immigrant
Kikuyu town of Nakuru lay. For although Nakuru is not in Kikuyu
country, Nakuru District and town had been predominantly Kikuyu since
the 1920s, following the influx of squatters into the area during World War
1 to escape from the exactions of the government nominated chiefs.
(Throup 1987:44-5; Kanogo 1987. See also Chapter 2 on the reaction of the
Kikuyu to some of the appointed chiefs). As Throup (1987:44) has
observed, from a 'Kikuyu perspective, Moi appeared to be the most
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important Kalenjin leader who had to be compensated elsewhere if a
confrontation was to be avoided'.
Moi's succession can also be seen as epitomising the greatest rewards
that a political client can claim from his patron. In view of the above it was
something he earned. None of the other clients had offered so much to
Kenyatta, nor voluntarily served him as loyally as Moi did. The other
members of the circle, Mungai, Koinange, Njonjo and Gichuru, had to
serve Kenyatta either because they had little chance outside his shadow or
because some were members of the 'Royal Family'. But Moi had a choice,
as demonstrated by his break with KANU in 1960 to form KADU. His
rejoining of KANU in 1964 was a strategic decision, but nonetheless
voluntary.
In fact Kenyatta needed Moi more than the other way, even
through the Mzee was infinitely more powerful. For within Kikuyu itself,
not all the notables and districts supported Kenyatta. Without Moi
Kenyatta would have had to depend on some or the "real" notables,5 such
as J.M. Kariuki, Mwai Kibaki and Bildad Kaggia. The political status of
Kiambu and possibly Kenyatta would have diminished somewhat. Anti-
Gatundu alliance of the rest of the Kikuyu, or even in alliance with other
peoples, would have ended Gatundu domination and Kenyatta's state. As
we shall see shortly, it was the alliance between Mwai Kibaki, (a Nyeri
Kikuyu) and Moi that finally defeated the Gatundu challenge to Moi's
succession. For these reasons, at least since 1968 Moi not only had been the
heir-apparent, but his position had been protected with Kenyatta's blessing.
The assassinations of Mboya in July 1969 and J. M. Kariuki in March 1975
had the effect of strengthening his position further.
The assassination of Mboya enhanced Moi's position in two respects.
5The 'real' notables were the key members of Kenyatta's inner circle, the men who
controlled the Presidency. (See Chapter 5).
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In the first place, it removed the the ablest of the potential challengers to
his bid to succeed Kenyatta. As we have seen in Chapter 6, Mboya's
ambitions, capabilities and the nature of his cross-country power base,
especially his power base in the trade union movement, made him a
threat to Kenyatta's clientelist system itself. As Miller (1984:44-5) has
noted: 'By 1969 [Mboya] was truly a national politician, appealing for unity
across ethnic lines ... and posed a threat if his broad appeal hid serious
presidential aspirations. (See also Sandbrook 1972:22; Goldsworthy
1982a:264-275, and 1982b). Secondly, the assassination alienated not only
the Luo but also Mboya's supporters throughout the country, increasing
resentment against the ruling oligarchy. Although Moi was vice-
president it did not make things any more complicated for him. He was a
part of Kenyatta's inner circle, but he was not of it. As the outsider the
assassination made him the less evil of the 'gang', and therefore less
unacceptable as Kenyatta's successor than the next most likely candidate -
Kenyatta's nephew Mungai.
The assassination of Kariuki had the same effect as that of Mboya
on Moi's prospects of succession. The difference was that Mboya's
assassination improved Moi's position in a general way, while that of
Kariuki improved it in a more particular way. Mboya's assassination had
pitched the Kikuyu as a whole against 'the rest', or more particularly the
Kikuyu against the already marginalised Luo. Kariuki's assassination
however pitched the Kikuyu against Kikuyu. Kariuki had made himself
the spokesman for the poor in both Kikuyuland and the rest of Kenya, and
was therefore the self-declared opponent of the 'Royal Family'. He has been
described as 'a powerful MP and ... leader of the unofficial opposition in
parliament' (Miller 1984:51-2). He also 'made no bones about his
aspirations to the presidency' (Nyong'o 1983:32-3). His open criticism of
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Kenyatta and the initial official attempt to cover up his murder, confirmed
the suspicion that the 'Royal Family' was directly responsible for his death.
(W R March 17 and 24, 1975; June 9, and many other issues; Throup
1987:48-9; Tamarkin 1978:315-6). It is therefore significant, but not
surprising, that it was Kikuyu support, but more appropriately anti-'Royal
Family' Kikuyu support, that ensured Moi's smooth succession.
Moi was also helped by the rivalry among the court itself. For
neither the court not the whole clientelist system was as cohesive and
efficient from the mid 1970s as it had been before 1970. The system had
deteriorated into a sort of crisis. Before his assassination J.M. Kariuki was
charging that politicians diverted contributions to their own use instead of
giving them to the people. Corruption became rife among top politicians
and their agents. This was particularly so in the allocation of land in the
Rift Valley during the government's programme to expand agricultural
production in the area between 1972 and 1975. This was a period
characterised by the 'politicisation of the land market' (Widner 1992:80).
Land was allocate on the basis of political support, not on the basis of need
or the ability and qualification of the recipient to make the best
agricultural use of it. Indeed Kariuki was not slandering the system under
Kenyatta: he was exposing what went on within it. Kenyatta's apparent
inability to check corruption, the excesses of the security forces (see for
example Ngugi wa Thiong'o's account in Detained: A Writers Prison
Diary, Heinemann, 1982), alienated the rest of Kikuyu against the
Gatundu oligarchy. Also since Kenyatta was already very advanced in years
and in ill-health, competition within the inner circle for succession
ensured that Moi faced no united opposition from the family. (Chege,
Independent Kenya). The split between Njonjo and Mungai at the top of
the clientelist pyramid was particularly important in this, as demonstrated
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by the failed "Change the Constitution" campaign in 1976, where the two
took opposite sides. Had they stood together, Moi's succession could have
been easily prevented, whatever the consequences.
Failure of the 'Amend-the-Constitution' Campaign, 1976
But the resilience of the clientelist system was best demonstrated in the
failed attempt to amend the constitution in 1976 in order to prevent Moi
from succeeding Kenyatta. It was a test case for the strength for the
strengths of one faction and that of the system as a whole, and needs to be
described here.
On 22 September 1976, Kihika Kimani, the MP for Nakuru North
called for the amendment of the section of the constitution on succession,
such that 'any person who succeeds a president who vacates his office for
any reason would himself be elected in a general election' (WR 18 October
1976). Had it been considered and passed, the amendment would have
reverted the law of succession to what it was in the independence
constitution of 1962 (Gertzel 1970; Murray 1968). Under the existing law
the vice-president takes office for the grace period of 90 days, after which
the President would be elected by parliament.
Since it was clear the campaign was designed to prevent Moi's
succession, it provided a rare opportunity for the articulation of the
factional lines, and for Moi's supporters and enemies to come out in the
open. On October 8, 1976, Stanley Oloitiptip, a Moi supporter, proposed
that parliament condemn the campaign to amend the constitution as
'unethical, amoral and bordering on criminality'; 92 of the members
present supported it, out of a total parliament membership of 170.
(Tamarkin 1979:24; ACR 1976-1977:B219). Inside the Gatundu Court,
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Mungai and Gichuru supported it. The Akamba strongman Paul Ngei was
another supporter. However, all public debate on the matter ended when
Njonjo, who 'supported' Moi6 , issued a statement to that effect early in
October. The statement said that it was 'a criminal offence' to discuss the
question of succession because it implied that some politicians wished to
'compass, imagine, devise or intend the death or deposition of the
president'. Njonjo also warned that the 'mandatory sentence for any such
an offence by a citizen [was] death, and any person who aids in such an
offence by being an accessory after the fact of it is liable to imprisonment
for life', (quoted in The Weekly Review 18 October, 1976). A few days later
the full cabinet had an emergency meeting, and a statement was issued
'reiterating' Njonjo's statement of the amendment of the constitution, and
the matter ended there.
This development demonstrated one of the benefits of well-
established clientelistic system, its ability to transcend and destroy ethnic
loyalties that Lemarchand (1972) draws attention to. Although I do not
agree with most of what Lemarchand says about the relationship between
ethnicity and clientelism7, he is in one case right when he says that
'Clientelism may in some cases weaken the strength of ethnic
identification and [this] in turn affect the shape and stability of clientelistic
networks'. The essence of a clientelist relationship is its reciprocity, and
how useful a client and patron are each to the other. If therefore a relative
or a member of the same ethnic group is in no position to offer support or
reward, patrons and clients will ally themselves with "outsiders" who are
able to offer them what they need. The boundaries of ethnicity are
therefore transcended.
6 Njonjo's support, as I will show in the next chapter, was a tactical move to project
himself.
7 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of this.
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Thus the general resentment against the Kikuyu over Mboya's
assassination, the particular resentment against the Gatundu Court over
the assassination of Kariuki, the rivalry between Njonjo and Mungai as
well as those between the political notables in each constituency, all
combined to enhance Moi's succession prospects, and made it a foregone
conclusion even before Kenyatta died on 22 August, 1978. In the absence
of these factors Moi's succession would have been in severe doubt if not
impossible.
The Aftermath: The Period Of Wait-and-See, 1979-80
Despite, or because of, his being the candidate favoured by the system, Moi
subsequently became a prisoner to it during the first few years of his
leadership. For one thing he had political debts to pay to those who had
supported him. The same indebtedness which made this caution necessary
and an asset at the same time became a liability. In particular Moi was in
danger of remaining a figurehead or being overthrown by the same
Njonjo faction that helped him into power. Of his main two Kikuyu
supporters, Njonjo and Kibaki, Njonjo was the more powerful and
dangerous (see below). He was therefore both a political friend who had to
be appeased up to a point, but beyond that point a political enemy to be
watched and destroyed at the right time. Miller (1984:89) has stated that
part of Moi's success in gaining the presidency was that he brought in
Njonjo and Kibaki on his side. Although the support of these two men
was critical to Moi's success, as already noted, it would be more accurate to
see the relationship between the three at that early stage (1978-9) as that of
interdependency: before 1979 Njonjo was in stronger position than Moi as
he, Njonjo, had more cards to play.
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Once he was sworn in as President at the end of 1978, however, Moi
faced a real dilemma as to how to overcome the problem of
interdependency or 'triumvirate leadership' imposed by the system. As
President he had the power to alter the system in any way he chose. His
dilemma was that the system had ensured his success so far, and as such
upsetting its delicate balance carried the risk of weakening his own
position. He had been, and to the extent that the system held sway, was still
a guest within it, and his success had been helped only by the division
between Njonjo and Mungai's faction. (Indeed Moi's position in 1978-80
was similar to that of Obote in 1960-63, because both men were helped by
the factionalism around them). It was a situation he could not leave
unchanged for long, however. The second problem was therefore how to
make himself master of the system without changing it. As I will show in
due course, it was the option of making himself the patron of the system
without destroying it that Moi chose to pursue. It involved his ridding
himself of dependence on Njonjo, which in turn made it necessary to
forge new alliances.
Moi's First Moves to Undermine the Gatundu Group
Given the above, Moi's first moves were tactically against the Gatundu
group, and not Njonjo, whom he still needed as a shield. To attack Njonjo
early and directly was like boring a hole under the boat by which he, Moi,
was crossing the stormy waters of Kenyan politics. He therefore started by
undermining the Kenyatta family and its associates from 1980. At the same
time he expanded his political constituency from mainly Kalenjin or Rift
Valley base to encompass the whole country. (I will discuss this in detail in
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a moment). For by first eliminating the threat of the Gatundu Group 8, and
expanding his constituency nationwide, Njonjo's value as an ally would
be undermined and he would then become dispensable.
The undermining of the Gatundu group began very early in Moi's
leadership by the tactical demotion of Mbiyu Koinange to the relatively
obscure ministry of natural resources in November, 1978. (Khapoya
1979:55-6; ACR 1978-1979; African Confidential 19,17 August 25, 1978 p. 1).
The significance of this change was that at a stroke Moi had removed the
instruments of state control from the Kenyatta family. Koinange had been
in charge of the all-important provincial administration. As already noted,
in Kenya there has historically been a close relationship between the civil
service and the executive. President Kenyatta in particular had relied on
the civil service as an agent of control (Chapter 5, above; Mueller 1968;
Gertzel 1966). At a time of a major political change, the service was
therefore indispensable to order and stability, and it was therefore
important to ensure that it was at the side of the new leader. Although
during the Kenyatta era the permanent secretaries in the various
ministries exercised considerable influence and sometimes had power
over their ministers, they were all controlled at the Office of the President
by Koinange, the Minister of State - hence their power. It was in this sense
that Koinange's removal was a significant political act, because by the very
nature of their office within the Presidency, ministers of state in Kenya
have been functionally the extension of the Presidency. Individuals who
filled the post had to be truly loyal to the particular President. As minister
of state Koinange was also responsible for the GSU and internal security,
the two organs that constituted the most important instruments of state
control. In fact even before Koinange was removed, Moi ensured that he
8 For a discussion on the Gatundu Group, see Chapter 5, pp. 104-6.
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had the loyalty and support of the individuals who controlled these
organisations, namely: Mr. Kanyota (Head of the GSU), Major General
Mulinge (Commander of the Army), and Bernard Hinga (Commissioner
of Police). (Tamarkin 1978; ACR 1978-1979).
Moi followed the demotion of Koinange with an attack on Njoroge
Mungai and other influential members of the Kenyatta family. For despite
his defeat in the bid to succeed Kenyatta, Mungai retained some political
clout. He remained chairman of both the Nairobi branch of KANU and
that of the government owned National Pipeline Company to which
Kenyatta had appointed him in 1975. More directly, he was the flagbearer
of the Kenyatta family (On this see Karim and Ochieng 1980). He was the
potential presidential candidate of the supporters of the change the
constitution campaign in 1976.
The strategy of undermining the Gatundu faction involved more
than direct attacks on their members. Moi simultaneously sought to
expand his base of support countrywide. Foe example on 12 December,
1978, the anniversary of Kenya's independence, he released all political
prisoner of the Kenyatta era as a sign of goodwill. The release of political
prisoners after changes of regime has been a common feature in Africa
(Amin, as noted already, also released political prisoners). But in Moi's
case the release had a political significance beyond the ordinary because it
helped his anti-Kiambu strategy. As Widner 1990:131) has pointed out, the
significance of freeing the prisoners was that it had the 'practical effect not
only of demonstrating goodwill but also of reviving the careers of some
potential allies against a Kiambu-based coalition.' After the release Moi
tried to reach a rapprochement with the Luo people who had been hostile
to the Kenyatta regime, by a limited rehabilitation of Oginga Odinga. In
1979 Odinga was appointed chairman of the Cotton Lint and Seed
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Marketing Board, and later that of the Maize Marketing Board, both of
them government enterprises. But like other former members of KPU
Odinga was prevented from contesting the 1979 general elections. (ACR
1981-1982:B182; Miller 1984:98-109; Nyong'o 1983:35; Throup 1987:59).
Moi also tried to present himself as a man of the people in contrast
to Kenyatta's aloofness and elitism. He took a more active part in self-help
projects, at which he made tactical 'generous and spontaneous
contributions' to impress upon the people his generosity (Nyong'o
1983:34). He initiated a literacy campaign and abolished school fees for
primary education. On another initiative tried to improve youth
representation in KANU. Late in 1979 he established a KANU branch at
the Nairobi University (Miller 1984:89).
The policy of progressively reducing Kikuyu dominance in favour
of a more representative distribution of power continued in the economic
sphere. Under Kenyatta capitalist accumulation and therefore economic
power had been the preserve of a few wealthy Kikuyu symbolised by the
Kikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (GEMA). The alliance between
economic and political power in during the Kenyatta era was such that his
regime was seen as the era of 'GEMA-domination'. During that time
'[GEMA] banks gave easy loans to middle class functionaries ... to buy
residential houses in the urban areas [and] 'advanced loans to commercial
farmers and ... commodity producers.' Furthermore, banks helped in 'state
projects within which sinecures were created for the supporters of the
regime' (Nyong'o 1983:34-5).
With the assistance of Finance Minister Mwai Kibaki, Moi pursued
a policy of economic liberalisation, designed to open opportunities for
more people. This involved the withholding of state patronage from
business and other (political) financial projects in Kiambu. As a result,
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after Moi took over power, most of GEMA-controlled institutions
collapsed. (Hyden 1987:177-136). Notable examples were Andrew Ngumba's
Rural and Urban Credit Financial Company and the Mutakino Farmers
Company based in Nakuru. The two institutions were involved in the
buying and reselling of land, an Tike so many other land-buying
institutions [were] used to accumulate capital for the purpose of
subsequently serving short-term political interests' (Hyden 1987:127; see
also Throup 1987:58-9)
In the arena of high politics, the general elections of 1979 provided
Moi with an opportunity to further strengthen his position. As much as
60 percent of the new MPs were new entrants; although this change was
not much different from the average percentage change of MPs in general
elections in Kenya, it was important because (as was to be expected) the
changes favoured Moi at the expense of other factions. Many of the MPs
who had supported the proposed constitutional change as well as former
members of KPU together with Oginga Odinga, were prevented by the
KANU machinery from contesting. As most KPU leaders were in any case
imprisoned and released by Moi, they had to seek presidential clearance to
contest elections and this was simply refused. Besides Oginga Odinga,
Achieng Oneko, George Anyoma, Masinde Muliro and Waruru Kanja
were refused clearance (Nyong'o 1983:35). Khapoya (1979:17-32) has shown
that for the first time since independence the Gatundu stronghold on the
cabinet was broken due to the increase of non-Kikuyu cabinet ministers.
The strategy to undermine Kikuyu, but especially Gatundu Kikuyu
influence in politics reached its height in mid 1980, when the government
suddenly abolished GEMA. The stated reason for the abolition of GEMA
was that it was a 'tribal' organisation and therefore a bad influence for
national unity. But the real reasons went much bigger and was linked to
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the new anti-Kikuyu strategy already mentioned. (Widner 1992:140-145). In
the words of one commentator, the ban represented 'the pursuit of specific
targets by general means'. The undeclared aim was to 'check the political
and financial advancement of certain individuals not loved by the Moi
administration' (African Confidential 21/21, October 15, 1980, p.l. See also
W R 8 August, 1980). The senior members included the most powerful and
richest of the people from these four districts. The organisation's
involvement in politics, as noted already, was demonstrated by the fact
that it was at a GEMA meeting that the "change-the-constitution"
campaign of 1976 was launched. The leading campaigner, the Nakuru
North MP Kihika Kimani, was both the chairman of the Nakuru branch of
KANU and secretary general of GEMA. Other notable members included
Njenge Karume, the chairman and close personal friend Kenyatta;
Duncan Ndegwa, the Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya, James
Gichuru, Mbiyu Koinange and Ngengi Muigai. (Karim and Ochieng
1980:56; W R 8 August, 1980; AC 15 October, 1980, and others).
Backlash
But the steady decline of Kikuyu influence had a negative effect on the
relationship between Moi, Njonjo and Kibaki, but especially that between
Njonjo and Moi. The strengthening of Moi's position in the country
represented a threat to Njonjo's ambitions because the president no longer
needed him as much as he did in 1978. There was no longer any doubt as
to who the real boss was. It was at this stage that Njonjo appears to have
decided to go on the offensive. Whether he feared for his position because
of the president's increased powers and confidence, or he simply decided it
was time to make a bid for power independently from other factors, is not
clear. But in May 1980, Njonjo resigned his post as attorney general and
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entered parliament as an elected politician. But instead of appointing him
to a powerful cabinet post, Njonjo was given a new and largely decorative
portfolio as Minister of Constitutional Affairs. (ACR 1980-1981). The
reasons behind such a move by a politician who was already very
powerful, as well as for his appointment to an insignificant post by the
President, were both clear.
Before 1980, as an appointed rather than elected politician, Njonjo
did not have any solid geographical power base. Thus, despite the fact that
he held massive legal and bureaucratic powers as attorney general and
political power broker in Nairobi, he had nothing apart from these. His
power throughout his long tenure of office had rested on his being needed
by the president of the day. Due to the paradox already referred to,
however, neither he nor Moi was comfortable in their relationship with
each other. It was correctly noted that Njonjo's new status as an elected
politician 'injected a new sense of tension in the political atmosphere' (AC
14 June, 1980).
In the next chapter we shall see how Moi reacted to this new
challenge to his leadership and with what consequences.
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CHAPTER NINE
The Successor Regimes: Crises and Disintegration
In Chapter 8 we noted how the successor regimes in Uganda and Kenya
attempted to consolidate themselves in power during the first few years.
But what they succeeded in doing was merely to consolidate their
positions in office, but not necessarily in power. They continued to face
challenges to their authority. The attempted coup against Moi at the
beginning of August 1982 was but one manifestation of the threats to his
authority and position. The challenge remained for Moi to make himself
the undisputed patron of his erstwhile fellow-clients. For Amin, since his
regime was divorced from the people and depended on the military, the
primary challenge was how far he could continue manipulating the top
military officers in his favour without being challenged.
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the responses of Amin and Moi
to the challenges they faced after 'consolidating' their positions in power,
and to evaluate the effects on their relationship with other officers and
politicians. In the section on Uganda I argue that Amin's long survival
and sudden fall in 1979 were both the result of factionalism within the top
ranks of the Army. First I explain how Amin consolidated his power and
why he survived for such a long period in office, by analysing his relations
with members of the Defence Council. After this I will discuss the
disintegration of the Defence Council and the polarisation of and the
subsequent fall of Amin. The section on Kenya discusses the period from
1980 to 1987 in two waves. In the case of Kenya I argue that Moi's failure to
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make himself the effective patron of Kenyatta's clientelism encouraged
him to be more authoritarian and repressive, and that the growing
instability Kenya has experienced from the early 1980s has been a direct
result of this. First I discuss the major political events of the period: the
attempted coup and expulsion of Njonjo from both government and
KANU in 1983-4. After this I interpret Moi's role as a patron and suggest
the probable trend of clientelism as a system of rule under him.
UGANDA
The Survival of Amin's Regime to 1975
When Amin came to power the general verdict among some observers
was that his regime would not last for more than a couple of years (Africa
Report, March 1972, p. 5; Short 1973: 34-35). In defiance of such predictions
Amin's regime survived for 8 long years, and might have lasted longer
were it not for the intervention of the Tanzanian Army. The irony of
this, on the surface at least, was the regime's surprisingly quick end in
1979. For within 6 months (October 1978-April 1979) of the outbreak of
hostilities between the two countries, Amin's regime was wiped out.
Surprising as both the long survival and sudden collapse of the regime
may seem, the two developments were consistent with the nature of a
regime characterised by spoils politics. Such a regime, since it thrives on
short-term strategies, has no long term policy strategies which might
make the rulers appreciate the need to integrate with the society. There
were therefore no institutional roots within the society to make it
subject to social changes that might weaken it; and at the same time this
lack of roots renders it vulnerable to a large scale or sudden attack.
A closer examination of what constituted Amin's regime, or how it
was constituted, suggests that there is nothing surprising about either its
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long survival or quick collapse. The reasons were the divorce between
state and society and the concentration of power within the Defence
Council, and in Amin's hands within the council itself. Only the physical
removal of Amin might have led to the removal of the regime. It was a
spoils regime in full bloom: Amin the winner took all from all and was
nearly everything. Beyond the physical Amin, there had ceased to be a
regime in Uganda long before April 1979.
Amin's position during the last few years in power can be compared
to that of Mobutu in Zaire, but especially that of Mohammed Said Barre of
Somalia before his fall in 1990. In Somalia, power was concentrated in the
hands of few relatives around Said Barre, and like Amin but unlike
Mobutu, Barre failed to control or impose his authority and his regime
collapsed. Mobutu, on the other hand, has managed to ensure that all his
closest associates have always been under his firm control and dependent
on him: within the inner circle he has remained the effective patron. In
spite of armed rebellions against the central government in the north-east,
south-east as well as in Katanga Province to the south, and the fact that
government has long ceased to function in most parts of the country,
Mobutu's hold on power has remained. (Young 1993; The Independent, 18
February 1994, p. 18). The reason is that the resentment against his regime
and the armed struggles in the peripheral areas have been unable to find
allies within the inner circle. The opposition groups, which include many
of Mubutu's former clients, have also been severely weakened by intense
factionalism. But for Amin, even the Tanzanians and Uganda exiles did
not combine forces to overthrow him in 1979 (See Chapter 10), the
disintegration of the Defence Council itself would probably lead to his fall
sooner than later.
To understand the long survival of the regime, it is therefore
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important to shift attention away from the relationship of the regime
with the population, and focus on Amin's changing relationships with
the army officers who constituted the core of the regime. State-society
relations were unimportant in understanding his survival because the
people had no powers of sanction against the regime's misuse of
arbitrary powers. The interests of one either ran parallel to that of the
other, or when they met were in potential conflict. But as the regime was
all-powerful, this potential conflict posed no threat to it. This explains why
in the end it was the Tanzanian Peoples Defence Forces (TPDF), an entirely
external force, that ended Amin's regime in April 1979.
Ethnicity Revisited
Omara-Otunnu's (1987) study of how Amin survived in power for so long
remains the most detailed treatment of this subject to date. His analysis has
a particular and useful distinction from other commentaries on the
subject, such as Mamdani (1983); Martin (1974) and Nabudere (1981).
Mamdani (1983), for example, attributes Amin's survival to 'fascism',
while Nabudere (1981) has suggested that the support of imperialist
countries have been more important. Hansen (1977) and Kiwanuke (1979),
and many other writers, have seen ethnicity as the most dominant factor.
Omara-Otunnu also subscribes to the notion of external assistance and
ethnic solidarity as contributing factors in Amin's survival, but his
emphasis is mostly on the personal power relations and the shifting
alliances within the Defence Council and the military as a whole. This
focus is correct because as we have seen the divorce between the regime
and the people meant that the regime remained the only area, apart from
an external force, where it was theoretically and practically possible to
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remove Amin and then perhaps overthrow the regime. For this reason
and discussion of Amin's survival must not only focus on the shifting
alliances within the military leadership but must also be confined to it.
It may be recalled that factional politics and clientelism both
undermine the usefulness of ethnic based alliances in the long run. In
spoils politics ethnicity is an insecure basis of support. The legendary
struggles and animosity between the two principal Luo leaders in Kenya,
Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya, is a case in point. Indeed it was Mboya
rather than Kenyatta who was more directly responsible for the destruction
of Odinga's party KPU in the "Little General Elections" of 1966. (Widner
1992:135; Goldsworthy 1982:241-6; Mueller 1976, and others). Clientelism
and spoils politics in the first instance thrive on personal rather than
corporate interests.
This is not to say that Amin discouraged ethnic alliances or
hesitated to use the ethnic card. It is simply that because of the temporary
nature of alliances in spoils politics power relations becomes personalised.
Individualism rather than collectivism becomes more important.
Therefore, no alliance is durable or permanent enough to become the
defining factor in power relations when national politics is dominated by
spoils politics. As ethnicity is a long-tern phenomenon, it becomes subject
to the sways and disruptions of spoils politics. It was this temporary nature
of alliances in spoils politics that made it necessary for Amin, in the words
of Omara-Otunnu himself, to 'consolidate his position by juggling around
top military personnel. In this way no one was afforded enough time to
build up a sphere of influence in a particular post' (p. 126).
This strategy would not have been necessary if ethnicity already
provided, or indeed could have provided, Amin with a secure base of
support. It is true that most of the senior officers appointed by Amin were
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from the West Nile region and thus ethnically related to Amin. But as one
(West Nile) officer was juggled around and replaced by another officer (say
also from West Nile), the individual factor becomes more significant than
the ethnic factor as both officers are from the same group. Amin's attempts
to rely on his fellow West Nile officers failed to provide him with a
secure base of support because the officers so appointed had their own
ambitions. In fact it was the officers from West Nile who subsequently
became the major internal threat to Amin. Most of the major attempted
coups against Amin were led by officers from this area.Rank and position
within the military hierarchy and relationship with Amin and other
officers were more important.
Lt. Col. Valentine Ochima was the first senior officer to be killed in
the factional struggles. He was Amin's first Chief of Staff and an Alur
from West Nile. Because of the strategic importance of this position, most
of the officers who were appointed to it lasted for only short periods,
some for only months. In understanding Ochima's fate, an allowance
should therefore be made for this as his successors too did not have better
luck. The commander of the Air Force, Col. Wilson Toko, also from West
Nile, was another officer to fall foul of Amin early in the regime. In April
1973 Toko led an attempted coup against Amin which failed (ACR 1973-
1974:B272). Yet a year later, in April 1974, another coup attempt was made
by Brigadier Charles Arube, an ethnic Kakwa like Amin. By some accounts
this was the most serious coup attempt made during Amin's eight-year
rule (Mutibwa 1992:106-107). Arube was shot dead on Amin's orders. The
willingness of Arube to lead the coup and Amin's readiness to kill him on
the spot contradicts the notion of reliable ethnic based alliances in in
political power struggles: ethnicity as a factor in Amin's long survival,
while it should not be discounted, should not be exaggerated either.
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Table 9.1
Attempted Coups Against Amin (]9?j -} 977)
DATE
LEADER(S) OF











Suspected plot, in collusion
with fellow-Alur politiciai
11r Valentine Ovonji. Col
Ocima wa3 killed in 1 972
May 1973 Col Gad W Toko









First major coup attempt
All officers suspected of
involvement sent on
enforced leave








Primarily a move against
Bi ig Malera, whom Amin
appoi nted Acti ng Chief-of-
Staff in Arube's absence.
Arube was killed
May 1974 Captain Kisule
Ft Lt Kaponga
Captain 1 Isumba





The aim was to kill Amin
and restore the kingdom.






Lt. Col Gore Commander of the
Masaka Garrison
Lugbar a (West Nile) Attempt, foiled. Reasons for
the attempt are obscure.
11 i3 believed Gore wanted
to avenge the death in
1974 of foreign mimi3ter
Col. 1 lichael Cindoga
February
1 977
Exiles in Kenya Former politicians Luo The plot wa3 uncover ed It
important becouse it
r esulted in the death of
A r c h bi s ho p Ja na n L uw um
and ministers Or yema and
Oboth Ofumbi




Baganda Abortive. The plotters
escaped to Kenya.
Source: Condensed from ACR 1 971 - 1 972. B230; 1 973-4. B295. B310; 1974-5 B31 1
1975-6, B252; 1976-7, B433; Mutibwa 1 992:1 06-7, and Decalo 1976:217;
New-African, October 1978.
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Arube's action epitomises the real problems in Amin's
relationship with the military officers. It now seems that Arube had some
personal grudge against the then acting chief of staff, Brigadier Hussein
Marela, one of the Sudanese officers and hated for his high-handedness .
Amin's reasons for putting him in this strategic post was that as Marela
had no power base in Uganda, he posed no threat to the president himself.
In fact this was the tactic Amin used to retain power because his most
loyal supporters, and therefore one element in his survival, were all
Sudanese. (See Table 9.1 Table 9.1).
Arube's action epitomises the real problems in Amin's
above). It was in fact a case of mercenaries supporting a foreign ruler to
subjugate his own people. Amin used these mercenaries as shields against
some of the ambitious Ugandan officers, who, if they took power, had
better chances of instituting a new regime because of their nationality and
the support they could expect. It was the manipulation of persons rather
than ethnicity that kept Amin in control of the regime and the country for
so long.
The State Research Bureau (SRB) and Paramilitary Forces
As Sudanese soldiers of fortune, with no geographical power base in the
country, they had an interest in keeping him in power. It is important to
draw this distinction as in current Uganda historiography everyone in the
north of the country, except the Luos, are bundled together and
misleadingly called Nubians, upon whose support it is supposed Amin's
regime depended (Omara-Otunnu 1987; Kiwanuka 1979; Hansen 1977).
However, the officers with bases in Uganda, such as Toko, Arube, Mustafa
Adrisi, Col. Toloko and others at one time or another supported Amin,
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but subsequently each fell out with him. As we will see in the next section,
from early 1976 Mustafa quarrelled with Amin over the prominent,
almost autonomous, positions of the Sudanese officers surrounding the
president.
Early in his regime Amin created and controlled several
paramilitary forces on which he relied to control opposition and protect
his regime. The best known and most feared was the SRB. But there was
also an expanded Military Police force, a Public Service Unit (PSU) and an
Anti-Smuggling Unit under the control of a former British officer Bob
Astles.
Estimates have put the number of full time active members of the
SRB over 3, 000, but it also had hundreds of part-time and occasional
members. (Khiddu-Mukubuya 1989:147-8; Omara-Otunnu 1987:109-112;
Mamdani 1983:42-6). The SRB was set up in 1971, first known as Military
Intelligence Unit under Amin's direct control in the President's Office. Its
activities soon expanded around the country and even abroad: it 'posted
its personnel as and when it pleased, within government departments,
institutions, the private sector and Uganda's embassies abroad'. In its
dealings it was it was the 'accuser, judge and executioner all in one'
(Khiddu-Mukubuya 1989:147).
The SRB and PSU can be described as mercenary forces because they
were under Sudanese officers Amin had brought into his army, such as the
long-time head of the SRB, Farouk Minaawa. The head of PSU likewise
was a Sudanese called Ali Towelli. Other high ranking Sudanese officials
upon whom Amin relied heavily were Brigadier Taban, Lt. Col. Sule,
Major Juma, the commander of the important Malire Mechanised
Reconnaissance Regiment. Another of Amin's close associates, and
member of the Defence Council was Major Isaac Maliyamungu, who is
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sometimes referred to as a Kakwa to emphasise the ethnic factor in Amin's
regime, but was in fact a Zairean. The paratroopers regiment, of which
Amin was particularly fond, was commanded by another Sudanese and a
member of the Defence Council, Lt. Col. Sabuni. (Mutibwa 1992:106-8;
ACR 1974-1975:B306-7; Mamdani 1983:40-44).
Mamdani's (1983) account of the organisation and activities of these
organisations is only one of many:
These agents and informers were the eyes and ears of the ... regime.
As one commentator has put it: 'The SRB was really like God, for it
was found everywhere'. Like the army, the SRB had a dual character.
On the one hand, it functioned as an institution of the state,
designed to detect any opposition in action or speech. Anyone,
neighbour, friend or relative, could be an agent or an informer. As a
result, political discussion outside official circles was silenced. On
the other hand, there was an individual dimension to the terror
unleased by the SRB or PSU. The SRB card endowed its owner with
the power of the state... (p. 43-4).
As the district headquarters of the SRB were often within the
military units established as a result of the administrative reorganisation
of 1973 , the control was therefore extensive and total. As far as the
prevention of opposition to the state from within the country was
concerned, these organs were successful and it would be correct to say
Amin owed his survival to a large degree to their activities.
This is where the importance of the Defence Council and the few
officers who constituted it comes in. The only organisation from within
the country that could have removed Amin from power was the SRB.
This it did not do for two important reasons. The first was the
"mercenary" nature of the SRB's leadership. The second was the regime's
ability to keep members of the SRB satisfied by direct handouts and
allowing them to have a field day forcibly taking things from the
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population. The economic aspects will be discussed in due course.
As for physically removing Amin, it was tried several times (above),
but Amin had a reputation for eluding would-be assassins by elaborate
plans. Accounts say that he seldom spend two consecutive nights in the
same place, and often spent a single night in two or more places to avoid
getting killed. It was also his practice not to give advance notice of his
movements. All known assassination attempts, and there were many,
failed. Recorded assassination attempts were made against Amin in 1972,
1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978; with sometimes several times in one
year. (Respective issues of African Contemporary Record)
Therefore, Amin's regime survived for a long time in part because
of its fragmented organisational structure: the various individuals from
ministers to battalion commanders, and centres of power (ministries,
provincial administrations and barracks), remained largely autonomous,
wielding the power and authority of the government but not accountable
for them. Also the divorce between society and state meant that any
serious threat to the regime could have come only from within the
military itself. But the fear of the SRB and the Military Police, and Amin's
practice of constantly reshuffling his top officers, restricted the scope of
serious internal threat. But from about 1976 the Defence Council itself
began to disintegrate, a process which eventually led to Amin's overthrow
in 1979.
The establishment of the provinces and "military districts" in the
administration reorganisation of 1973 had eroded the concept of unified
central control by Amin or the Defence Council. In contrast to the relations
between the Presidency and Provincial Administration in Kenya under
both Kenyatta and Moi, the provincial governors and battalion
commanders in Uganda remained largely autonomous. Amin was their
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man in Kampala rather than they his men in the provinces because they
acted much as they pleased: Amin only endorsed their acts. According to
his own directive, the provincial governors were 'the supreme bosses of
their provinces' and required them only to be 'personally responsible for
his security when he visited their provinces' (ACR 1974-1985:B308).
The autonomy of the provincial governors, Amin's reliance on
them for control, and the relationship of the provinces with the centre
was one cause of disintegration. The arrangement encouraged
competition between, rather than cooperation, with the centre and the
provinces collectively became alternative, rather than subordinate,
centres of power. For example, one of Brigadier Charles Arube's allies in
the attempted coup in March 1974 was the Governor of Buganda
Province, Lt. Col. Elly. (Mutibwa 1992:107; ACR 1974-2975:B308, B310-1). Lt.
Col. Elly's readiness to participate in a coup against Amin demonstrated
how fast relations with the centre could deteriorate: he had been
appointed only in the previous year.
Disintegration and Fall of Amin's Regime, 1976-1979
In accounting for the disintegration of Amin's regime, we need to focus on
the disintegration of the Defence Council itself, and its collapse as the
nucleus of the government, and not on the 'galvanising of internal
opposition' or external factors as Omara-Otunnu (1987) and Nabudere
(1981), among others, have suggested. The disintegration of the Defence
Council and Amin's fall were a product of the dynamics of factional
politics discussed in Chapter 5. No matter how tight a monopoly a
winning faction may hold on power and its use, factions are bound to
emerge within that faction itself and sooner or later the leader's own
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position may became the prize of competition unless, as Kenyatta did, a
clientelistic system is established to regulate power relations. Thus Obote
fell in 1971 in spite of the concentration of power in his hands in the
Republican Constitution of 1967 and repressive measures against
opponents. The same process of gradual polarisation of factions that led to
Obote's fall in 1971 in fact contributed to Amin's fall in 1979.
Prelude to Fall, 1975-1976
The period from 1975 to middle of 1976 was comparatively peaceful with
Amin secure in power. One reason was that after Arube's coup attempt in
1974, Amin carried out another purge in the army and made changes in
the position of the top commanders. The purges eliminated or silenced
real and imagined opponents. The changes also achieved a desired effect
because Lt. Col. Marela, whose appointment as Chief of Staff was one
factor in Brigadier Arube's coup attempt in 1974, was retired from the army
in 1974 and the post of Chief of Staff went to Mustafa Adrisi. (Omara-
Otunnu 1987:129; Mutibwa 1992:107-8). Mustafa was at that time a colonel,
and had apparently no personal political ambitions; therefore Amin
considered him to be a safe pair of hands. His appointment had had a
healing effect, if temporarily.
Secondly, on the surface at least, the full effect of Amin's "economic
war" had not yet affected the Army as adversely as the rest of the
population; on top of which they were enjoying the only "fruits" of the
economic war, namely, in corruption. There was already a lack of
essential commodities like salt and soap in the country as a whole, but as
the military and the people lived in different worlds socially, politically
and economically, what was happening to the people did not affect or
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concern the Army: the special shops in the barracks still had goods not
available to the rest of the population. The scarcity of goods in the shops
was in fact advantageous to the military, since hoarding goods and selling
them to the people at inflated prices made lucrative business. At the
beginning of 1975, for example, a kilo of hoarded sugar sold for over six
times of its official price; and cars were selling 'at four times the prices they
fetched two years' before in 1972-3. (Africa, March 1975, p.45; ACR 1974-
1975:B320). It was the years of magendo with most people practically
trying to become 'black millionaires' and the Army officers and mafuta
mingis who had benefited from the seized Asian properties were fully
content. Any attack on Amin was interpreted as an attack on themselves
and their privileged position. The soldiers saw the continuation of as a
part of their own interests and survival.
The third reason was that from June 1975 to June 1976 Amin was
the chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU): the hosting of
the year's Summit Conference in Kampala and Amin's election as
chairman somehow improved his domestic conduct, and it also kept him
too busy with matters concerning Africa (such as the independence of
Angola) to pay much attention to the squabbles within the military. (ACR
1975-1976; Mamdani 1983:72-4). But in June 1976 Amin handed over the
chairmanship of the OAU to Prime Minister Rangoolaan of Mauritius in
St Louis. The hand-over marked the end of his 'glory' days and the
beginning of his fall.
The eventual collapse of the regime in April 1979 was hastened by a
series of events, with one leading to the other, which started with the raid
by Israeli commandos on Entebbe Airport on 3 July 1976. The raid
happened while Amin was still at the OAU meeting in Mauritius. Three
days before the raid, on 28 June, members of the Popular Front for the
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Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Air France aircraft with 80
Israelis among the a total of 246 passengers, and flew to Entebbe. There
they demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli and other
countries in exchange for the hostages. It is not clear whether Amin
wished to side with the Palestinians, as the Israelis claimed, or merely
wanted to negotiate a peaceful solution to the crisis, as he claimed. (ARB
July 1976:4101-4109). Apart from the fact that Amin had lost international
credibility, there was little time for him to establish his position on the
crisis. His well-known anti-Isreal and pro-Palestine posturing made it
impossible for him to claim impartiality. The ransom demand was not
negotiated because the Israeli response was to carry out a military raid to
free the hostages. (Africa July 1976, pp. 14-18; Mutibwa 1992:111-2).
It has been claimed that the most important effect of the raid was
that the exploding of the myth of Amin's military invincibility, and that
this hastened his fall. According to this view, once it was demonstrated
that the Uganda Army could be so easily beaten, opponents of his regime
from within the country and outside became more bold (Mutibwa 1992;
Omara-Otunnu 1987). This view seems to be a part of the tendency
retrospectively to interpret the Amin regime, and it is misleading. In the
first place, there was at that time no opposition group in Uganda large or
organised enough to want to militarily take on Amin. Any armed
opposition was either underground or lacked the capacity to take on the
regime. And even if there was such a groups with the capacity to carry out
military operations against the regime, as a part of the armed forces, they
would not have needed an Israeli raid to demonstrate to them the military
capacity of the Uganda Army.
The most important effect of the raid , as far as Amin's fall was
concerned, was the clash with Kenya. Kenyatta had until then
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maintained a grudging but officially friendly attitude towards Uganda,
even though Amin had intermittedly annoyed Kenya throughout the
previous year over territorial claims (Uganda Government 1976;
Kiwanuka 1979:146-152). It was the raid that soured relations between them
and brought the two to the verge of war, over the fact that Kenya had
provided a base for the Israelis to mount the attack. Amin threatened to
invade Kenya, and Kenyatta responded with what amounted to an
economic blockade of Uganda. Immediately some 200 lorries carrying oil
to Uganda were stopped. The Kenya government also demanded prompt
payment for 'all goods received and to be received from Kenya' (ARB July
1976:4106).
The effect of this temporary economic squeeze on land-locked
Uganda was far-reaching: it led to increased hoarding by the top military
officers, and to a conflict of economic interests among them. This in
turn brought into the open the animosities within the top military officers,
but in particular they precipitated the clash between Amin and General
Mustafa.
Disintegration of the Defence Council, 1976-1978
A period of disorders and lawlessness within the Army followed the
economic squeeze by Kenya. Now the soldiers also experienced the lack of
essential commodities. Since the military and mafuta mingis depended
for their trade on oil and other goods shipped to Uganda through Kenya,
the stoppage affected them where it hurt most, and some of the soldiers
started seizing oil from filling stations and oil tankers they could find.
This particularly affected private traders from Kenya on the way to
Rwanda and Zaire. The companies were forced to stop operations. This
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effectively put an end to the flow of any oil to Uganda.
It was at this stage that General Mustafa, Vice-President as well as
Minister of Defence and Internal Affairs, tried to establish order within the
armed forces. He travelled around the country making tough speeches on
law and order, and called on some commanders to investigate any more
'disappearances' of both civilians and soldiers and punish those
responsible. In his capacity as defence and internal affairs minister he
directed battalion commanders to report directly to him acts of lawlessness
among the soldiers under their command. When the Commissioner of
Prisons failed to account for reported disappearances of prisoners, Mustafa
dismissed him without reference to Amin. It was reported for example
that 'Adrisi strongly condemned the actions of some of the same security
forces in looting property and in using roadblock checks for demanding
bribes ... and warned against military officers who use their positions to
break the law' (ACR 1976-1978:B441). This 'crusade' was probably a sincere
effort intended to instil law and order and rehabilitate the image of the
soldiers in the country. But Amin probably saw his boldness as a threat,
while his (Amin's) opponents saw Mustafa Adrisi as their hope. Back in
1976, for example, it was Mustafa who led a group of 30 army officers and
asked for the resignation of the military government in order to allow the
establishment of a civilian administration (New African June, 1978, p. 56).
An anti-Amin faction gradually articulated within the Defence Council
around Mustafa Adrisi.
Four close associates of Amin, three of whom were prominent
members of the Defence Council, fell out with him at this time. They were
General Isaac Lumago,at that time Army Chief of Staff; Moses Ali, Minister
of Finance; Col. Nasur, Commander of the Malire Mechanised Regiment
in Kampala, and Farouk Minaawa of the SRB. All the three had had a
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long commercial partnership centred around the Uganda Motors Ltd.
company and the Ministry of Finance, and involving the import and
distribution of vehicles and spare parts. (New African June 1978, 56; ARB
April 1978:4825). Ostensibly it was therefore a business association, but for
Amin the alliance was a clear threat, and his response to this threat, like
Obote's response to the Onama-Amin threat in 1970, was to lead directly to
his fall.
On 10 April, 1978 , at a meeting of the Defence Council, all Cabinet
ministers and Permanent Secretaries, Amin accused the four officers, but
particularly General Mustafa Adrisi, of disloyalty, citing their readiness to
act without his authority. He reinstated Sentamu, the dismissed
Commissioner of Prisons and dismissed Kassim Obura, whom Mustafa
Adrisi had appointed in Sentamu's place. Isaac Lumago, the Chief of Staff
was also dismissed because of his association with Mustafa Adrisi.
Another of Mustafa Adrisi's known supporters, Col. Juma Oris, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, was also dismissed on the same day. (ACR
1977-1978:13434).
It was clear that Amin was in fact preparing to move against
Mustafa, by first isolating him from his allies, which as noted was the same
strategy that Obote had used as a preparation to move against Onama
before the coup of 1971 (Chapter 7). Thus when Mustafa was involved in a
near fatal car 'accident' in Kampala on 19 April 1978, only 9 days after
these dismissals, there was no doubt among his supporters that it was an
assassination attempt set up by Amin. In fact Mustafa Adrisi's bodyguards
opened fire and killed several people on the spot (ARB April 1978:4825).
The crash left him crippled and he was taken to Cairo for treatment. (Rowe
1988:275). But even before his condition was known, Amin himself took
over the ministries of defence and internal affairs. Mustafa Adrisi was
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technically cut off from power, but what Amin apparently did not reckon
with was the popularity of Mustafa Adrisi within the Army and the
political backlash his treatment would generate within the country and
against the government.
It was while Mustafa Adrisi was still in Cairo that the struggle
between his and Amin's supporters came into the open inside Uganda, but
especially in the various barracks around the country. The factional
division of the Defence Council was reflected in a division of the armed
forces into a broad pro-Mustafa Adrisi and pro-Amin factions, thus
seriously threatening Amin's position. According to Omara Otunnu
(1987:140), even before Mustafa Adrisi returned to Uganda a group of
Lugbara soldiers mutinied in Kampala, demanding Amin's resignation in
favour of Mustafa Adrisi. Mutibwa (1992:113) has recorded that at this
point that 'at least four senior officers went to Amin ... and asked him
point-blank to step down and hand over the government.' The officers
who had asked for his resignation were not even arrested, but they knew
they were marked men. 'To escape [Amin's] wrath, but wishing to
continue opposing him, the officers went and joined up with the Simba
Battalion in Mbarara, which they used as their defensive base against
Amin.' (Mutibwa 1992:113). The move to Simba Battalion by the "rebels"
was militarily dangerous. After the abortive invasion from Tanzania in
1972, Simba Battalion was heavily mechanised to be in readiness for any
possible invasion from Tanzania. It was sufficiently strong to take on any
unit that Amin might have sent against it.
After the reorganisation of most powerful regiment in Uganda, the
Malire Mechanised Regiment in Kampala in 1973, Amin had depended
for protection and defence of Kampala entirely on the SRB/GSU, the small
Marines on Lake Victoria, plus his so-called Suicide Regiment. Military
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barracks in outlying areas either supported him only halfheartedly or not
at all. The Air Force at Gulu in the north, and the Chui Battalion in the
nearby town of Kitgum, were both known to be his opponents and
supporters of Mustafa Adrisi. So were the barracks at Tororo in the east and
of course Mbarara in the south west. For the first time the dangers of a
clash among the battalions was real.
The struggle between the two factions played a critical role in the
war between Uganda and Tanzania that led to Amin's downfall. The
minor mutiny, and the use of the Simba Battalion as a defensive fortress
against the government by the four officers was the critical step. One
version had it that Amin decided to distract the attention of Simba
Battalion by ordering it on a 'military adventure' to attack and annex the
Kagera Salient from Tanzania, and to loot and carry home booty for
themselves (Omara-Otunnu 1987:141). Another version was that his
option was to 'smash' Simba Battalion, and accordingly 'sent Chui
Battalion, based at [Kitgum], to attack it (Mutibwa 1992:113-4). In view of
the fact that the "rebel" officers were hiding at Simba Barracks, Mutibwa's
version seems to be the more probable one. It is equally probable that the
Chui Battalion, since it supported Mustafa Adrisi, went to Mbarara to
defend rather than fight against the battalion. Precisely how this expanded
to an attack on the Kagera Salient is not clear.
It has sometimes been suggested that Amin's fall was precipitated by
the killing of Archbishop Janani Luwum and two of Amin's cabinet
ministers, Oboth Ofumbi and Erineyo Oryema, in February 1977. (Africa
March 1977, pp. 28-30; Omara-Otunnu 1987:138-9). Accounts differ as to the
precise reasons why Luwum, Oryema and Oboth-Ofumbi were killed at
once. According to Amin they were plotters in collusion with guerrillas
in Kenya (Uganda Government 1977). Omara-Otunnu (1987:138) sees it in
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ethnic terms, as a part of Amin's anti-Luo strategy: 'It is significant that the
two other personalities were [also] Luo-speakers'. But an account that
appears to be consistent with the general political climate of
unpredictability and fear resulting from the anarchic situation has been
offered by Mutibwa(1992), and had to do with Amin's heightening sense of
insecurity. The brush with Kenya had resulted in Kenyatta allowing
opposition to Amin to organise more openly than he had hitherto done.
Early in 1977 Amin learnt of plans, coordinated in Nairobi, to stage a coup
against him. Archbishop Luwum apparently knew of these plans but
refused either to be involved in it, as requested, or to inform Amin about
it, as Amin thought he ought to have done. 'What led to [his] death was
the fact that he did not tell Amin of this plot' (Mutibwa 1992:112). As for
the two ministers Amin apparently thought that as they were Luos they
were naturally involved in the plot.
But the Archbishop's death should more properly be seen as a tragic
symptoms of the political uncertainties at that time, rather than a cause
of his fall. The killings were condemned world-wide (described in
Mutibwa 1992:110-114), and this may have given some boost to the
internal and external opponents of the regime, but it was the internal
conditions of the regime that had led to the killings. Amin had killed
other prominent people throughout his regime, as already seen in Chapter
7, but none of them led to the his fall.
Otherwise, the forces that eventually overthrew Amin had no
tangible organisational links with any faction or political influence inside
Uganda before 1979. In any case it was the Tanzanian government that
coordinated the war against Amin, and Tanzanian Peoples Defence Forces
(TPDF) that carried it out. The Uganda group, a constellation of various
exiled guerrilla fighters collectively called the Uganda National Liberation
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Army (UNLA), were so divided amongst themselves that it was only in
March 1979 when Amin's fall was imminent that they first met at Moshi
in northern Tanzania to form a common front, the Uganda National
Liberation Front (UNLF). The UNLF was an umbrella organisation, a
hastily forged alliance of exiled opposition groups from the USA, Kenya,
Tanzania, Zambia, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries.
Most of them had never been heard of inside Uganda, and even the leader
they elected, Professor Yusuf Lule, according to none other than Yoweri
Museveni himself, was not politically known to many of the numbers
present at Moshi. (Mutibwa 1992:127). Flow the UNLF under Lule
embarked on the task of government in the face of increased factionalism
and spoils politics after Amin's fall and the developments thereafter will
be considered in detail in Chapter 10. We now turn to look at
developments in Kenya after the collapse of the uneasy triumvirate
leadership at the beginning of 1980.
KENYA
Fall of the Triumvirate Alliance and Economic Problems to 1980
The major events to which Moi reacted may be briefly described here, to
provide a basis for the discussion that follows. From 1978-80 Kenya
suffered economic hardships, which led to political discontent and
student riots at the University of Nairobi. From 1980-1982, corruption
among ministers was rife and Moi apparently failed to check it, leading
his critics, such as Oginga Odinga, to call for multi-partyism. Mwakenya
an underground opposition organisation, also became active against the
government. Repressive measures to silence critics follow, and KANU
was declared the sole party in June 1982. The coup attempt in August 1982
was the next major event in the set, followed by the campaign against
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Njonjo from 1983-4.
Economically the period from 1980 to 1983 was bad for Kenya. The
country's trade deficit, which at the end of 1978 was $389 million, increased
to $791.5 million at the beginning of 1982 (ACR 1981-1982). This put severe
constraints on Moi's hopes of diversifying the economy out of the hands of
the few rich in order to enable more Kenyans to benefit economically.
His populist policies as well as the attempt to promote agricultural
production alongside if not at the expense of the expansion of private and
public enterprises were checked by the economic hardships. This problem
was made worse by the fact that the last two years of Kenyatta's rule (1976-
1978) had seen an economic boom. This was brought about in part by a
temporary and large rise in world prices of coffee due to the reduced world
supply of the crop, which arose as a result of the destruction of Brazil's
coffee by frost during the previous year and the civil war in Angola.
Smuggling of Uganda coffee and exporting it as Kenya produce also helped
the economy (Independent Kenya, 1982: 56-60).
The 1975-77 boom had benefited those Kenyatta had selected as
partners of the state: workers in the public sector, urban businessmen, and
agricultural workers in the Rift Valley Province and in the Western
Province. Whereas in the Central Province GEMA promoted a capitalist
class based on manufacturing and small scale industries, in the Rift Valley
Kenyatta promoted an agriculture-based capitalist class dependent on the
export of agricultural products.1 During the 'struggle for the Rift Valley'
massive government resources were diverted in the province to create
business and jobs (Widner 1992:75-106). The "struggle" refers to the process
by which Kenyatta sought to expand his base of support in the province to
1 'Capitalist class' is used here in a loose sense. The term is used here after Diamond
(1987:569-600) and refers to, in the Kenya of the day, 'a category encompassing those [with]
similar economic motivation because they [had] similar economic opportunities, even if
class consciousness, class solidarity or class action [did] not exist'.
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counter the threats posed by populist politicians like J. M. Kariuki from
1970 to 1975. This expansion was aided by the economic boom. Also as
Holmquist, Weaver and Ford (1994:48) have pointed out, during this
period 'state bureaucracy and state-owned enterprises expanded and state
employment and other patronage spending were used as source of social
control.'
So the economic problems Moi faced required both transformation
and increasing production. It was the first time in the political
development in Kenya that economic control and political control were in
different hands. Before independence the colonial administration had
allied with the settlers, who controlled the economy; and after
independence Kenyatta had allied with the Kikuyu capitalists, and foreign
capital, who to a large extent controlled the economy. Moi took political
power without economic control and the establishment of an alliance
between the new political class an the old economic class was his greatest
economic problem. As Holmquist, Weaver and Ford (1994:92) have noted
on the relationship between the state and public and private economic
sectors, 'unlike Kenyatta, Moi found few of his cohorts among the
leadership of the two major growth sectors and this prevented [him] from
using the state ... to systematically nurture those sectors'. Moi's agricultural
policies, aimed as it was at undermining the wealth and political power of
the Central Province (Throup 1987) likewise favoured the Rift Valley and
the Western Province, and often the same set of individuals that he had
sought to promote against the GEMA capitalists. Like a stepfather to
grown-up children, he had to struggle harder to win their confidence and
support.
It was these people who were affected by the economic hardships. It
was also this group of middlemen, in alliance with their former political
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allies now being undermined by Moi, who were probably behind the urban
unrest from 1981, either for the purpose of securing more concessions
from the government on their own behalf or if possible removing it for
the benefit of Moi's political opponents. According to Bates (1987:79-80):
The leaders of the cooperative movement, their patrons in the
national bureaucracy, the officers of the Ministry of Cooperatives and
provincial politicians, all saw the [economic] crises as an opportunity
... The politicians saw it as an opportunity to attract resources from
the national government that could be channelled to their
constituents. Both the provincial politicians and Ministry of
Cooperatives saw the crisis as an opportunity to forge political bonds
with the new national government.
Moi's response to this threat was understandably political rather
than economic. For instead of helping agricultural production as a long
term economic strategy, for example by supporting coffee and horticulture
farmers, he opted for the short term political gain by undermining the
economic importance of the rural agricultural cooperatives and the cereal
boards that Kenyatta had promoted 2.
The government took over responsibility for local distribution from
the boards, 'and restricted the permissible levels of local consumption...
The Treasury also allocated funds to hire road transport to haul the grain...
in the urban centres' (Bates 1987:77). In 1980, Moi negotiated $30 million
in food aid from the United States. Maize imports between 1980-1
amounted to shs. 1.000 million, and Kshs. 2,500 million.(ACR 1881-
1982:B204; Independent Kenya 1982:65). These were deposited in the
depots of the cereal board for distribution, ostensibly to be released in
controlled quantities to impress upon the consumers that it was the
2 These are the local branches of the national bureaucracy sometimes called the Maize
Board, whose function were to purchase cereals and distribute it to the rural areas, and
which maintained 'a series of depots and purchasing centres around Kenya' (See Bates
1987:76-92)
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government that was coming to their aid rather than the "old" board.
But this practise led to corruption as the officers involved, from the
ministerial level to the local level, engaged in grain hoarding and selling
in addition to other corrupt practices, but since these were Moi's "political
shields" he was powerless to stop them. 'In spite of continued revelations
in the press about large-scale corruption... by cooperatives involving large
amounts of money... hardly any of the accused office-bearers were brought
to court'. The only prominent person to be tried and convicted for
corruption at that time was the former GEMA leader, Khika Kimani.
(.ACR 1982-1983:B171).
It was against this background that the coup of 2 August 1982
occurred. It was led by a section of young officers in the Kenya Air Force.
They seized the Post Office, Broadcasting House and other strategic
installations. The officers constituted themselves into the Peoples
Redemption Council and announced the fall of Moi's government. Many
people in Nairobi, especially students from Nairobi University and
Kenyatta University College, went in force to support the coup. Looting
and general confusion followed until loyal government forces, led by the
Army and the GSU, counterattacked and put the rebellion down, with
heavy loses of life. One account had it that so many people, a large portion
of them students, were killed that all the city mortuaries were full. But in
its effort to present the coup attempt as a mutiny by a small group of
hooligans, the government put the number of dead as low as 200.
The 'Njonjo Affair' of 1983-1984
Currie and Ray (1986:47-59) have suggested that student riots at the
University of Nairobi and general unrest in the urban centres by alienated
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youth were the principal causes of the coup. While students and the
young in Nairobi were the first and most enthusiastic supporters of the
coup and accounted for most of the dead in its suppression (Miller 1984:94;
ACR 1982-1983:5181), it would be more accurate to see the coup as an
outcome of the power struggle, engineered by Moi's "economic
stepchildren" in alliance with his more powerful political enemies. The
fact that Njonjo was attacked and then politically destroyed by Moi shortly
after the coup attempt was not a coincidence.
It may sound odd to talk of the re-emergence of Njonjo in in 1980
since for almost twenty years from independence in 1963 he was always at
the centre of the country's political life as Attorney General. The term is
used here to denote Njonjo's emergence not as a political heavyweight,
but as a potential leader of Kenya in the same way as Odinga (between
1960-1966), Mboya (1960-1969) and Moi (from 1967) had emerged before
him. This reemergence immediately put him in a competing position
with Moi for the leadership of Kenya, and the coup attempt, as noted,
cannot be analytically separated from this struggle. Njonjo's re-
emergence and its implications for Moi's position, and Moi's reaction to it
were the springboard of the major political events in the country from
1980 to 1987.
The best way to understand Njonjo's fall in the middle of 1983 is to
disengage a little from the event itself and view the whole process from a
distance. The pattern of events leading to his fall were in fact different
stages in the unfolding drama: they were not only related but one also
led to the next. It is in this sense that Miller (1984:98-9) has described Moi's
as the "cyclical era" in Kenya's political development. In the face of events
happening around it, the 'concern became one of shoring up the
government, not [finding] ways to accommodate protest'; consequently the
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government 'became confrontational, more aggressive and more extreme'
(p. 98). Moi's style of rule itself became an actor in politics, and its
interaction with events around it produced the politics of Kenya as we
know it.
It was within this climate that the growing mistrust between Moi
and Njonjo turned into an open suspicion. As far as Moi's relationship
with his ministers were concerned, an important effect of the attempted
coup was the increase in his suspicion and fear towards some of his more
powerful and independent minded allies. And since Moi was apparently
unable to discover the cause of the coup to his satisfaction, his mistrust
increased. Moi felt betrayed by the internal security services, the CID, the
Special Branch, to say nothing of the Air Force itself. For it was later
discovered that it took a long time for the Special Branch to respond to the
coup, and the CID had failed to notify the government that a coup was
imminent (Currie and Ray 1984:571).
As Attorney-General the CID had been under Njonjo, and he had
close relations with Ben Githi, the Commissioner of Police, Peter Mbuthia,
the Commandant of the General Service Unit and Peter Kariuki, the
Commander of the Air Force. Ben Githi and Njonjo were particularly close
and have had long standing political and business interests. In April 1982,
for example, the two were accused together in parliament for conspiring to
overthrow the government of President Albert Rene of the Seychelles
Islands on behalf of or in collaboration with South Africa (ACR 1982-
1983:B175). The government of the Seychelles had complained of Kenyan
collaboration in the attempted invasion, and the fact that Moi allowed an
open accusation against Njonjo suggest that he had already decided to go
on the offensive. As Widner (1992:147) has observed, 'over the years
Njonjo had accumulated sufficient political powers, as chief of several of
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the country's internal security services, to constitute a threat to the
president.' These three were the first and highest ranking officers to be
tried and convicted for involvement (through deliberate inaction) in the
coup (Currie and Ray 1984:571-580).
Therefore, four months after the coup attempt, in December 1982,
Moi attacked Njonjo in parliament for accumulation of too much political
power, even though at that time he was no longer attorney general
(Widner 1992:146). This development can be compared to Amin's attack on
Mustafa Adrisi in April 1978 for acting without his authority (above). The
importance of the attack was that it was it symbolised the fact that Moi and
Njonjo were no longer allies and was also a signal to the other politicians
anxious to demonstrate their loyalty to Moi to attack Njonjo. Accordingly,
in the same month, a number of MPs from the Rift Valley Province and
Western Province joined the attack on Njonjo. Martin Shikuku, the MP
for Butere accused Njonjo of disloyalty to Moi and asked for his
resignation in December 1982. To show that he was behind Shikuku's
attack, 'on 22 January 1983 Moi became a member of the Butere
Development Fund, and promised personal appearances at [fund raising
events] in Luhya districts.' ( Widner 1992:147). Therefore by the time Moi
openly floated the idea of a "traitor' being groomed by unnamed foreign
powers for leadership in Kenya in May 1983, the grounds for Njonjo's
demise had already been planned. He was subjected to formal
parliamentary inquiry. He subsequently resigned from Parliament in July
1983.
The Njonjo affair provided Moi with the chance to both rid himself
of a potential opponent, undermine Kikuyu political influence or threat
and at the same time consolidate the links with new his allies. The snap
elections of September 1983 was called, in Moi's own words, to 'clean up
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the political scene' and the result appears to have just achieved this, since
those 'cleaned' from the scene were either the allies of Njonjo or those not
openly loyal enough to Moi. The election provided the chance to forge
new allies. After Njonjo's fall, Moi in fact visited Butere and 'raised Kshs
3.1 million for Shikuku's Butere Development Fund.' (Widner 1992:147-8).
Both Shikuku and Elijah Mwangele, the other Luhya MP who had
supported Njonjo's fall, were given ministerial positions in the
government after the elections of September 1983: Shikuku became an
assistant minister in the Office of the President, and Mwangele was
promoted from Minister of Tourism to the more senior post of Minister of
Foreign Affairs (ACR 1982-1983:B188-9). Known Njonjo allies, such as the
Masai politician Stanley Oloitiptip, and the Kikuyu G. G. Kariuki, were
both removed from the new cabinet. To plant his own man among the
Masai, Moi appointed Professor George Saitoti straight to the cabinet as
Minister of Finance and Planning. The cabinet was now clearly more
Nyayo3 than ever before (Compare ACR 183-1984:165-8 and ACR 1982-
1983:B188-9).
For the next few years, until 1987, Moi's power was not challenged
by any prominent politician. But afterwards struggles ensued within the
new alliance itself, which led for example to Mwai Kibaki's sudden
demotion to the Ministry of Health in 1988. I shall discuss this new
development in Chapter 10. Meantime will evaluate the viability of
clientelism as a system of rule in the light of the changes under Moi just
discussed.
Kenya's political experience from 1980 was characterised by a
creeping disintegration of the clientelist system up to the mid-1980s, and
3 Nyayo is the political slogan adopted by Moi in place of Kenyatta's Harambee. It
roughly means 'follow in the footsteps'. At first it seemed to have been Kenyatta's footsteps
that Moi exhorted Kenyans to continue following, but after 1981 it evidentially meant his
own footsteps. (See Widner 1992).
249
then a form of coercive authoritarianism thereafter. The following is a
general review of the various stages of the disintegration of Kenyatta's
institutionalised clientelism during Moi's leadership, but especially after
the purge of Njonjo and his supporters in 1983-4.
Creeping Disintegration of Clientelism, 1980-1987
It is important to note once again that the Kenyatta clientelism was in
essence a Kikuyu clientelism. It was essentially a Kikuyu clientelism in the
sense that Kenyatta's most reliable allies were Kikuyu (see Chapter 6).
Whether they were more reliable because they were Kikuyu is a moot
point, because during Kenyatta's rule they saw him as their patron and the
means for their own political advancement. Moi was in it but not of it,
and his success had been due to the political struggle between Njonjo and
Mungai. As I will show below, due to the realignment of alliances after
Kenyatta's death, forceful measures became almost the only option if he
was to maintain power. He thus unavoidably sowed the seeds of the
disintegration in the process of consolidating his hold on power both
before and after the attempted coup in 1982.
Had he been willing or able to forge an alliance with the Luo, then
with the support of a segment of the Kikuyu under Kibaki, Moi might
have freed himself from his continuous fear of a Kikuyu plot. But he
failed to rehabilitate Oginga Odinga from the political wilderness and
instead preferred to make the Rift Valley Province his sole base of power
by promoting the Kalenjin and Luhya, with selected 'guests', to prominent
posts. The problem was that Kalenjin group was neither as cohesive as
Kenyatta's Gatundu Kikuyu, now under Moi's firm control as the Family
was under Kenyattas's. Moi's new allies from the early 1980s included the
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following: Elijah Mwangale (Luhya, and Minister of Tourism, later of
Foreign Affairs), Justus ole Tipis (Kalenjin, Minister of State in the
President's Office and KANU National Treasurer), Simon Nyachae (Luo,
Minister of State and head of the Civil Service), Nicholas Biwott
(Kalenjin, minister of the President's Office, later of Energy and Regional
Development), Mwai Kibaki (Vice-President and Minister of Finance).
The new alliance was thus too faction-ridden to provide the basis for stable
clientelism. It was for example, Elijah Mwangele who in 1985 led the fight
against Mwai Kibaki, which eventually led to his dismissal in as vice-
president in 1986 (Widner 1992:154-8; W R 22 February 1985:6-7).
Kenya's political development from 1980 must be seen against this
background because it was Moi's search for a more secure base of power
that dominated and determined his policies. The introduction of
multipartyism at the end of 1991 was in part a result of the failure of
clientelism and Moi's response to this failure. Recent claims (Kihoro 1992,
Sunday Times, 27 December 1992; Malinda 1992:190) that it was political
pressure from donor countries, and withdrawal of aid that forced Moi to
agree to the formation of opposition parties may be technically correct only
in regard to the timing of the announcement in November 1991, but does
not tell the whole story. The donor countries themselves responded to
the political conditions in Kenya.
A number of developments can be cited as contributing factors for
the emergence of this crisis. Besides the tactical mistake 4 in failing to forge
an alliance with the Luo, Moi's style of rule made it impossible to wield
even the allies he had in a cohesive force. His personal intervention in
the political process (in contrast to Kenyatta's behind-the-scenes or
4 'Practical impossibility would equally be accurate, but I prefer tactical mistake
because Moi did not seriously try to rehabilitate Odinga, without whose participation an
Luo-Kalenjin/Luhya alliance was impossible.
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'patrimonial' style was a factor in this). His style of personally intervening
in the political process combined with a rather compulsive use of the
presidential prerogatives of ministerial changes had the effect of increasing
rather than reducing factionalism. It was for example Moi who touched
off the purge against Njonjo (1983-4), when on 9 May 1983 he floated the
idea of a traitor plotting to overthrow the Kenya government. Although
he left it to other MPs to mention Njonjo's name as the traitor, and kept a
low profile as ministers accused and counter-accused amongst themselves
to show who were Njonjo's friends or who were more nyayo, he was
never an arbitrator in the affair thereafter. Within a fortnight of the
'traitor' allegation, on May 17, he announced that the proposed 1984
election would be brought forward to September 1983. (ARB May 1983:6843;
N A July 1983:22-3). He was therefore unable to build and sustain an
image of the all-powerful and leisurely detached patron necessary for
orderly clientelism because his authority, though not power, diminished.
(Compare Sandbrook 1985:90).
This mattered, because it was largely due to his personal
interventions that throughout the decade Moi has been unable to
convince his opponents, and to even larger extent the general public, that
he had nothing to do with some of the worst manifestations of factional
politics in the country, such as the periodic assassinations of prominent
persons. According to Lonsdale (1992:19), for example: 'Many Kenyans felt
their suspicions of political collusion in the death of Bishop Alexander
Muge in a traffic accident confirmed when his widow's white cockerel
attacked the President three times when he called to offer his condolences'.
The widespread "ethnic clashes" in the Rift Valley Province late in 1992
(Africa Watch 1993, and various issues on Weekly Review), have also been
blamed on Moi. Some of the "warriors" were said to have been 'dropped
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and assisted by government helicopters' (Kihoro 1992:31).
The overuse of the presidential prerogatives of ministerial
reshuffles to bring in his supporters and drop opponents was another
form of frequent intervention which had the effect or eroding Moi's
authority. 'The dropping of ministers and reshuffling the cabinet as well as
public offices is a normal, almost routine activity'. (NA September, 1985, p.
28). Reshuffles were carried out in 1980; 1981; 1982 (February, August);
1983 (September elections); 1984 (September, November); 1985 (April,
August); 1986 (April). (ACR 1980-1981; 1981-1982:B192-193; 1982-1983:B187-
189; 1983-4:B166-167; 1985-1986:B330-331). This was itself a symptom and
further cause for clientelist crisis because the new recruits themselves
sought to entrench their positions in power. Simon Nyachae, who was
appointed to head the Civil Service in in 1984 'quickly assumed a position
of authority second only to the President's (ACR 1984-1985: B261).
The use of the constitution, expulsions from KANU, and the
presidential prerogative of ministerial change for control was not new in
Kenya. As already noted in Chapter 6 and elsewhere (Mueller 1984; Ghai
1969; Okoth-Ogendo 1972; Gertzel 1970), Kenyatta himself had used these
options to greater extent. But Kenyatta's use had been more subtle in that
he avoided open personal involvement. When considered alongside
Moi's personal interventions in the political process, his resort to these
options consequently appeared to have been from a position of weakness
rather than a strength - a serious admission for one aspiring to be a
patron.
Mwakenya Activities and Resort to Repression
The activities of 'Mwakenya', an underground movement which operated
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mostly in the cities of Nakuru, Kisumu, Nairobi and other centres in the
Central Province between 1982-1987, was another factor in the
disintegration of clientelism in that it challenged the authority of the
regime without the government being able to suppress it. Also the fact
that there was an underground movement opposed to him increased
Moi's suspicion of his allies.
The campaign of the movement consisted of distributing anti-
government information through its pamphlets, such as Mzalendo,
Mpatanishi, Pambona and Mwakenya (Currie and Ray 1986; Weekly
Review, 2 January, 1987; 13 March, 1987, and 10 April 1987). But following
the government's decision to crack down on it in April 1986, the
movement took some initiatives and carried out several sabotage acts. In
July 1987 three former members admitted destroying telephone lines and
derailing a train near Nakuru on behalf of the movement. By then over
60 people had been jailed for belonging to it, most of whom were former
students and intellectuals at the universities. (W R 13 March 1987;
Amnesty International 1987:55-8, Appendixes II and III).
While Mwakenya and its methods of selective sabotage and
pamphleteering did not present a threat the regime, it nevertheless had a
significant political impact. It propelled the government towards a greater
use of repression , which in turn reflected badly on the leadership of Moi
both in Kenya and abroad. The hunt for Mwakenya supporters was also
turned into a political witch-hunt. For example in April 1987, Oginga
Odinga himself was accused of belonging to the movement. Detainees
were also tortured beaten while in custody, to extract information for
political use. Peter Njenga, a Nakuru businessman, died on February 22 at
Kenyatta National Hospital after being tortured by the security forces.
(W R, 13 March, 198; 10 April, 1987, p. 6).
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Mwakenya may have failed in its objectives of removing the Moi
regime and setting up a new socialist order in Kenya; but made a
contribution to political change in Kenya. For example, it was the increased
repression under the regime that has been a factor in the introduction of




Alliances in the 1980s and After: Developments and Prospects
To the extent that a viable clientelist institution stabilises factional
struggles, we can say that the political fortunes of Uganda and Kenya
"changed places" during the last years of the 1980s. The inability to
regulate personal power relations in Uganda has been the major cause of
instability from independence; and in Kenya factionalism was
institutionalised into clientelism upon which its stability had to a very
large extent rested until the early years of the 1980s. We can say that the
fortunes of the two countries changed places in the sense that in the late
1980s factional politics increasingly became a threat to Kenya's stability as
it has been to Uganda's in the past.
Whereas in Kenya the period saw the deterioration of the
clientelist system into a crisis of clientelism, and to the verge of spoils
politics, the trend in Uganda has been in the opposite direction, towards
a gradual recovery from spoils politics after the advent of the NRM/A of
Yoweri Museveni to power in January 1986. Under the NRM/A the
prospects for the evolution of a clientelist system or even
institutionalisation (for example under its no-party system), have been, in
theory, improved. But Moi's interventionist style from 1980 onwards
have tended to encourage spoils politics or state collapse and discourage
clientelism.
The purpose of this last chapter is to describe these changes, and to
assess the prospects for state stability in the two countries in the 1990s. In
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the section on Uganda I discuss the post-Amin regimes of Lule, Binaisa
and the Military Commission between 1979 and 1980, and the second
Obote administration to the rise of the NRM/A in 1986. The aim is show
how different the NRM administration has been from previous regimes
in its capacity to control factional politics and provide the basis of stability.
The section on Kenya discusses and accounts for the steady deterioration
of clientelist relations under Moi from the early 1980s, and assesses the
prospects for stability in the 1990s. I begin with a discussion of the
emergence of factionalism in Moi's "Nyayo" alliance of 1983-4. The
section ends with a reflection the introduction of multipartyism at the
end of 1991 and the elections that followed in 1992.
UGANDA:
Amin's Fall and the Intensification of Factional Struggles, 1979-1985
Amin's removal from power in 1979, contrary to the hopes of most
Ugandans, did not put an end to the spate of spoils politics and its
accompanying disorders of weak or nonexistent central authority,
corruption, general lawlessness, and economic collapse. Not only did
spoils politics continue, but in a sense it became worse than during
Amin's regime. Under Amin, despite the autonomy of the provincial
governors and battalion commanders around the country, state power
was at least used in the name of Amin. Also if he chose, Amin was
capable of bringing any of the officers under control or physically
eliminating them. But after his fall, especially during the first years,
there was no clear centre of authority in Uganda and state power "lay on
the ground" to be competed over by the various factions.
Amin's overthrow itself, like his rise in 1971, was a product of the
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ongoing spoils politics. The physical force that removed him was external,
but the politics that both led to and followed his overthrow was internal,
through the exiled politicians. As we have seen in Chapter 9, the war with
Tanzania started against the background of serious factional divisions
within the Army and the Defence Council. Even if Amin fell without the
intervention of the Tanzanians, factional struggles would have continued
in Uganda, regardless to what type of government, military or civilian,
was set up. The return of the exiles only made it worse.
If Tanzania could have occupied Uganda and imposed its
authority on the various external and internal factions spoils politics
might have been checked, at least in theory. But Tanzania's declared aims,
for the understandable reason of not wanting to get overly involved in
the factional struggles within Uganda, were limited to 'punishing Amin'
and assisting the establishment of a new administration in Uganda by
exiled Ugandans (ARB, April 1979:5223). As Mudoola (1988:280) has
observed, 'Tanzania could have entered Kampala and proclaimed a new
Ugandan leader. But this would have been bad politics and would most
probably have alienated forces within Uganda'. Tanzania's intervention
thus merely provided a cover for the pursuit of factional interests by the
Ugandans, and the old factions were left to struggle to fill up the political
vacuum created by Amin's fall.
Under these circumstances, for two main reasons, spoils politics
actually increased. The first was that the fall of the Amin meant that all
political offices in the country were open for occupation, which led to the
intensification of competition among the exiled politicians in filling
them. Besides, as mentioned above, was that there was also no overall
authority to facilitate an orderly manner of the 'occupation': Tanzania had
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a theoretical authority, but it could not have intervened effectively
without compromising on its stated aims. Second, the Uganda National
Liberation Front (UNLF), the organisation that formed the first post-
Amin administration, was a loose and faction-ridden coalition. Also since
it was only an interim administration charged with organising a general
election (ARB, April 1979:5222; NA, May 1979:16), the strengthening of
personal or group interests for the elections became the overriding
preoccupation of the various factions. They lost sight of the needs for
reconstruction or cooperation.
In fact factional struggles in Uganda in 1979-80 bore a striking
similarity to the struggles in 1959-62. (See Chapter 3). In both cases the
political leaders were more interested in getting into power. Also the
political vacuum created by Amin's departure was similar to that left by
the departure of the British. Owing to the intensity of the struggles and
the absence of institutions to regulate them, the first administrations
following each period were both weak coalition governments: UPC/KY
in 1962-1964 and the UNLF administrations from 1979-1980.
The Lule, Binaisa and Military Commission Regimes, 1979-1980
The UNLF was not only a loose association of many organisations. The
main organisations that made it up were also hostile towards one
another. It therefore failed to become an organ of rule. Unlike KANU
under Kenyatta, it had neither an all-powerful presidency, or a civil
service through which the leaders could control the different factions.
In addition to the main factions, UPC, DP and others, there were
also 'so many others that mushroomed here and there as the end of
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Amin's regime drew nearer.' (Mutibwa:1992:126). The UNLF
confederation consisted of 22 organisations. The only thing they had in
common was vaguely described as 'the Moshi spirit', after the northern
Tanzanian town in which they met.1 This spirit amounted to no more
than the common desire to see Amin removed and to partake of the
spoils thereto. The factional interests resulted in the UNLF as a body
remaining weaker than its constituent parts. This ensured that the
governing organ, the National Executive Committee (NEC), remained
weak.
The most powerful of the constituent parts of the UNLF were the
Military Commission and the National Consultative Council (NCC). The
Military Commission consisted of six members under the chairmanship
of Paulo Muwanga, with Yoweri Museveni as vice-chairman. Other
members included Oyite Ojok, chief of staff of the UNLA, and Tito Okello,
its commander. Both Paulo Muwanga and Oyite-Ojok were pro-Obote
and UPC. The NCC was the interim parliament and consisted of all
members of the UNLF, and had the power to overrule all the president's
decisions. It was under the chairmanship of Edward Rugumayo, and
controlled by the "radicals", politicians opposed to both the UPC and DP.
Therefore, although the NEC as the cabinet theoretically held executive
powers, it was in fact the weakest "committee". Its efforts to make itself
independent from either NCC or Military Commission control led to the
removal of the first two post-Amin presidents, Yusuf Lule and Godfrey
Binaisa, within short periods of their election to power.
1 For details on the formation of the UNLF, and how its internal divisions hampered
the administration s of Yusuf Lule (April-June, 1979) and Godfrey Binaisa (1979-1980), see
contemporary reports in the following publications. Africa (London): May 1979, pp. 10-18;
July 1979, pp. 22-23; May 1980, pp. 29, 32; June 1980, pp. 20, 25. New African (London): May
1980, pp. 17-22; June 1980, pp. 28-30. For additional academic discussion, see Mutibwa
(1992:125-147); Omara-Otunnu (1987: 146-156); Mudoola (1989:131-135; 1988); Nabudere
1988:299-312); Twaddle 1988:313-335).
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Lule lost power on 20 June 1979, only after 68 days after becoming
president, and Binaisa in May 1980, after serving for less than one year.
(ARB, June 1979:5297-5201). The ostensible reason for Lule's removal was
his decision to make ministerial appointments without consulting the
NCC, in accordance with the 1967 Republican Constitution. But even
without such "mistakes" it is hard to see how he could have lasted in the
face of the factionalism within the UNLF. As Mudoola (1988:285) has
pointed out, 'Lule had fallen because he was not acceptable to the power-
brokers within the UNLF; Binaisa, because he did not have the ability [or]
time [to plan] the removal of his opponents'. (On this see also Omara-
Otunnu 1987:152). As this observation makes clear, the first priority, even
for the president, was not the solving of the serious insecurity and
economic problems that the country was then experiencing, but the
'removal of opponents'.
Both the rise and fall of Binaisa were determined by the
uncertainties of power relations in spoils politics. Binaisa in fact won
the presidency like winning a prize in a lottery. He had returned to
Uganda from the USA to lobby Lule for his appointment as Uganda's
ambassador to the United Nations in New York. But Lule was dismissed
even before the two men could discuss the matter. Because each faction
tried to impose its candidate, there was a stalemate. So the 'NCC members
were pleased to learn that Binaisa was in town' (Mutibwa 1992:130-132).
He had no friends in the NCC and was not even seeking power at that
time. It was in fact to prevent power from falling in the hands of
Rugumayo that Binaisa was hurriedly drafted in as a candidate and
elected. But in May 1980, less than a year after becoming president, he was
removed by a coup led by Oyite Ojok.
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The cause of Binaisa's fall was the so-called 'umbrella formula' -
his insistence that the proposed 1980 elections should take place under
the auspices of the UNLF. Under this plan all candidates would have
stood as individuals and not as representatives of any political party. This
would have automatically ruled out the reorganisation of the old political
parties, and prevented the participation of Obote and a return to multi¬
party politics. Most of the NCC members voted in favour of the umbrella
formula, in part because most of the members did not see any roles for
themselves in either the UPC or the DP, and were also were opposed to
Obote. Paulo Muwanga and Oyite-Ojok, on the other hand, opposed the
umbrella plan because it conflicted with their strategy of bringing Obote
back to power. This precipitated a period of intense power struggle
between the Military Commission and the NEC, which eventually ended
with Binaisa's overthrow by Oyite Ojok in May 1980. (Low 1988:49-50;
Mudoola 1988:282-4).
The events leading up to the coup, when Binaisa sought to weaken
the Military Commission and strengthen his own position. In February
he dismissed Muwanga from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but under
pressure from the NCC, Muwanga was later appointed as Minister of
Labour. At the same time Museveni was demoted from the Ministry of
Defence to that of Regional Cooperation. But this strategy did not remove
the UNLA from control of the Military Commission because Oyite-Ojok
remained Chief of Staff. Oyote-Ojok's control of the UNLA was such that
Binaisa had no practical authority over the forces without his support.
Therefore, in March Binaisa made a surprise visit to Kenya and conferred
behind closed doors with President Moi. According to New African (April
1980, p. 32), Binaisa's visit had two main aims: first, to prevent the
262
shipment of unauthorised arms to Uganda, then at the docks in Mombasa
and marked "Farm Machinery" to conceal the true identity of the
contents. The weapons were destined for Uganda, but without Binaisa's
prior approval or knowledge. Secondly, Binaisa was keen to get military
assistance from Moi: either a contingent of the Kenyan Army to replace
the Tanzanians, (whom he feared were supporting UPC), or to support
him in case of a confrontation with Oyite-Ojok. But as we have noted,
Moi had his own problems in the economic and leadership crisis, and
declined to get involved in Uganda.
Early in May Binaisa decided to go on the offensive, and in a
surprise reshuffle appointed Oyote-Ojok as Uganda's ambassador to
Algeria. But as if to confirm the president's weakness and the supremacy
of the Military Commission over the NEC, Oyite-Ojok refused to take up
the appointment. (ARB February 1980:5585; NA, January 1986:20; Africa,
June 1980:20-21; Mutibwa 1992:130-7). Although Binaisa insisted on Oyite-
Ojok's going to Algeria, he ha no means to enforce the order. The power
struggle ended with Binaisa's overthrow by Oyite-Ojok on May 11 1980.
The Military Commission immediately took over supreme power and
constituted itself into a government with Muwanga as Head of State and
Museveni his Deputy. Even the NCC, which had come to regard itself as
kingmaker, was in no position to stop the seizure of power the Military
Commission declared that its seizure of power and all its decisions were
irreversible by any authority, and not subject to challenge in any court of
law.
The Military Commission ruled Uganda from May to December
1980. Its primary objective and "achievement" was bringing Obote back
to power, and little else. From the beginning it openly prepared the way
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for Obote's return: UPC supporters were placed in strategic positions.
More than half of the 30-member "broad based" cabinet it appointed
consisted of UPC members. (ARB May 1980:5683). Also one of its first
legislative acts was to scrap the umbrella formula which Binaisa had
instituted for the elections scheduled for October 1980. In fact the Military
Commission and UPC supporters never took the umbrella formula
seriously, because even when Binaisa was preaching the idea, plans for
Obote's return were going on. It was not a coincidence that on 27 May,
only two weeks after the Binaisa's fall, Obote returned to Uganda from
Tanzania to launch his campaign for the 1980 elections. And with his
allies in complete control of state power, and the UNLA behind him, his
return to power later that year was a foregone conclusion. The elections
should therefore be seen as the climax of the struggles for power in post-
Amin Uganda that had started at the formation of the UNLF at Moshi in
March 1979.
The Second Obote Administration, 1980-1985
The second Obote administration (1980-1985) proved even less capable of
establishing an orderly administration than his first (1962-1971). For
despite his weak position in relation to the UPC notables during his first
administration, he led a legitimate government and outside Buganda he
enjoyed some popular support. Uganda as a whole was also in a more
ordered state at that time, economically and politically.
The second administration not only enjoyed very little support
inside Uganda: it was also actively opposed from the beginning. Of the
main political factions, only the DP agreed to participate in Parliament
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and its leader, Paul Ssemogerere, became Leader of the Opposition. This
was 'in response to Obote's promise to give them the post of Deputy
Speaker and the nomination of four of the Specially Elected Members'.
(Mutibwa 1992:151). The importance of the DP participation was that the
regime was given some legitimacy and international acceptance. This
enabled it to receive much needed financial support from donor
countries, especially the United States and Britain. Also Obote's
declaration that the Asians Amin had expelled in 1972 were free to return
and reclaim their properties was specially popular with Britain. (Furley
1989:284-5).
Otherwise Obote's real constituency remained the military. But the
problem was that the UNLA itself was divided, mostly along ethnic lines
between Acoli and Langi soldiers, respectively under Tito Okello/ Bazilio
Okello and Oyite-Ojok. Although the Acoli and the Langi had militarily
and politically cooperated in the fight against Idi Amin, they were divided
and antagonistic towards one another. Since Obote needed the
cooperation of the Acoli to rule, the antipathy further weakened the
regime. This division was brought in the open over the appointment of a
new chief of staff after Oyite-Ojok's death in December 1983 (below). Also
Vice-President Paulo Muwanga, the regime's supposed man in Buganda,
was dislike by the majority of the Baganda and his participation in the
regime did not make Obote any more acceptable to the Baganda. The fact
that Paulo Muwanga became Prime Minister after Obote's overthrow by
the two Okellos in 1985 suggest that, as in 1967-70, the polarisation in the
party had extended to the forging of alliances within the Army perhaps as
early as 1981.
Obote's authority was also further undermined by the start of a
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guerrilla war against it by Museveni and his NRM/A and other armed
groups (see below). The importance of the NRM resistance went beyond
distracting the attention of the government and the Army. The fighting
and Obote's preferred solution of defeating his opponents militarily rather
than reaching a political solution with them created frictions between
him and some of his supporters, particularly Paulo Muwanga. Muwanga's
dilemma was that the Lowero Triangle, where most of the war was
fought, was in Buganda, and as a Baganda himself it became difficult for
him to support Obote's "scorched earth" method of winning the war,
which involved indiscriminate destruction to cut off the guerrillas from
their base of support. Frictions therefore developed between the two
men early in the administration. By the middle of 1981, Muwanga had
started private consultations with the NRM, which drew them further
still. (ACR, 1985-1986:B466; ARB June 1981:6089; NA March 1985:12;
September 9185:14).
The policy to pursue a military rather than political solution to the
guerrilla warfare of the NRM became a factor in Obote's eventual fall.
The operations in Luwero was only the best known of many military
operations against rebels undertaken by Obote's government from 1980.
Of a shorter duration but no less intense was the devastation of districts in
the West Nile region in 1980-1981. The rebel groups in West Nile included
the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) led by Moses Ali, and Former
Uganda National Army (FUNA). Operations against these by the UNLA
reduced the whole region to rubble (Gingyera-Pinycwa 1991:44-64). The
result was that by 1985 nearly a million Ugandan were in exile in the
surrounding countries. Sudan and Zaire alone had between them about
half a million refugees. (Pirouet 1988:249-50; Flarrell-Bond 1986).
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Therefore, by the end of 1984 international support for the regime
had waned, and the popularity of the NRM/A had increased both at
home and abroad. A critical report by Amnesty International in 1985,
entitled Uganda: Six Years After Amin (Amnesty International 1985),
exposed the poor human rights record of the regime. The US State
Department described the situation in the "Luwero Triangle" as
'horrendous' and stated that from the time Obote took power in 1980,
between 200,000 and 300,000 civilians had died at the hands of the soldiers
(Pirouet 1988:249). Dropped by his international allies and threatened at
home, Obote was isolated. The disintegration of the UNLA had also
deteriorated by this time: it was no longer an effective fighting force and
divided into Acoli and Langi factions.
Oyite-Ojok's death in a plane crash 2 on 3 December 1983 threw the
unease Acoli-Langi alliance that held the UNLA together into confusion.
There was a widespread belief that the 'natural' candidate for the post of
chief of staff was Brigadier Bazilio Okello, the second most senior Acoli
officer in the Army after Tito Okello, the Commander, and was at that
time the Commander of the Northern Brigade based at Gulu. But as
already suggested, Bazilio Okello was, or was suspected of being, on the
side of Paulo Muwanga. Besides Bazilio Okello and Obote had for a long
disliked each other both politically and personally. (Omara-Otunnu
(1987:160). So Obote appointed Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier)
Smith Opon-Acak, a fellow Langi, as Chief of Staff.
The appointment of Lt. Opon-Acak was not therefore purely or
2Officially, according to Radio Uganda on 4 December 1983, Oyite-Ojok died in a
helicopter crash (ARB December 1-30, 1984). Mutibwa (1992) has however forcefully
stated that it was the NRA that shot down the helicopter. An 'insider's' account by a
former intelligence officer in Obote's version of Amin's SRB, the National Security Agency
( NASA), suggests that the NASA, with or without Obote's knowledge, arranged the fatal
crash. (NA February, 1986:16). Also compare NA, February, 1984, pp. 32-3, and Omara-
Otunnu (1987:160).
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mainly for ethnic reasons, as has been suggested (for example, in
Mutibwa 1992:162-3). It is more likely that Obote wished to have someone
he could easily control at the head of the army. As we have just seen, the
two Okellos and Muwanga were in favour of finding a peaceful, as
opposed to military, solution to the conflict with the NRM/A. It was
Oyite-Ojok and Obote who had favoured and pursued a military solution.
The more likely reason the selection of Opon-Acak was Obote's belief
that as a relatively unpoliticised officer Opon-Acak would be more
amenable to his presidential wishes. Another advantage was that
Obote's opponents were unlikely to find Brigadier Opon-Acak a useful
ally.
But the "rebuff" of Bazilio Okello increased tensions between the
Langi and Acoli in the armed forces. Obote's overthrow in fact started as a
factional fighting between Acoli and Langi troops within the UNLA (NA
September 1985:14; Omara-Otunnu 1987:162-3). The outcome of this
tension was that a year later, in July 1985, Bazilio Okello and General Tito
Okello revolted and overthrew Obote for the second time and installed a
Military Council with General Tito Okello as Head of State.
The success of the Okello coup demonstrated Obote's loss of
control. That a coup was imminent became known almost one month
before it actually took place but Obote was unable to prevent it. Bazilio
Okello started preparations for the coup at the beginning of July at Gulu.
When Obote learnt of it all he could do was to announce Bazilio Okello's
dismissal on radio; and was unable to enforce the order when it was
ignored. (Omara-Otunnu 1987:164-5). Also unlike most coups the Okello
coup started some 400 miles away from the centre of power and took a
whole three days to arrive in the capital, meeting no resistance. In fact
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according to an "eyewitness" account Obote and Opon-Acak were
deserted even by their bodyguards and escaped to Kenya disguised as
traders on a lorry carrying sacks of coffee. (New African November 1985,
p. 6).
Tito Okello's administration, which ruled Uganda from July 1985 to
January 1986, was known as the Military Council. It was a brief
administration and largely uneventful in terms of political development.
It was bogged down even before it set up a government by the continuing
resistance of the NRM/A. Apart from its attempt to incorporate Moses
Ali's UNRE and the FUNA forces from the north, it did little that it could
be remembered by. Its only "achievement" was the signing of the Nairobi
Peace Accord on 17 December 1985 with the NRM/A and other smaller
opposition organisations that had been fighting Obote's government in
various parts of the country. Under the accord Museveni was to have
become Vice-Chairman of the Military Council and a new national army
was to consist predominantly with members of the UNLA and NRA. But
the accord was never implemented, with the result that the NRM/A
overthrew the Military Council in January 1986. (See the reproduction of
the full text of the Nairobi Accord in Omara-Otunnu 1978:168-203,
Appendix C).
An Assessment of the NRM/A Administration, 1986-1990
Museveni's rejection of the terms of the Nairobi Peace Accord may be
seen, in retrospect, as the turning point in Uganda's politics, because apart
from containing factional struggles, it provided a basis for the
institutionalisation of clientelism, if not a chance for the evolution of a
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real political institution. If the accord had been implemented, it would
have meant the the absorption of the NRM into the vicious circle and a
continuation of the old struggles. The NRM/A triumph in January 1986
was unlike all the other previous changes of government, in that its
seizure of power was not just another episode within the existing spoils
politics. The Okello coup of July 1985 can hardly be described as a change
of government because apart from Obote's removal from power, nothing
else changed by way of policy or the effectiveness of administration.
January 1971 and July 1985 were therefore mere episodes in the
progression of spoils politics.
Even if, as some have argued, the NRM itself was motivated by
factional interests (Omara-Otunnu 1992:448-452; 1987:175-181), its
administration since seizing power has tended to undermine rather than
encourage factionalism of the kind and on the scale Uganda had seen after
independence. If the NRM is seen as Museveni's faction, it has
nevertheless demonstrated a capacity to assimilate other factions in a way
previous administrations failed to do.
Also since coming to power the NRM has developed a new
approach to politics by introducing a new method of administration. As
soon as it took power in 1986 it introduced new structures with the aim,
among others, to 'encourage participatory democracy' by incorporating
everyone the political process. Museveni's regime can be compared to
that of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana since 1982, and Thomas Sankara in
Burkina Faso (until his death in 1989): all of them made sharp breaks
with long periods of spoils politics. Resistance Councils and Resistance
Committees have been established at every level from the village to
Parliament. (NRM 1990; Nsibambi 1991:279-269; Smith 1993:18-39;
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Mudoola 1991:230-246; Kasfir 1991:247-278). Resistance Councils act as the
legislature and Resistance Committees as the executive. At the village
level, called Resistance Council I, all persons aged 18 and above are
members of the council, who elect the Resistance Committee, who hold
office for two years. Village Resistance Committees then constitute the
next (parish) Resistance Council, whose Committee in turn constitute the
next, and so on. (NRM 1990:1-3). The whole system of government is
therefore structurally tied together. Perhaps of far more importance in
discouraging spoils politics or factionalism is the fact that the office¬
bearers are elected directly by the people who know them well, not
appointed by the president or any district notable.
Also the danger of disruption at any of the various levels is
undermined, or can be immediately prevented since Museveni and the
National Resistance Council (NRC) have remained supreme and hold
ultimate power of sanction. As Mudoola (1991:234) has observed, 'in
establishing the Resistance Councils, the NRM has made it quite clear
where sovereignty lay.' Whether or not the institution that would
eventually evolve under such a system will be democratic or not is
another matter (for which see Kasfir 1991:247-278).
The controlled introduction of popular participation in the political
process by the population is a beginning of gradual institutionalisation. It
would be accurate to say that it has also lifted the country out of chaos
into a form of clientelist politics in transition. There is a good chance that
at least clientelism would evolve, even if it does not lead to
institutionalised form of politics. In the first place, the NRM/A has made
and enforced certain changes which encourage orderliness and therefore
slow evolution of the political process. The ban on political party
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activities immediately after it took power has been a positive
development towards institutionalisation because it discourages overt
factionalism, and should have a cooling effect on the country's
overheated political climate. The ban has discouraged, or at the very
least did not encourage, factional conflicts in the same way as happened
under the old orders. The introduction of periodic elections to the NRC
as well as the lower tiers of RCs system also has encouraged participation
in politics by the population. Unlike in the 1980 elections run by the
Military Commission, elections under the NRM seem to have been fair
and free (apart from the banning of political party activity), and elections
have become an integral part of the process of institutionalisation. In
commenting on the people's attitude to their role in these elections Kasfir
(1991:258) found that after the 1989 election there was a 'widely held
belief that voters had a significant impact in the function of the new
assemblies.' (See also Mudoola 1991; Smith 1993).
The absorption of selected opposition groups within the NRM has
not weakened its authority or that of Museveni personally. Museveni
does not owe his position to them either collectively or individually, and
none of them is the equal of the NRM/A: they joined on the NRM's
terms rather than through negotiated compromises. Technically his
authority is unchallenged and he could do whatever he wishes with any
of the factions the NRM/A has since assimilated. Although this
constitutes a danger of dictatorship, it also provides chances for the
evolution of clientelism, since political power is centralised and
controlled, and not open to competition.
If Museveni's motives remain patriotic rather than personal, he
has it within his power to develop a non-personalised institution,
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although the dangers of dictatorship or even factionalism that might
undermine the system remain. As a Ugandan who has observed the
system throughout has observed, stability or instability depends on
whether 'the right buttons or the wrong buttons are pushed' by
Museveni (personal information).
Whether Museveni would use his positions to successfully
establish and manage a clientelist system as Kenyatta did from 1963, or
whether he would, as it seems so far, use his position to nurture the
evolution of a political institution to which all political players would
become accountable, remains to be seen. The chances for both clientelism
through the series of Resistance Committees (RCs) from the village level
up to parliament, are good. Much depends on unforeseen
developments, and there are at least three, which if fulfilled would result
in institutionalised politics.
The first is if no credible leadership challenge is mounted against
him. Any such challenge would inevitably make him feel threatened and
force him to care more about his personal position than the political
development. The result would be a gradual or rapid degeneration of
clientelism into spoils politics. Secondly, it depends on his willingness
and capacity to disassociate the NRM from the NRA. Their association is
so close that the NRA to date appears to be a personal army. This creates
fear and mistrust on the part of the others and encourages arrogance on
the part of Museveni. If he is willing and able to turn the NRA into a
truly national army, under a new name if possible, then the chances for
the evolution of a political institution will be increased. The third is
Museveni's willingness to freely submit himself to on open, fair and free
election, and his capacity to respect the results if he should lose. So far all
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the elections have been for parliament without himself standing or being
contested against.
KENYA:
Developments From 1988 and After
The demotion of Mwai Kibaki and therefore, in Moi's view, the removal
of a potential challenge to his position in the short term, did not mean a
consolidation of the presidential hold on power. Kibaki had been the last
notable Kikuyu representative in Moi's government, and his removal
broke the delicate balance of forces that had held politics together in the
country. His removal heralded the technical end of the old clientelism
and the beginning of a potential new and more uncertain one centred on
the Rift Valley Province with the Western Province, represented by Elijah
Mwangele, as the principal ally. But the danger was that Moi had, in the
process of establishing this new alliance, given too much power to his
allies: subsequently he became more and more in their control rather
than the other way round.
The demotion of Mwai Kibaki after the 1988 elections was
primarily the result of personal power struggle between him and Foreign
Minister Elijah Mwangele. Mwangele made no secret of his schemes
against Kibaki and had 'at one time declared his ambitions to become
Vice-President' himself. (ACR 1985-1986:B328). Moi condoned and
supported Mwangele against Kibaki, it has been suggested, because he had
grown suspicious of Kibaki in part because Kibaki had 'remained
politically aloof and was less than zealous in condemning government
critics' (Malinda 1992:189). It is also said that Moi also feared that 'with
Njonjo out of the picture' the Kikuyu might turn to Kibaki as their leader
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and thus sought to divide the Kikuyu in order to rule them' (Widner
(1992:148). However, it is more correct to see Kibaki's fall as a part of
Moi's inability to control his new allies than a result of his personal fear
of Kibaki. Personal fear on the part of Moi was more real in the fall of
Njonjo than in that of Kibaki. The Kikuyu themselves opposed Kibaki
even in his own district of Nyeri because he had had failed to "protect"
or promote their interests within the regime. (ACR 1987-1988:B315). The
campaign against Kibaki was also helped by the active participation of
prominent Kikuyu opposed to him.
The campaign took the form of sponsoring the rise of other
leaders in Nyeri District, Kibaki's political stronghold. The two men
chosen were Kariuki Chotera, a former Mau Mau leader and chairman of
the Nakuru branch of KANU, and Ngumbu Njururi, the MP for
Karatina town in Nyeri district (Throup 1978:54-55; Widner 1992:149; WR
8 March 1985:6-7). From February 1985 there started what has been called
"political tourism" in Nyeri: Kibaki's opponents from Nairobi attended
self-help projects in his constituency in his absence and without his
approval or knowledge. The affair led to a period of public quarrel
between Kibaki and Mwangele and the Kikuyu politicians being groomed
as alternative leaders in Nyeri. At one point Mwangele warned Kibaki
that 'none of us is indispensable'; but Kibaki's attempts to protest his
loyalty to Moi passed unheeded by the President. 'The strange aspect of
this seemingly innocuous affair was that Moi failed at any point to say
publicly where he stood in the controversy, or to damp down the conflict,
let alone to express his confidence in his Vice-President' (ACR 1985-
1986:B328; ACR 1986-1987:B324).
After the elections of March 1988, Kibaki lost his position as Vice-
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President, was replaced by Josephat Karanja, then the Vice-Chancellor of
Nairobi University. But Karanja himself lasted in the post for only one
year. In May 1989 he was dismissed and replaced by George Saitoti, the
Minister of Finance.
This loss of control was also manifested, between 1988 and 1990, in
increased corruption among the ministers Moi relied on, as well as in
continued and increased repression by both the security services and
KANU. KANU in fact became an unofficial alternative police force
specifically to defend the regime's interests. According to Widner (1992)
'KANU's police functions expanded ... as early as 1987 [when it was]
announced that the police would receive assistance from members of the
party.' Subsequently, the activities of the youth wingers expanded to
searches in the houses of suspects and monitoring 'public places, such as
bars, hotels and restaurants ( p. 170).
The repression in turn encouraged a corresponding hardening of
attitude towards the government by its critics and opponents. Prominent
church leaders also joined in the criticism of the government, and
eventually became the regime's chief critics. The suppression of
legitimate opposition had meant that only the Church was left in a
position to protest against the social ills that had resulted. (W R 10 May
1991:8-9; 27 September 1991:11-15; 8 May 1992: 20-22; Lonsdale and Kihoro
1992; Widner 1992:190-5).
Towards the 1992 Elections
It was against this background that the call for multipartyism and the
elections of December 1992 took place. But the road to the elections was a
276
bloody one, leaving behind a series of political victims. The causalities
included Bishop Alexander Muge, of the Church of the Province of
Kenya, Robert Ouko, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, killed in February
1990, and between 1,500 and 2,000 ordinary people killed and over 300,000
made homeless in ethnic clashes in the Rift valley Province from the
end of 1991 onwards. (Africa Watch 1993; Flolmquist and Ford 1992:102-3;
W R 10 May 1991:11-14; 5 June 1992:21-2; 22 May 1992:18-9; 8 May 1992:15-
24, and many other issues).
Bishop Muge was the first prominent figure to openly declare his
opposition to the policies of the regime, and subsequently became its
harshest critic. Already by 1988 he was a marked man because of his
criticism of the regime's human rights record. When he was warned by
Justus ole Tipis, Minister of Internal Affairs, Bishop Muge said that he
would continue speaking out against human rights abuses because in
Kenya only he could 'say things that other people do not want to say
because they will get into trouble with the politicians' if they did so (ACR
1988-1989:B234-5: Widner 1992:190). So when he was killed in a
suspicious motor-car accident on the highways of Kenya, many felt that
the government had a hand in his death (Lonsdale 1992).
Robert Ouko was killed February 1990, but his death cannot be seem
merely as an attempt by the government to silence a critic, in the same
way as that of Bishop Muge. Ouko was more than a critic. He was a real
threat, not necessarily because he might have had his eyes on the
presidency: it was his anti-corruption drive that made him a threat
especially to Nicholas Biwott, then Minister of Energy and Industry, who
was eventually implicated in the murder in an inquiry conducted by
officers of Scotland Yard (W R 10 May 1991:12-14; 27 September 1991:15-6;
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Malinda 1992:189-193;Widner 1992:193-6). In addition to demonstrating
the extent of corruption in Moi's regime and the lengths those involved
were prepared to go in order to "protect" the practice, Ouko's murder also
illustrated the weakness of Moi within his new alliance. Although no
specific reason has been proved for Ouko's murder, the inquiry by
Scotland Yard have suggested two reasons that overlap: there was a
personal disagreement over foreign business contracts between Ouko and
Biwott, and Ouko was about to submit a 'detailed report for the President
in connection with corruption in which ... Biwott was the principal
[culprit]' (Malinda 1992:191). Yet Moi felt unable to act against Biwott for
quite a long time, and jailed him only briefly after mounting pressure
following the Scotland Yard inquiry. As Holmquist and Ford (1992:99)
have pointed out, this was probably because 'Biwott [held] incriminating
evidence over the President's head and Moi [could not] afford to alienate
him.'
Ouko's death also led directly to the introduction of multiparty
politics at the end of 1991. At first the government put out the idea that
Ouko had committed suicide (without explaining how a dead person
could set fire to himself). After this was discounted (W R 27 September
1991:15), it it was unwilling or unable to punish the principal culprit.
Multipartyism and the 1992 Elections in Perspective
The introduction of multipartyism in November 1991 and the
competitive general elections in December 1992 were neither sudden nor
dramatic as they may appear. (Holmquist and Ford 1992:97-111; Malinda
1992:188-192; Holmquist, Weaver and Ford 1994:69-105; Africa Watch
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1993).
Holmquist, Weaver and Ford (1994:100-102) have concluded that
the introduction of multipartyism in Kenya has been in response to
democratic forces and therefore represented a victory and hope for
democracy not only in Kenya but in Africa as a whole. 'Whatever [would
be] the course of democratic transition efforts, it is clear that popular
protest under the banner of democracy changed the fundamental ... forms
of rule in Africa' (p. 100). This assessment tends to both be too
optimistic about the chances of democracy in Africa and give too much
credit for the changes in Kenya to the "democratic forces". The change in
Kenya was mainly in response to the crisis that had developed in the
political system, and not necessarily to a wish or desire for democracy on
the part of both the government and its critics. External pressure,
particularly the threat to cut off aid by the leading donor countries like
the United States, has also played a role in in forcing Moi to accept
multipartyism. Kihoro (1992) in fact sees this as the most important single
factor. But it is important to consider the roles of these factors alongside
the threat posed by the disintegration of the "Nyayo" alliance, and Moi's
need to "clean up" the political scene. In any case Moi agreed to the
elections firstly to ward off criticism, ensure the continued flow of aid
and consolidate his hold, rather than in order to promote democracy.
Democracy, like socialism and capitalism, were merely adopted as
rhetorical ideologies in the factional struggles, particularly by those who
controlled the leadership of FORD. As we will see in a moment, the
conduct of the government and opposition leaders during the campaign
(such as the pursuit of personal interests that led to the break up of the
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) coalition and the
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government ethnic cleansing tactics that left thousands dead) did not
advance the cause of democracy; and multipartyism has left Kenya no
more democratic than it was before.
The establishment of controlled dictatorship in the late 1980s and
the introduction of pluralism have been an integral - and in this case
chronological - part of the disintegration of the clientelist system. In
short, the introduction of multipartyism and the elections were a
particular response to this crisis, and differed from other responses in
scale and magnitude: though its scale and magnitude themselves reflected
the scale and magnitude of the crisis. Since coming to power in 1978, Moi
had as we have seen depended on regular shake ups of the system to give
him "a new mandate" or a breathing space. These changes reflected his
need to regularly reaffirm his relationships with the allies of the time. In
1991-2, owing to the extent of the "sickness" of the system, an all-shake up
was necessary, hence multipartyism and the elections. It can indeed be
compared to the snap general elections of September 1983 in that both
were forced on Moi by a threat to his position. In 1983 it was Njonjo's
ambitions, or the fear of it. But in general it was in response to two
developments that threatened to engulf him. Moi's willingness to submit
himself to an election was also encouraged by the divisions among the
opposition groups. In addition to making him confident of victory, it
provided an opportunity to reunite the Kalenjin behind him, forge new
alliances by incorporating selected politicians and silence his critics for a
while.
By the end of 1991 Moi had run out of ideas or options for survival,
as reflected in some of the more desperate measures he and his allies
adopted to retain power. And these were not merely the deploying of
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KANU youth militants as an alternative police force discussed above, but
more sinister measures. In 1991, for example, the chairman of the Nakuru
branch of KANU recommended 'government supporters to visit beer
halls and cut off the fingers of those who made the two-finger multiparty
salute' (Makinda 1992:191). But the tactics failed to silence the critics,
though they succeeded in inciting violence on a massive scale in support
of the status quo.
Thus, Moi survived the elections and remained president mainly
due to the lack of unity (therefore, by extension, the strength of
factionalism) among the opposition parties. The FORD opposition
coalition hopelessly disintegrated when the elections were promised. The
problem was that despite their opposition to Moi and KANU, FORD was
made up of those notables who had over the years fallen out with the
Moi/Kenyatta regime. When the coalition was formed, Oginga Odinga
was elected its chairman (through not the candidate for president. This
post was left vacant). Other officers include Masinde Muliro (Luhya, as
Vice Chairman); Martin Shikuku (Luhya, Secretary General); and the
Kikuyu politicians Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba. Had they been able
to stand together they would have presented a formidable opposition to
KANU, but the regional/ethnic divide of Kenya made this impossible.
FORD can in fact be likened to UNLF in Uganda: like UNLF the notables
and factions who made it up 'had nothing n common apart from their
opposition to Moi.' There was also the Democratic Party (DP) of Mwai
Kibaki. The formation of DP ruled out even a united Kikuyu opposition
to Moi, which might have been capable of dislodging him. (W R 3 July,
1992:3-9; 8 May 1992:4-14; Holmquist and Ford 1922:106-7; Malinda
1992:191-2). In an important way, Moi's agreement to allow the elections
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and multipartyism was influenced and perhaps made possible only by the
knowledge that he would not face any serious united opposition.
Before the elections FORD in fact broke up in factions, two of which
became known as FORD-A (FORD-Asili) and FORD-K (FORD-Kenya), led
respectively by Kenneth Matiba and Oginga Odinga. The whole electoral
process therefore was primarily power play and had little to do with
democratisation. The election rules were likewise designed with the
divisions in the opposition camp in mind and to ensure that only Moi
could have won. The rules stated that the president was to be directly
elected by the voters and not by delegates of the parties (who could be
bribed due to their limited numbers). To be elected president, a candidate
had to win at least 25 per cent of the popular vote in at least five of the
country's eight provinces. (W R 3 July, 1992, p. 6; 5 June 1992, pp. 16-8).
None of the FORD candidates and even Kibaki of the DP, since they were
all district or provincial notables, could have expected to win 25 per cent
in five provinces.
Besides, prior to the election itself, Moi and KANU engineered
"ethnic clashes" to ensure that the party retained power, with tragic
consequences. The so-called ethnic clashes started at the end of 1991, at
about the time Moi announced his willingness to allow multiparty
politics. His opposition to the introduction of pluralism had rested on the
argument that such a system encouraged ethnic clashes, and the ethnic
clashes turned out to be an attempt by Moi to 'fulfil his own prophesy in
his lifetime' (Lonsdale and Kihoro 1992:11). But the clashes had a
practical function far more relevant to the elections than fulfilling a
prophesy. The violence, Africa Watch (1993:12) has observed, was 'a
manifestation of the government's new method to maintain power' at all
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coats. In fact, Kalenjin politicians, before resorting to incite ethnic clashes,
had pressed for a return to majimboism so as to ensure their continued
hegemony in the Rift Valley, not caring that such a policy could lead to
the break up of the country as a whole. 'The most virulent proponents ...
of majimboism include[d] Vice-President George Saitoti; MP Nicholas
Biwott; Minister for Local Government William ole Ntimama, and MP
for Eldoret South, Joseph Misoi' (Africa Watch 1993:13). As noted, these
were Moi's new allies. The bishops of Kenya told Moi in a joint pastoral
letter in May 1992 about the need to act against these men and stop the
clashes. They told him that in Kenya 'every citizen has the right to live
in any part of Kenya and dwell in peace an security. [But at] present you
seem to be securing the interests of a small clique of a rich and powerful
men who are surviving at the cost of life, blood and misery of
thousands of small people' (WR 8 May, 1992, p. 21).
As far as the election was concerned, the purpose of inciting the
clashes was to clear constituencies of potential supporters for the
opposition parties. It therefore constituted a rigging of the elections on a
massive scale. The target of the attacks were predominately Kikuyus and
Luos living in the Rift Valley Province, and who were more likely to vote
for the opposition FORD-A, FORD-K or DP parties. Politicians hired,
trained, and even paid the attackers, who included men from the
country's security forces. According to the report of the Parliamentary
Select Committee set up to investigate the clashes in 1992, the attackers
'were paid sums ranging from Kshs. 500 [$6.50] for safe return from the
clash front; Kshs.1,000 to 2,000 [US$12.50 50 $25) for killing one person or
burning a grass-thatched house, and Kshs. 10,000 [US$125] per permanent
house burnt (Africa Watch 1992:30). This, combined with bribery of voters
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by Moi. Banks were set up to provide instant "loans" to to induce the poor
to vote for Moi. In some cases KANU officials actually voted on behalf of
some of the electorate in remote areas. According to the Guardian (30
December 1992, p. 7) at Ngong, 'a queue of 2,000 agitated and illiterate
voters had to state their intentions to officials in front of party leaders.
Poll officials then crossed the ballot papers on the voters' behalf' This was
real politics and it was how Moi survived and won the "democratic"
elections of December 1992.
Moi's strategy proved correct; he won 36 percent of the popular
votes to a combined count of 64 percent for his opponents, but took 100
seats in the 188-seat parliament, plus 12 additional seats that he
appointed. (Africa Watch 1993:9). This reflected in part the fact that in
most constituencies in the rift valley the ethnic cleansing programme had
scared opponents of KANU to vote for the opposition, and was partly
due to the fact that the opposition parties were urban-based and had no
organisation or influence in the far-flung and more sparsely populated
areas in the north, north-east and the Coast.
What the introduction of multipartyism has done is to provide
another chance for Moi to create a new clientelistic alliance incorporating
Kenya's various subnationalties, as Kenyatta did from 1963. Political
direction has since hovered between three possibilities: continuation of a
weakened clientelist system, its deteriorating into spoils politics and, less
likely, its evolution into an institutionalised system, especially since the
formal introduction of multi-party political system and the elections of
1993. The most likely outcome is that the clientelist system would
continue in its weakened form until at least the year 2000.
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CONCLUSION
The Role of Clientelism in Politics in Africa
This study has demonstrated that interpersonal power relations among the
leading politicians in Uganda and Kenya have been the most important
factor in the political development since independence. It has shown that
it was their quest for the control of the state that has provided the main
momentum behind political change. This quest for hegemony, as Chabal
(1992) calls it, has affected and to a great extent undermined the formal
institutions like the civil service, parliament and political party.
Constitutional changes have often been undertaken primarily for the
purpose of safeguarding the position of the leaders and not in order to
improve governance of the state for the greater good of society. Examples
are the imposition of the Republican Constitution of 1967 on Uganda by
Obote, Amin's numerous military decrees during the first years of his
regime (1971-1979), and constitutional amendments in Kenya n 1965-1969
as well as during much of Moi's early years in office.
In politics in Africa as a whole, personal power struggles have been
the dynamic force in political change because power is often pursued as an
end, and not for the betterment of society. This is true of the
overwhelming majority of African states, although the intensity of the
struggles and their outcome varies from one country to another, and from
time to time. The Sorry political states in which countries like Somalia,
Zaire, Liberia and Sierra Leone have found themselves in have been the
result of factionalism.
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Clientelism, as a system of rule, has been shown to have the capacity
to check factional struggles and provide a measure of stability in states
whose politics are dominated by factional struggles. This happens when
factional struggles are effectively controlled by a dominant leader, as
happened in Kenya under Kenyatta. But if factional struggles are not
controlled, spoils politics and instability are the inevitable outcomes, as in
Uganda. The experiences of Uganda and Kenya represent only two extreme
examples of the good and bad effects of interpersonal power struggles on
the stability or instability of the state.
The study has also shown that the application of clientelism as an
analytical concept in African politics has distinct advantages over the
earlier theories of modernisation and underdevelopment in that the
concept of clientelism enables us to systematically focus on personal
relations. The advantage of clientelism in the study of political change in
Africa is that it can account for the changes which the modernisation and
dependency theories have failed to explain in a satisfactory manner. The
focus on interpersonal power relations within the political systems also
avoids the contradictions between the predicted trends in Africa's political
development in the early 1960s and the actual experiences that it has had.
For example, a notion that Mobutu of Zaire has been committed to the
development of Zaire and the betterment of Zairean society as his political
objectives cannot be reconciled with the sorry state his country has been
in under his rule. (Young 1994; Chazan et al 1991:184-188). The experiences
of Liberia and Somalia likewise cannot be explained by saying that Charles
Taylor General Mohamed Farah Aidid have been motivated by the need
to develop their countries more than their personal interests. The same is
true of Sierra Leone, not only in recent years but since independence
(Clapham 1976) Since clientelism focuses on the way personal relations
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influenced political action, and how such relations are regulated, it is
likely to remain a useful paradigm for the proper understanding of Africa's
political development in the independence era.
The earlier theories of political change of the 1960s and 1970s -
modernisation, ideology, dependency and underdevelopment - are for this
reason in various degrees either irrelevant or inadequate for a
systematically consistent explanation of the political changes in the newly
independent states in Africa. Their inadequacy is that, as imported
theories, they obscure or deny altogether the influence of indigenous
political activities in shaping political change. (Keller 1991:50-53; Ndegwa
1992:42-45). The dependency and underdevelopment theory for example
can not explain why the once deposed Obote was able to come back to
power in 1980, only to be disposed again in 1985 and by the same army that
had fought on his side against Amin. Nor do they account for the different
experiences of countries under the same (dependency) conditions. For
instance why have there been so many coups in Uganda (in 1966, 1971,
1979, 1980 and 1985) but none in Kenya or Tanzania?
Clientelism as an Analytical Concept
The effective use of clientelism as an analytical concept depends on how it
is defined, and the society to which it is applied. In general the current use
of the concept faces two special difficulties. The first difficulty arises in
distinguishing between pre-and post-independence forms of clientelism,
and determining the relationships between the two in the independence
era. In Senegal, for example, the traditional forms of clientelism not only
survived in the independence era, but has tended to dominate the
'modern' forms of clientelism (O'Brien 1975). It is therefore not easy to
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distinguish where anthropological clientages ended and where modern
political clientelism started. This is one of the issues that presents special
difficulties in the analytical application of the concept.
The second difficulty is the relationship between clientelism and
ethnicity, which often overlap. For while ethnicity provides the 'natural'
domain for the forging of clientelist relations because members of the
same ethnic group already have a group identity and real or assumed
group interest it does not by itself provide a secure basis for clientelism n
the long run. Clientelism thrives on the satisfaction of the interests of
those constituting the relationship, and not on ascriptive group identify.
Since t is normal for members of individuals belonging to the same ethnic
group to have different and conflicting interests, the pursuit of these
interests weakens ethnic solidarity and sometimes renders ethnicity
unreliable as a basis for clientelism. (Lemarchand 1972:83-90). Special care
is thus needed in explaining the apparently contradictory relationships
between Kenyatta and Charles Njonjo and Moi, which cannot be seen
entirely either in clientelistic or ethnic terms. A proper understanding of
these two set of overlapping relations is one area that needs separate and
urgent research. However, the difficulties do not undermine the analytical
qualities of clientelism, because this largely depends on how it is defined.
When it is 'precisely' defined to refer only to the interpersonal
relations of the master-servant type of the traditional, pre-independence
setting, clientelism as a theory has a limited applicability in understanding
national political changes in the independence era. But the extension of
this relationship to the national power structure through the local
patron's relations with other higher persons at the district, regional and
national level, necessitates the broadening of the concept to encompass
not only all the different levels of such relationships, but also the conflicts
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it inevitably produces, and the result of this conflicts on the political well-
being of the state. When defined in this broad way, clientelism can be
successfully applied to research and can provide a better understanding of
political changes.
Clientelism as a System of Rule
The effectiveness of clientelism as a method of rule depends on the
strength of clientelist ties within the ruling alliance, but in particular on
how the ties are managed. Centralisation or decentralisation of power thus
determines the strength or weakness of clientelist ties and, by projection,
the stability or instability of the state. Although he does not mention it,
Migdal (1988) is really talking about the capacity of clientelism to provide
and maintain state stability when he writes that
in societies with weak states a continuing environment of [factional]
conflict has dedicated a particular, pathological set of relationships
within the state organisation itself, between the top state leadership
and its agencies... [Ties which] ... in turn have shaped the very nature
of the insinuation of state institutions (p. 207).
The greater the degree of centralisation, or more precisely, the grip on
power by the president/patron, the easier it is to regulate the clientelistic
ties. Since the relationships can be effectively regulated from a strong
centre, a dominant person with unchallenged political authority is
indispensable to the viability of clientelism as a system of rule. The
successful regulation of interpersonal relations from the centre results in
the establishment of clientelism as a political machine which, for a given
period, performs the role of a conventional institution in its own right, as
happened in Kenya during the Kenyatta years (1963-1978).
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Senegal provides another African example of the resilience of the
clientelist system once it is firmly established. Since clientelism was
already well entrenched through the network of intricate saintly
relationships between religious leaders and the population in much of
Senegal before independence, President Leopold Senghor decided to relied
on these ties even through he was a Catholic and the ties were controlled
by Moslem Mourides. (O'Brien 1975; Fatton 1986). The Senegalese
experience is another example where the system dominates the leaders
rather than the other way round. For Senghor, like Moi from 1978, could
not have disregarded or dismantled the existing system without seriously
undermining his own position in power. The succession of Abdou Diouf
(a Muslim and therefore of the system) after Senghor reinforced the
relations between the state and the system rather than threatening it, to A
greater degree than Moi's succession did in Kenya in 1978.
As a political system clientelism has certain advantages. It was the
capacity to weaken ethnic alliances, and its orderly development can
provide an alternative basis of unity. This is because clientelist relations
are based on reciprocal interests, and not solely or mainly on ascriptive
factors like ethnicity. Its capacity to straddle ethnic and regional boundaries
reduces the dangers of ethnic associations. The efforts of the northern-
based National Party of Nigeria (NPN) to recruit leading politicians from
other regions of the country during the 1978 elections, for example, was a
clear attempt to expand the clientelistic base of the party and thus
strengthen it nationally (Joseph 1991:147-150). And in this the NPN was
partially successful, because it recruited Alex Ekwueme, a leading politician
from the east, who served as Vice-President in the government of
President Shehu Shagari (1979-1983). Moi also owed his succession to
clientelism rather than ethnicity, since he came from the Kalenjin ethnic
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group and Kenyatta's clientelism was based largely on the Kikuyu Purely
ethnic alliances as a basis of power leads to a hegemonic domination by the
most powerful ethnic group, a development which is potentially divisive.
For example, if Kenyatta had relied exclusively on ethnicity as the basis of
his power, he could have established a Kikuyu hegemony, but this would
have carried the dangers of more destabilisation and possibly civil war in
Kenya, as the experience of Nigeria in the mid 1960s has shown.
The major disadvantage of clientelism as a political system is that,
firstly, the interests of the alliance in power becomes more important than
that of the state as a whole. Clientelistic governments therefore encourage
maladministration. The second disadvantage is that the management of
clientelist relations diverts the scarce state resources to maintain the
system, leading to corruption and the emergence of a handful rich people
in a poor country. Weak leaders also become too dependent on their
"clients", and authoritarian measures to maintain the regime. This
happened during Moi's regime in Kenya from the mid-1980s. Despite its
disadvantages to the state of promoting personal interests rather than that
of the country as a whole, in the absence of viable institutions, clientelism
is a better alternative system of rule than continuous factionalism.
The successions of the late 1970s in Uganda and Kenya have
introduced new personalities on the political scene, and new alliances in
power. Clientelism, through somewhat modified, has not been eliminated.
At the present the future of political stability, either through
institutionalised politics or clientelism, looks better in Uganda than in
Kenya. The chances for Moi to forge a clientelist alliance under himself as
Kenyatta did from 1963 are remote. In the first place he does not have
Kenyatta's dominant authority and his years of repression has made him
very unpopular. In the second place his Kalenjin alliance is a minority
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alliance, and cannot pull the other ethnic groups as guests in the same way
as Kenyatta's Kikuyu alliance was able to do. Moreover, multiparty politics
provide other centres of power in the various other political parties and
KANU no longer enjoy a monopoly as the only avenue of advancement.
Power is likely to remain open for competition both amongst KANU
members and with the other political parties. Stability in Kenya will
therefore come only when the country evolves institutionalised politics
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